Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Susceptibility to the Conjunction Fallacy

Applied Cognitive Psychology

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 238-248

  Brotherton, Robert ^a   French, Christopher C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; AGED; ARTICLE; CONJUNCTION FALLACY; CONSPIRACY THEORY; FEMALE; HEALTH BELIEF; HUMAN; MALE; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MEDICAL RESEARCH; MIDDLE AGED; PRIORITY JOURNAL; QUESTIONNAIRE; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84895521053     PISSN: 08884080     EISSN: 10990720     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/acp.2995     Document Type: Article

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