Can climate change negotiations succeed?

Politics and Governance

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 138-150

  Hovi, Jon ^a,b   Skodvin, Tora ^a   Aakre, Stine ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Climate change negotiations; Compliance; Cooperation; Enforcement; Participation; Political feasibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 84896443691     PISSN: None     EISSN: 21832463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.12924/pag2013.01020138     Document Type: Article

References (71)

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