Hindsight bias, Conjunctive explanations and causal attribution

Social Cognition

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 482-493

  Nestler, Steffen ^a   Von Collani, Gernot ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61449209159     PISSN: 0278016X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1521/soco.2008.26.4.482     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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