Family firms and internationalization-governance relationships: Evidence of secondary agency issues

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 606-616

  Singla, Chitra ^a   Veliyath, Rajaram ^b   George, Rejie ^c  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT   (India)

^b KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT BANGALORE   (India)

Author keywords

blockholders; family business firms; governance mechanisms; India; internationalization; secondary agency problems

Indexed keywords

MANAGEMENT; PLANNING;

AGENCY PROBLEMS; BLOCKHOLDERS; FAMILY BUSINESS; GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS; INDIA; INTERNATIONALIZATION;

INDUSTRY;

EID: 84895927245     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2111     Document Type: Review

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