Ruling but not governing: The military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey

Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-189

  Cook, Steven A ^a  

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References (440)

1. See Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Politics", Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (January 2004):139-158.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 4.
3. Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: The Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
4. David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 1;
5. Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000):251-267;
6. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms", Political Studies 54(1996):941.
7. George Tsebelis argues persuasively that institutions result from the conscious choice of individuals who determine that previous institutions did not serve their interests. See Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
8. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
9. Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981);
10. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England", Journal of Economic History 59, no. 4 (December 1989):803-832;
11. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
12. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms", Political Studies 54(1996):936-957.
13. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
14. Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 24;
15. Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 205.
16. See www.confinesociales.org/directorio.
17. Ellis Goldberg, "Why Isn't There More Democracy in the Middle East?" Contention 5, no. 2 (winter 1996):145.
18. Claude E. Welch Jr. "Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes, or Random Events", Armed Forces and Society 18, no. 3 (spring 1992):323;
19. see also Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996);
20. David R. Mares, ed., Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998);
21. Rebecca Schiff, "Concordance Theory: The Cases of India and Pakistan", in Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, ed. David R. Mares (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 27-44.
22. For a complete discussion of civil-military relations in several important Latin American countries, see J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
23. Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civil Control", Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (winter 1996):154.
24. Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).
25. The definitive work on the Muslim Brotherhood remains Richard P. Mitchell's The Society of Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
26. Also see Hadi Ragheb Awdah and Hasanayn Tawfik Ibrahim, The Muslim Brotherhood and Politics in Egypt (in Arabic) (Cairo: Mahroussa Center for Research, Training and Publishing, 1996);
27. Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt", International Journal of Middle East Studies 27(1995):321-339;
28. Raymond William Baker, "Afraid for Islam: Egypt's Muslim Centrists between Pharaohs and Fundamentalists", Daedalus (summer 1991):41-68;
29. Hasan Hanafi, "The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt", Arab Studies Quarterly 4, no. 1-2 (spring 1982):54-74.
30. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
31. See, for example, Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963);
32. Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization", in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 69-89;
33. and Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States", in ibid., 7-67.
34. S. E. Finer, writing in 1962, was more cautious than his colleagues about the role military forces could play in these critical areas. Finer cautioned that the military "lacked⋯ title to govern. " For his part, Samuel Huntington seemed to share Finer's apprehensions but nevertheless recognized that the military was superbly placed to provide for order and economic development. See S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962)
35. and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
36. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 87-102.
37. John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), xv.
38. Ümit Cizre Sakallioǧlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", Comparative Politics 29, no. 2 (January 1997):151-166.
39. Quandt states: "The army's motives in intervening are apparent on one level. They were protecting their institutional prerogatives, throwing over an unpopular president to survive. The senior officers were protecting a comfortable way of life as well, since many had gotten rich from power." He cautions against underestimating the officers' nationalist sentiment, which was also a primary factor in their decision to nullify the elections of 1991 and oust Chadli. See William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), 61.
40. See, for example, John Waterbury, "A Note on Egypt: 1973", American Universities Field Staff Report 18, no. 4;
41. William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (New York: Routledge, 1994);
42. Bradford L. Dillman, State and Private Sector in Algeria: The Politics of Rent-seeking and Failed Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).
43. Interview, Ankara, May 1, 2000.
44. Interview with U. S. government officials, Cairo, September 27, 1999;
45. see Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 104-118;
46. and Robert Springborg, "The President and the Field Marshal: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Today", Middle East Report (July-August 1987):5-16.
47. Interview with a former employee of the Central Auditing Organization, Cairo, January 12, 2000.
48. Interview with Egyptian military officers, Cairo, September 24, 2004.
49. Maghreb Confidentiel, October 16, 1997
50. cited in Bradford L. Dillman, State and Private Sector in Algeria: The Politics of Rent-seeking and Failed Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 95.
51. Dillman, State and Private Sector, 3.
52. "IMF Concludes 2004 Article IV Consultation with Algeria", Public Information Notice 5/10 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, January 28, 2005).
53. Gerassimos Karabelias sums up the relationship between the Turkish military and the economy well: "Their [the Turkish Armed Forces'] economic activities have assisted not only in increasing the degree of the political and financial autonomy of the officer corps from the civilian government but also in developing closer, direct ties between the military establishment and leading industrialists both in Turkey (e.g., Koç, Eczacibasi, and Sabanci Holdings) as well as abroad (e.g., American, German, French, Israeli and Russian military and high-tech companies)." See Gerassimos Karabelias, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95", Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 4 (October 1999):140-141.
54. Lale Sariibrahimoǧlu, "At the Crossroads", Jane's Defence Weekly 42, no. 21 (May 25, 2005):22-29.
55. Murat Aydin', '6th EU Adaptation Package Forwarded to Prime Ministry", Zaman, May 23, 2003, www.zaman.com/default.php?kn=2334.
56. See General Ahmed Fahkr, "Speculation about the Egyptian Military and Conflict Management: Strategic Goals of the Egyptian Armed Forces", (in Arabic), al-Gumhuriya, January 20, 1985;
57. interview with President Hosni Mubarak, al-Ahram, July 3, 1986 (Cairo: State Information Service);
58. General Ahmed Fahkr, "Hot Topic of the Summer: The Egyptian Military Budget", (in Arabic), al-Ahram, July 25, 1986.ff
59. Lahouari Addi, "Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony", Foreign Affairs 77, no. 4 (July-August 1998):49.
60. Yahia H. Zoubir, "Algerian-Moroccan Relations and their Impact on Maghribi Integration", Journal of North African Studies 5, no. 3 (autumn 2000):47.
61. "The Return of Uneasy Tranquility", Economist, March 11, 2000.
62. Interview with a former senior Turkish official, Ankara, June 6, 2000.
63. M. Hakan Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere", Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (fall 2000):36.
64. Interview with a retired Egyptian military officer, Cairo, November 8, 1999.
65. There is no database on the use of Supreme State Security Court (not to be confused with the State Security Court, which was abolished in 2003) and military tribunals to prosecute individuals advocating for political reform. Ye t there is no lack of evidence that this court has been systematically used against the regime's political opponents. The most well-known of these cases was the detention and trial of Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the staff of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies over their advocacy for clean elections and greater respect for human rights. The leader of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Hafez Abu Sadeh, went into exile in Paris for several years to avoid prosecution in the Supreme State Security Court. In 2002 alone, 300 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested and referred to this court, although most were released after varying periods of detention. However, in July of that year, a military tribunal handed down sentences ranging from three to five years for an additional 22 members of the Brotherhood who had been arrested in 2001. For a detailed discussion, see "Egypt: Country Report on Human Rights Practices-2002", www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18274.htm.
66. Recalling the period immediately following Algerian independence, one former Algerian officer stated: "Colonel Boumediène placed himself voluntarily behind Ahmed Ben Bella who was placed in the presidency, always guarding the means of real power [in Algeria], that is the Army." See General Yahya Rahal, History of Power-A Testimony (in French) (Algiers: Casbah Editions, 1997), 153-154.
67. Minister of Defense Khaled Nezzar indicated in the early 1990s that the Algerian military supported democracy as long as a "just mean" was established in the National Assembly (i.e. an arrangement in which no single party could wield significant power). Quoted in Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War", Middle East Journal 50, no. 1 (winter 1996):21.
68. Hugh Roberts, "From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition: The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian Islamism, 1979-1992", in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994):438.
69. Interview with a Turkish military officer, Washington, DC, March 5, 2002;
70. interview with a Turkish military officer, Ankara, July 5, 2000.
71. See, for example, address delivered by President Hosni Mubarak on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the 1952 Revolution, www.presidency.gov. eg/html/22-July2002 Speech.html;
72. Gamal Kamal, "Mubarak Visits the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Reads the Sura on the Spirits of Sadat and Abd al-Nasser; The President to Members of the Supreme Military Council 'Comprehensive Power' Requires a Powerful Armed Forces; Field Marshal Tantawi 'We Will Not Forget Our Role⋯ in Achieving the Victory' " (in Arabic), al-Gumhurriya, October 6, 1999;
73. "Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi in a Conversation on 'Good Morning Egypt'", (in Arabic), al-Gumhurriya, October 6, 1995;
74. "Our Policy is Maintenance of Military Strength, Protection of National Sovereignty, Preservation of Peace" (interview with Defense Minister Yusef Sabri Abu Talib, in Arabic), al-Ahram, October 5, 1989;
75. Abdelkader Yefsah, The Process of Legitimation of Military Power and the Construction of the State in Algeria (in French) (Paris: Éditions Anthropos, 1982), 106;
76. John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 206.
77. Quoted in I. William Zartman, "The Algerian Army in Politics", in Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib, ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1973), 217.
78. ŞDerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey", in Atatürk: The Founder of a Modern State, ed. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1981), 208.
79. Quoted in George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics, Part I", Middle East Journal 19, no. 1 (winter 1965):56, n. 4
80. and in Cengiz Çandar, "Redefining Turkey's Political Center", Journal of Democracy 10, no. 4 (October 1999):131.
81. General Kenan Evren in 12 September in Turkey: Before and After, prepared by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (Ankara: Ongun Kardesler Printing House, 1982), xi.
82. Interview with a Turkish military officer, Ankara, July 5, 2000;
83. interview with a Turkish military officer, Washington, DC, May 15, 2001.
84. Michael C. Hudson, for example, referred to Algeria's political system as "the most liberal" in the Arab world. Unfortunately for Hudson, this evaluation was published at the same moment Algeria's military establishment declared a state of siege and arrested the FIS leadership in response to the general strike of April-June 1991. See Michael C. Hudson, "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World", Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 (summer 1991):417.
85. See also, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Crises, Elites, and Democratization in the Arab World", Middle East Journal 47, no. 2 (spring 1993):292-306.
86. Le Monde, September 12, 1963
87. quoted in Abdelkader Yefsah, The Processes of Legitimation of the Pouvoir Militaire and the Construction of the State in Algeria (in French) (Paris: Éditions Anthropos, 1982), 117. A year before Boumédienne's statement, Ahmed Ben Bella made the following comments concerning the Algerian military: "It is necessary to work out its [the military's] reconversion, not because it constitutes a base for military dictatorship but because without the support of this mass of men we would be unable to construct the new Algeria. We have magnificent cadres, politically educated. The best of them should take their place in the party, for the future of the country is the party"
88. See Maria Antoinetta Macciocchi, "An Interview with Ben Bella", in Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib, ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1973), 124-127
89. reprinted from L'Unità, August 12, 1962.
90. William B. Quandt refers to the military establishment and related security services as "the real powers behind the president";
91. Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), 23.
92. John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 209.
93. Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987: Colonial Upheaval and Post-Independence Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 111;
94. Hugh Roberts', 'From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition: The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian Islamism, 1979-1992", in Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 437;
95. "Toward an Army of Tontons Macoutes" (interview with Abdelkader Yefsah, in French), Le Nouvel Observateur, January 19-25, 1995. It is important to note that by the mid-1970s, the Council of the Revolution comprised only nine members. In the decade after the 1965 coup, both Boumédienne's consolidation of power and the willingness of the officer corps to allow one of their own-particularly one with the president's charisma and stature-to manage the affairs of state resulted in an almost two-thirds reduction of the council.
96. Interview with Abderrezak Bouharra (in French), el-Watan, January 23, 2001.
97. Jean-Claude Vatin, "Religious Resistance and State Power in Algeria", in Islam and Power, ed. Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hilal Dessouki (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 119-157;
98. Ernest Gellner, "The Unknown Apollo of Biskra: The Social Base of Algerian Puritanism", Government and Opposition 9, no. 3 (summer 1974):277-310.
99. See also Lahouari Addi, Algeria and Democracy: Power and Political Crisis in Contemporary Algeria (in French) (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 1995), 27-33.
100. Chapter 1, Section 1, Enhanced National Charter of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (in Arabic), February 1986, in Official Gazette of the Republic of Algeria, 162.
101. Chapter 1, Section 2, Enhanced National Charter of the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic (in Arabic), February 1986, in Official Gazette of the Republic of Algeria, 162.
102. Political Institutions and Development in Algeria (in French) (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1988). Abdelkader Yefsah has described the officers' efforts to "give the impression of a civilian power";
103. The Processes of Legitimation, 107. Séverine Labat has characterized the Algerian political system as "dressed in the finery of democratization";
104. "Islamism and Islamists: The Emergence of New Types of Politico-Religious Militants", in Islamism and Secularism in North Africa, ed. John Ruedy (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 103-121.
105. interview with Abassi Madani, Horizons, January 14, 1990.
106. The text of Law 89-11 (in French) is reprinted in el-Moujahid, August 10, 1989
107. and Maghreb-Machrek 127 (January-March 1990):200-205.
108. Arun Kapil, "Liberalization and the Question of Democracy in Algeria, 1979-1992" (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 1999), 399.
109. Hugh Roberts, "The Struggle for Constitutional Rule in Algeria", Journal of Algerian Studies 3(1998):19-30;
110. Lahouari Addi, "Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony", Foreign Affairs 77, no. 4 (July-August 1998):44-53.
111. Anthony J. Pazzanita, "From Boumedienne to Benjedid: The Algerian Regime in Transition", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 15, no. 4 (summer 1992):65.
112. Roberts, "Struggle for Constitutional Rule", 24.
113. John Nellis indicates that regime legitimacy was an important factor in the development of the 1976 National Charter; see "The Algerian National Charter", 2.
114. Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 233.
115. see his "The Tragedy of Democracy without Democrats" (in French), Le Monde, April 13, 1994.
116. Yahia H. Zoubir, "Stalled Democratization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Algeria", Democratization 2, no. 2 (summer 1995):117. Zoubir also uses the term "democratic facade"
117. Quandt argues, for example, that Algeria's military remains so decisive because it is less divided than any other group in Algerian society; see Between Ballots and Bullets, 78.
118. Claire Spencer, "Algeria in Crisis", Survival 36, no. 2 (summer 1994):158.
119. Roberts "Struggle for Constitutional Rule", 25, 98;
120. I. William Zartman, "The Algerian Army in Politics", in Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib, ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1973), 212.
121. Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (New York: NYU Press, 1998);
122. Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War", Middle East Journal 50, no. 1 (winter 1996):18-39;
123. Hugh Roberts, "Doctrinaire Economic and Political Opportunism in the Strategy of Algerian Islamism", in Islamism and Secularism in North Africa, ed. John Ruedy (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 123-147;
124. Ahmed Rouadjia, "Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986-1992)", in The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: Ithaca Press, 1995), 69-103.
125. Chadli's reforms hardly resembled a radical alteration of Algeria's economy. Rather, the program left the state-owned sector largely intact. While providing more room in the economy for Algeria's small private sector, Chadli's goal was, in fact, to spur more nimble public industries. The unfortunate result of these policies was a liberalized economy, but one that lacked the institutions to underpin the effective functioning of a market. In such an environment, inefficiencies and distortions remained, rendering every step of the business process-planning, supply, investment, and even licensing-risky ventures. For a complete discussion, see Bradford L. Dillman, State and Private Sector in Algeria: The Politics of Rent-seeking and Failed Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).
126. Project of the Political Program of the Islamic Salvation Front (in French), Algiers, March 7, 1989.
127. See "Economic Axis", Project of the Political Program of the Islamic Salvation Front, 5.
128. "Economic Axis, Part IV-Finance", Project of the Political Program of the Islamic Salvation Front, 9.
129. Interview with Abassi Madani, Horizons, January 14, 1990.
130. "Platform of Political Demands of the FIS", reprinted in Mustafa al-Ahnaf et al., Algeria According to Its Islamists (in French) (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1991), 49-51.
131. Dirk Vandewalle, "Islam in Algeria: Religion, Culture, and Opposition in a Rentier State", in Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reforms? ed. John Esposito (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 35.
132. Pradeep K. Chhibber, "State Policy, Rent Seeking, and the Electoral Success of a Religious Party in Algeria", Journal of Politics 58, no. 1 (February 1996):137.
133. Dillman, State and Private Sector in Algeria, 75.
134. "Political Axis", Project of the Political Program of the Islamic Salvation Front, Part D, 4.
135. Platform of Political Demands of the FIS (in French), reprinted in al-Ahnaf et al., Algeria According to Its Islamists, 49-51.
136. Interview with Abassi Madani (in French), Jeune Afrique 1543 (July 25-August 1, 1990):3-6.
137. "Abassi Madani: Between Municipalities and Legislatures" (interview with Fatiha Akeb and Mohamed Balhi, in French), Algérie- Actualité 1298 (August 30-September 5, 1990):8-9.
138. Yahia H. Zoubir, "Algerian-Moroccan Relations and their Impact on Maghribi Integration", Journal of North African Studies 5, no. 3(autumn 2000): n. 18.
139. "The Army and the Political-Religious Current" (in French), Algérie-Revue de Presse 354-3(April 1991): n. p. In January 1986, the Central Directorate of the Political Commission of the ANP ended mass circulation of el-Djeich. When the officer corps wanted to inform the Algerian public and politicians of its thinking on important issues of the day, the contents of the magazine's editorials were reprinted in Algerian newspapers. The excerpts cited here were published in the April 4, 1991, edition of Horizons and in el-Moujahid on April 7 of the same year.
140. Quoted in Yahia H. Zoubir, "The Painful Transition from Authoritarianism in Algeria", Arab Studies Quarterly 15, no. 3 (summer 1993):98.
141. Jean-Claude Vatin has written: "The constitution of 1963, the Charte d'Alger in 1964 and the governments of 1963 and 1965 made clear that Islam would be preserved⋯ Reinforcing a young state was the only way to secure independence. Moreover, there was no other structure to answer the needs of development, to help solve the crisis of adaptation while preserving national unity at the same time." See Jean-Claude Vatin, "Religious Resistance and State Power in Algeria", in Islam and Power, ed. Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hilal Dessouki (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 140.
142. "Political Axis", Project of the Political Program of the Islamic Salvation Front, 3.
143. Platform of Political Demands of the FIS (in French), reprinted in al-Ahnaf et al., Algeria According to Its Islamists, 49-51.
144. Interview with Abassi Madani (in French), Jeune Afrique 1543 (July 25-August 1, 1990):4.
145. Bradford Dillman, "Parliamentary Elections and the Prospects for Political Pluralism in North Africa", Government and Opposition 35, no. 2 (spring 2000):227.
146. François Burgat reports, however, that the hydrocarbon industry was "hit by the full force of the strike and that the cost to the national economy had been quite high." See François Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa, 2nd ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 294-295.
147. Roberts, "From Radical Mission", 466-468.
148. "The Army and the Political-Religious Current" (in French), Algérie-Revue de Presse 354-3(April 1991): n. p.
149. Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 184 n. 60.
150. Vandewalle, "Islam in Algeria", 38.
151. Project of the Political Program of the Islamic Salvation Front, 2-3, 15. Ahmed Rouadjia makes a similar point concerning the Front's penchant for borrowing heavily the "nationalist phraseology" of the FLN.
152. See his "Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement", 69-103.
153. Abdelkader Yefsah has pointed out two factors that were critical to Algerian legitimacy: industrialization and nationalist authenticity. See Processes of Legitimation, 121.
154. "Sheikh Abassi Madani: No to the Application of Sharia, French Is as Useful as Arabic, the Arab Maghreb Union Is Multiple, but the Umma Is One" (interview with Abassi Madani, in French), Arabies, July 1990:20-22.
155. Interview with Abassi Madani by Fatiha Akeb and Mohamed Balhi (in French), Algérie-Actualité 1298 (August 30-September 5, 1990):8-9.
156. As part of its efforts to restore order during the October 1988 rioting, the military not only fired on demonstrators, killing anywhere from 150 to 500 Algerians, but also used a tactic associated with the French occupation: torture. According to François Burgat, the army's use of torture irrevocably tarnished the officers' nationalist credentials with the Algerian people. See Burgat and Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa, chap. 11.
157. For a complete discussion, see Lahouari Addi, Algeria and Democracy: Power and Political Crisis in Contemporary Algeria (in French) (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 1995):55-74.
158. Mahieddine Filali, "The National Liberation Army, From Formation to Organization" (in French), el-Djeich 270 (November 1985):16.
159. "The Army and the Political-Religious Current" (in French), Algérie-Revue de Presse 354-3(April 1991): n. p.
160. "Objective Number One: Protect Their Privileges" (interview with Abdelkader Yefsah, in French), Le Nouvel Observateur, January 19-25, 1995, 23.
161. See also Rémy Leveau, "Algeria between the Tank and the Minaret" (in French), Telerama, August 24, 1994;
162. Quandt, Between Bullets and Ballots, 61;
163. and Roberts, "From Radical Mission", 438.
164. Between Ballots and Bullets, 44.
165. Daniel Brumberg, "Islamists and Power Sharing: A Comparative Assessment of Middle East and Southeast Asian Cases", working paper, U. S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, summer 1998, 14. Chadli's opponents within the FLN were so dissatisfied with his economic reform program that this faction considered nominating another candidate for president.
166. Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 128-129.
167. Roberts, "From Radical Mission", 462.
168. To understand the way the military establishment viewed Chadli, Hamrouche, and their apparent relationship with the FIS, see "The Hamrouche-Chadli-FIS Connivance" (in French), chap. 8 of Memoirs of General Khaled Nezzar (Algiers: Chihab Editions, 2000).
169. Reported in The Guardian, December 16, 1991.
170. Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 238-239.
171. Abed Charef, Algeria: The Grand Skid (in French) (La Tour d'Aigues: Éditions de l'Aube, 1994), 236;
172. Nezzar, Memoirs, 235.
173. Nezzar, Memoirs, 236.
174. Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 238-239;
175. Hugh Roberts, "The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy", Government and Opposition 27, no. 4 (autumn 1992):441;
176. interview with an Algerian government official, Washington, DC, January 2, 2001;
177. interview with Yahia H. Zoubir, Orlando, FL, November 18, 2001.
178. Nezzar, Memoirs, 237.
179. This theme is also emphasized in Mohammed Muqadam, "Algeria: Coup Plotters Isolated after Retiring", (in Arabic), al-Hayat, August 24, 2001;
180. Yahia Rahal, A History of Power: A General's Testimony (in French), (Algiers: Casbah Editions, 1997);
181. Hamid Barrada, "The Striking Changes of Khaled Nezzar" (in French), Jeune Afrique 1858-1859 (August 14-27, 1996):26-29;
182. Omar Belhoucet, "Khaled Nezzar's Testimony" (in French), El Watan, May 15, 1996;
183. and Khaled Nezzar, "Duty and Truth" (in French), el-Watan May 15, 1996.
184. Nezzar, Memoirs, 240.
185. Though the Constitutional Council was formally an advisory body established under Section III (Audit/Control and Consultative Institutions), Algeria's judiciary, despite what the country's constitutions had declared, was not an independent branch of government. Lahouari Addi indicates that the judiciary, in its application of the law, fell well below international standards. See "From the Shadow of Terror the Army Seizes Power" (in French), Le Monde Diplomatique (February 1998):1, 16-17;
186. "Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony", Foreign Affairs (July/August 1998):44-53.
187. These included the following: "With respect to the dispositions of the present constitution, the political parties are not to be founded on a religious, linguistic, racial, gender, corporatist, or regional basis; political parties are prohibited from recourse to partisan propaganda bearing/carrying the mentioned elements in the above line; obedience to foreign interests or parties is proscribed; political parties are not to resort to violence or to coercion. " See the Constitution of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, November 28, 1996, www.al geria-watch.de/farticle/docu/constit.htm.
188. Human Rights Watch, Algeria's Human Rights Crisis 10, no. 2 (August 1998):15.
189. Mona Yacoubian, "Algeria's Struggle for Democracy", Occasional Paper no. 3, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1997.
190. Addi, "Algeria's Army", 50.
191. For the complete text of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, see www.elmouradia.dz/arabe/infos/actualite/actualite.htm
192. or www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/infos/ac tualite/algerieact.htm.
193. See, for example, Mark N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (London: Croom Helm, 1982)
194. and "The Demilitarization of the Egyptian Cabinet", International Journal of Middle East Studies 14(1982):203-225;
195. Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr., Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988);
196. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "The Formation of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat to Mubarak", in The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, ed. Ibrahim Oweiss (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 188-209;
197. Ibrahim A. Karawan, "Egypt", in The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 107-121;
198. Ali Dessouki and Gehad Audah, "Military and Development: The Dynamics of Role Change-the Case of Egypt", paper presented to the 14th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 28-September 1, 1988;
199. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971). This chapter does not take issue with the broad facts surrounding the events of the late 1960s and early 1970s as they relate to Egypt's military establishment. The officers did give up their role in the day-to-day governing of the country and as a result there was a concomitant reduction of officers in successive Egyptian cabinets. Analyses such as those cited above conspicuously give short shrift to factors that undermine the analytical connection between a reduction in raw numbers of officers involved in Egyptian politics and administration and compromised influence.
200. In contrast to Abdel-Malek or Perlmutter, I do not consider Egypt- or Algeria or Turkey-to be "military regimes" in which officers thoroughly penetrate the state apparatus at a variety of levels. Malek was writing during the first 15 years after the Free Officers' coup/revolution when this was, indeed, the case. Perlmutter, perhaps because he was convinced that Nasser and his collaborators had failed miserably in developing durable political institutions, did not recognize that the military could retain its significant influence in a setting that was something other than the "personalist and praetorian rule" he asserted. The Free Officers and their successors have been rather successful in developing an institutional setting in which the military continues to dominate but, with the exception of the president, does not govern. Thus, instead of an Egyptian military regime, it is more apt to refer to Egypt's military-dominated system. See Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1968)
201. and Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: The Praetorian State (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974).
202. P. J. Vatikiotis, "Some Political Consequences of the 1952 Revolution in Egypt", in Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt, ed. P. M. Holt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 369-370. This is by no means to suggest that Egypt's military establishment was united in its support for the Free Officers movement. Indeed, once it became clear that Nasser and his colleagues did not intend to hand the reins of government back to civilians, opposition to the Free Officers developed within the ranks of the officer corps. Most notably, General Mohamed Neguib, who had led the Free Officers at the time of the coup, opposed his erstwhile allies along with a number of other commanders who rallied around Neguib. After the Free Officers outmaneuvered Neguib in April 1954, his supporters were purged.
203. Joel Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1996):13.
204. Gamal Abdel Nasser quoted in Gehad Audah, "The State of Political Control: The Case of Nasser 1960-1967", Arab Journal of the Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (April 1987):98.
205. For a complete discussion, see Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society;
206. P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations? (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961);
207. Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-1984, 2nd ed. (Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1985);
208. P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 4th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991);
209. James Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
210. Vatikiotis, "Some Political Consequences", 368.
211. Salah Issa, Constitution in the Dustbin: A Tale of the 1954 Constitution (in Arabic), (Cairo: Cairo Center for the Study of Human Rights, 2001).
212. "March 30 Programme", in E. S. Farag (trans.), Nassar Speaks: Basic Documents (London: Morsett Press, 1972), 165-166.
213. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1980 (Cairo: State Information Service, May 1980). See also Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Non-constitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government (Albany: State University of New York, 2002), chap. 6.
214. Kirk J. Beattie, "Egypt: Thirty-five years of Praetorian Politics", in Military Disengagement from Politics, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos (London: Routledge, 1988), 218;
215. John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 383;
216. Shahrough Akhavi, "Egypt: Diffused Elite in a Bureaucratic Society", in Political Elites in Arab North Africa, ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Longman, 1982), 230.
217. These organizations were required to conduct their activities within the parameters of "democratic socialism, social peace and national unity." For a complete discussion, see Marat Terterov, "Lessons from Political Liberalization", Civil Society 5, no. 54 (June 1996):19.
218. For a complete discussion of Law 40/1977 and its implications for political participation, see Hassanein Tawfiq Ibrahim and Hadi Ragheb Audah, The Muslim Brotherhood and Politics in Egypt: A Study in the Electoral Alliances and Parliamentary Practices of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Framework of Limited Political Pluralism, 1984-1990 (in Arabic) (Cairo: Mahroussah Book, 1995), 40-44;
219. Eberhad Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 28-30.
220. Fauzi Najjar "Elections and Democracy in Egypt", American-Arab Affairs 29 (summer 1989):103-104.
221. "Egypt: Elections Concerns", News from Middle East Watch, November 15, 1990, 1;
222. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World", PS-Political Science and Politics 27, no. 3(1994):508;
223. Najjar, "Elections and Democracy", 97-98.
224. "Citizen's Rights and Democracy" (in Arabic), National Democratic Party Position Paper, September 2004, 16-18.
225. Gamal Essam El-Din, "A Controversial Law", al-Ahram Weekly, July 7-13, 2005.
226. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 98-102.
227. For the complete text of the Emergency Law, see Abd al-Moneim Husni, A Compendium of Egyptian Law and Statutes (in Arabic), vol. 6 (Giza: Merkaz Husni l-il-Dirasaat al-Qaanuniyah, 1987):292-306. Many of Egypt's most restrictive laws, including the Military Police Act; the Protection of the Internal Front and Social Peace or the "Law of Shame"; the NGOs Law of 1964 and its later incarnations; and the Law to Protect Democracy in the Syndicates, are based on, superseded by, or reinforced with the Emergency Law.
228. Appeals made to Egypt's Court of Cassation fall into two categories-review and cassation. Those appeals sustained based on review may result in invalidation of the verdict and acquittal or retrial. Appeals held on the cassation may only result in a retrial before a new threejudge panel of the Supreme State Security Court. If, however, a defendant is found guilty a second time and makes a second appeal to the Court of Cassation, that court is permitted to rule on the facts of the case. For a complete discussion see "The State of Egypt vs. Free Expression: The Ibn Khaldun Trial", Human Rights Watch, New York, January 2002.
229. www.ndp.org.eg/modifications/THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 76%20.htm.
230. See, for example, Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat;
231. Ahmed Abdalla, "The Armed Forces and Democratic Development in Egypt", in The Army and Democracy in Egypt (in Arabic), ed. Ahmed Abdalla (Cairo, Sinai Publishers, 1990);
232. Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988);
233. Maisa Gamel, The Political Elite in Egypt (Beirut: Center for the Study of Arab Unity, 1998).
234. Interviews with retired military officers, Cairo, November 8 and December 7, 1999;
235. interview with a retired military officer, Cairo, December 7, 1999.
236. Interview with retired Egyptian military officers, Cairo, October 8, 1999;
237. Interview with a retired Egyptian military officer, Cairo, January 18, 2000. In the immediate aftermath of Sadat's death, Dr. Sufi Abu Talib, the speaker of the People's Assembly, did assume the duties of the president for the remainder of October 6 until Mubarak was nominated president on October 7, but even as Abu Talib did so, Mubarak was preparing to assume the office.
238. Interviews with retired military officers, Cairo, November 22, 1999;
239. Interview with an Egyptian military officer, Washington, DC, April 26, 2005.
240. Both Ahmed Abdalla and Mona Makram Ebeid have made similar points with regard to the hegemony of the Egyptian executive in general. See, for example, Abdalla's monograph on Egypt's 1995 elections, Parliamentary Elections in Egypt: What Egypt⋯ What Parliament⋯ and Which Egypt? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Middle East Papers, 1995);
241. Mona Makram Ebeid, "Egypt's 1995 Elections: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?" Middle East Policy 4, no. 3 (March 1996):119-136.
242. Interview with a retired military officer, Cairo, January 22, 2000.
243. Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement, 48-49.
244. Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr., "The Formation of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat to Mubarak", in The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, ed. Ibrahim Oweiss (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 199.
245. See Michael Farhang, "Terrorism and Military Trials in Egypt: Presidential Decree No. 375 and the Consequences for Judicial Authority", Harvard International Law Journal 35 (winter 1994):225-237.
246. Though the High Constitutional Court refused to rule on the substance of Law 153/1999, the justices did indicate that several of the proposed statute's provisions were unconstitutional, forcing the government to modify the text. See "Stifling Civil Society in Egypt: Proposed New Law on Associations is a Step Back for Political Pluralism", Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, May 31, 2002, www.lchr.org/defender/middle east/egypt/laws/e laws main.htm.
247. For a discussion on the independence of Egypt's judicial branch, see Kienle, A Grand Delusion.
248. Gehad Audah, "The 'Normalization' of the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to the Early 1990s", in Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, vol. 4, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994):388.
249. Ibrahim A. Karawan, "Egypt", in The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 112.
250. Interview with retired Egyptian officers, Cairo, January 22, 24, 2000;
251. Abdalla, "Armed Forces and Democratic Development", 1464.
252. Ibrahim and Audah, The Muslim Brotherhood and Politics in Egypt, 68.
253. For a complete discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood's grievances during Sadat's tenure, see, for example, Mohamed Abd al-Quddus, "The Corrective Revolution that the People Want!!" (in Arabic), ad-Dawa (May 1978):52-53;
254. "The American Elections⋯ A Smack to Those Who Pride Themselves with False Election Results in the Arab-Islamic World" (in Arabic) al-Itisam, December 1980, 3;
255. Abd al-Moneim Said Aly and Manfred W. Wenner, "Modern Islamic Reform Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt", Middle East Journal 36, no. 3 (summer 1982):336-361;
256. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat", Arab Studies Quarterly 4, no. 1-2 (spring 1982):75-93;
257. Raymond W. Baker, "Afraid for Islam: Egypt's Muslim Centrists Between Pharaohs and Fundamentalists", Daedalus 10, no. 3 (summer 1991):41-68.
258. On the Brotherhood's repudiation of violence, see Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 59-65;
259. See Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 319-320.
260. Audah", 'Normalization' of the Islamic Movement", 375;
261. Jon B. Alterman, "Egypt: Stable, but for How Long?" Washington Quarterly 23, no. 4 (autumn 2000):111.
262. Gilles Kepel, "Islamists versus the State in Egypt and Algeria", Daedalus 124, no. 3 (summer 1995):109-127.
263. Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 21-22.
264. For a complete discussion of the Brotherhood's economic agenda in the period just before and after the Free Officers' coup, see Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 272-282.
265. This coalition began to crystallize even while ten members of the Brotherhood sat in the People's Assembly under the umbrella of the Hizb al-Wafd, as the Labor party was in many respects a more philosophically compatible partner for the Ikhwan. Al-Amal was founded in 1978 to play the role of Sadat's leftist opposition and although the party, under the leadership of Ibrahim Shukri, fulfilled this function for a time, al-Amal became a forceful critic of Sadat and the general direction of Egypt's domestic and foreign policies. Both Shukri and his outspoken lieutenant, Adel Hussein, had previously been firmly disposed toward Marxism and leftist critiques of Egyptian politics, but in the late 1970s and early 1980s they both underwent a conversion that placed them and elements within the party on the same political and cultural terrain as the Ikhwan. As a result, an important feature of the alliance was the transformation of Labor's newspaper, ash-Sha'ab, into a tribune of the Brotherhood. This is not to suggest that the publication solely reflected Brotherhood thinking, as leftist columnists and politicians continued to contribute. Yet, although in the course of establishing the alliance both the Ikhwan and al-Amal did make a number of compromises, the Brotherhood's penetration of both the party and its newspaper-particularly in the continuing absence of the Brotherhood's magazine ad-Dawa-at times rendered the two organizations indistinguishable. Indeed, a comparison of the founding principles of al-Amal, the organization's electoral program of 1984, and the platform of what came to be known as al-Tahaluf al-Islami (the Islamic Alliance) demonstrates the significant influence of the Ikhwan on the Labor Party. Ibrahim and Audah, The Muslim Brotherhood and Politics in Egypt, 310;
266. Bjorn Olav Utvik, "Filling the Vacant Throne of Nasser: The Economic Discourse of Egypt's Islamist Opposition", Middle East Insight (January-February 1995):27-28.
267. Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 104-118;
268. interview with U. S. government officials, Cairo, September 27, 1999;
269. interview with retired Egyptian military officers, Cairo, November 8, 22, 1999;
270. Interview with a former employee of Egypt's Ministry of Finance, Cairo, January 12, 2000. This retired official explained that a special unit within the Central Auditing Organization does review the military's budget and finances, but that its findings are released neither to other sections of that agency nor to the public.
271. Interview with a retired Egyptian military officer, Cairo, November 8, 1999;
272. Robert Springborg, "The President and the Field Marshal: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Today", Middle East Report 147 (July-August 1987):10;
273. For discussions of the military's activities related to national service see, for example, Ahmad Hamroush, "The Military in National Service" (in Arabic), Ruz al-Yusuf, May 14, 1999;
274. Ahmad Hamroush, "Question of the Hour: What Is the Army Doing in the Face of Terror?" (in Arabic), Ruz al-Yusuf, January 3, 1994;
275. "Field Marshal Abu Ghazala in the Conversation of the Week" (in Arabic), Al-Musawwar, May 13, 1988. Egypt's fiscal year 2000 request for U. S. military assistance makes the same argument, indicating that a continuation of U. S. aid is the fastest and most efficient means to achieving Egyptian "economic security" and "military self-sufficiency"
276. Interview with a retired Egyptian military officer, Cairo, November 9, 1999.
277. Interview with Egyptian military officials, Cairo, September 23, 2004.
278. Mohamed Abul-Nasr, "Valuable Freedom" (in Arabic), Liwa al-Islam, July 1990, 4-5.
279. Brotherhood spokesmen freely related that they sought to use the institutions of the Egyptian political system in an effort to ultimately alter those institutions. In February 1989, Maamoun Hudeibi stated, "I've said many times, we entered elections under the slogan 'Islam is the solution. ' How can it be that we participate in the existing system when we are trying to change it in the preferred manner-by changing institutions with institutions?" Quoted in Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 330.
280. Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Umar al-Talmasani, al-Majalla June 9-15, trans. by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 13, 1984, D2-3.
281. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 53-54.
282. Issam al-Arian, a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood has stated, for example, "The Brothers consider constitutional rule to be the closest to Islamic rule⋯ We are the first to call for and apply democracy." Cited in Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 48.
283. Texts and Analysis of the Statements of President Hosni Mubarak, President of the Republic to the People's Assembly (in Arabic) (Cairo: People's Assembly, 1999), 26.
284. Interview with a retired Egyptian military officer, Cairo, January 18, 2000.
285. Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 62.
286. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 388-389;
287. Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society, 41-42.
288. Quoted in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat", Arab Studies Quarterly 4 no. 1-2 (spring 1982):87.
289. Nasr, "Open Letter to President Mubarak." In Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser, in his meditations on Egypt's role in the first Arab-Israeli war, wrote: "⋯ when the Palestine crisis began, I was utterly convinced that the fighting in Palestine was not taking place on foreign soil, nor was our participation going beyond the requirements of simple friendship. It was a duty made obligatory by the necessity of self-defense"
290. Mustafa Mashour, "This Conference⋯ Between Whom? With Whom? To Whose Benefit?" (in Arabic), ash-Sha'ab, October 22, 1991.
291. See Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980);
292. Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal el-Gamasy of Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1993).
293. Yves Heller and Alexander Buccianti, "International Repercussions: The Impotence of Opposition in Egypt" (in French), Le Monde, February 19, 1991.
294. "The Islamic Group in the Gulf War" (in Arabic), Ruz al-Yusuf, February 18, 1991.
295. The Ikhwan were not alone in their efforts to open various aspects of Egypt's foreign and security policy to public discussion, nor was the organization always the most vocal in some areas. Still, the Brotherhood's rhetoric entered them into the field of defense and security policy-strictly a closed military zone. Concerning the decision to dispatch forces to the Persian Gulf, for example, Ahmed Abdalla has written: "The only institution to discuss the decision to send Egyptian troops to the Gulf before the decision was made was the general command-no parties, not even the ruling party, nor the cabinet, and certainly not parliament." Ahmed Abdalla, "Mubarak's Gamble", Middle East Report 168 (January-February 1991):19.
296. Unlike their Algerian counterparts, the Brotherhood sought to avoid a head-on collision with Egypt's military establishment, preferring instead to burnish their own nationalist credentials through demonstrations (which were quickly suppressed) in cooperation with other opposition groups, press conferences, and petition drives urging the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from the Persian Gulf. 'Abd al-Hayy Mohamed, "Faculty and Student Unions, the Professional Associations Reject the Military Alliance" (in Arabic), ash-Sha'ab, September 18, 1990;
297. Magdi Ahmad Husayn, "We Reject an American Framework Giving it a Blank Check for [the United States] to Control Policy, Oil, and Security in the Gulf" (in Arabic), ash-Sha'ab, September 18, 1990;
298. 'Abd al-Hayy Mohamed, "All Political Parties and Forces Express their Support for the Iraqi People" (in Arabic), ash-Sha'ab, January 29, 1991.
299. Spingborg, "The President and the Field Marshal⋯", 6;
300. Abdalla, "The Armed Forces⋯", 1458. Though the Islamists remained wary of Abu Ghazala for his widely (and correctly) perceived pro-American worldview, the Brotherhood viewed him, in general, with favor. In late October 1986, for example, Mohamed Abd al-Qudus, a prominent member of the Ikhwan, published an article in ash-Sha'ab entitled, "Sons of the Country: A Salute to the Field Marshal", in which Abu Ghazala was praised for his role in the October war, his piety, and his message that the armed forces belonged to all the people of Egypt.
301. "Field Marshal Abu Ghazala in the Discussion of the Week" (in Arabic), al-Musawwar, May 13, 1988;
302. "Our Policy Is to Defend the Power of the Army, Protection of the Nation, and Preservation of Peace" (in Arabic), al-Ahram, October 5, 1989;
303. "The Strong Armed Forces' Duty Is Peace, Countries of the World Pursue Military Cooperation with Egypt" (in Arabic), al-Akhbar, January 10, 1993.
304. General Ahmad Fakhr, "Hot Discussion of the Summer: The Egyptian Military Budget" (in Arabic), al-Ahram, July 25, 1986.
305. Joel Campagna, "From Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years", Journal of International Affairs 50, no. 1 (summer 1996):290-291.
306. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Reform and Frustration in Egypt", Journal of Democracy 7, no. 4 (October 1996):132.
307. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 38;
308. Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt", Middle East Journal 49, no. 1 (winter 1995):15.
309. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World", PS-Political Science and Politics 27, no. 3(1994):508;
310. also see Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), chap. 8.
311. Audah, "The 'Normalization' of the Islamic Movement", 404;
312. interview with a retired Egyptian military officer, Cairo, January 18, 2000;
313. interview with a former U. S. government official, Washington, DC, September 20, 2000.
314. Geneive Abdo, No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 96-97.
315. Interview with a retired Egyptian military officer, Cairo, December 22, 1999.
316. Interview with a Western government official, Cairo, January 6, 2000. As Mona Makram Ebeid explains, it was not just Egyptian leaders who were concerned about another Algeria, but also Egyptian liberals and secularists who feared the Islamists more than the prevailing authoritarian order.
317. See Mona Makram Ebeid, "Democratization in Egypt: The 'Algeria Complex'", Middle East Policy 3, no. 3(1994):119-124.
318. Interview with a retired Egyptian military officer, Cairo, February 26, 2000.
319. Asef Bayat, "Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt", Comparative Study of Society and History 40, no. 1(1998):168;
320. Ahmed Abdalla, "Egypt's Islamists and the State: From Complicity to Confrontation", Middle East Report 183 (July-August 1993):29.
321. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 87.
322. For a complete inventory of what is now regarded as the Kemalist reforms, see Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right", in Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives, ed. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuǧrul Ahmet Tonak (Oxford University Press, 1987), 223.
323. Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey", in The Modern Middle East, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 363-365.
324. James Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case", Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 3 (July 1989):387.
325. Quoted in Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 256.
326. See Andrew Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 1999), chap. 19.
327. Articles 56 and 57, Constitution of the Turkish Republic (1961), Official Gazette of the Turkish Republic 10859, July 20, 1961.
328. Preamble, Constitution of the Turkish Republic (1982), Official Gazette of the Turkish Republic 17874, November 20, 1982.
329. Ilkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Politics: The Case of Turkey", Government and Opposition 18, no. 4(1983):426;
330. Şerif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution", International Journal of Middle East Studies 2(1971):208.
331. Feroz Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", Middle Eastern Studies 27, no. 1 (January 1991):7.
332. see also Law 2820: Political Parties Law (in Turkish) Official Gazette of the Turkish Republic 18027, April 24, 1983;
333. Ilter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey", in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: deGruyter, 1988), 69.
334. Umit Cizre Sakallioǧlu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey", International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 2 (May 1996):251 n. 60. The TGNA repealed Article 163 in 1991. Yet as important as this step may be, the Political Parties Law of 1983 and the 1991 Law for the Struggle against Terrorism retain provisions similar to those of Article 163.
335. Article 312, Penal Code of the Turkish Republic, quoted in Nilufer Narli, "The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey", MERIA Journal 3, no. 3(September 1999): n. 12.
336. James Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case", Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 3 (July 1989):388.
337. Feroz Ahmed, The Making of Modern Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1993), 130.
338. Turkish Armed Forces, "Defense White Paper 2000", www.msb.gov. tr/Birimler/GnP PD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#WHITE%20PAPER.
339. Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 22. In the 1980s, Birand-one of Turkey's leading journalists-gained unprecedented access to the Turkish military academy and staff colleges. Shirts of Steel is the only available account (in both Turkish and English) of the education and socialization of Turkey's future military officers.
340. "Ecevit Denies Claims of Interfering in Military Assignments", July 5, 1998 www.turkpulse.com/armed.htm.
341. Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam", 40.
342. See Birand, Shirts of Steel, 86.
343. Public opinion polls reveal that the military is the most trusted state organization, far outstripping the police and various components of the bureaucracy, as well as Turkey's civilian political elite. See, for example, polling done by Fikret Adaman, Ali Çarkoǧlu, and Burhan Şenatlar for the Turkish Economic and Social Foundation at www.tesev.org.tr/eng/events/corrp27feb2001.php;
344. Ustun Erguder, Yilmaz Esmer and Ersin Kalaycioǧlu, An Assessment of Turkish Society (in Turkish) (Istanbul: Turk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi, 1991), 22;
345. Hürriyet poll, June 16-22, 1997.
346. Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 151.
347. Interview with a Turkish military officer, Washington, DC, August 9, 2001.
348. For a complete discussion, see Ali Çarkoǧlu and Binnaz Toprak, Religion, Society, and Politics in Turkey (in Turkish), (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2000).
349. also see Turkish Armed Forces, "Defense White Paper 2000." In an April 2005 speech to the Turkish War Academies Command, General Özkök listed "religious fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism" as two primary threats to Turkish unity. In the context of Turkish politics, this was a clear warning from the senior command that the civilian, Islamist-led government should not step beyond certain bounds.
350. For a complete discussion of the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis"
351. see Gokhan Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' in Modern Turkish Political Thought", The Muslim World 89, no. 3-4 (July-October 1999):350-376.
352. Ümit Cizre Sakallioǧlu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey", International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 2 (May 1996):231.
353. For a complete discussion of Turkey's experiment with ISI, see John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerbale Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
354. Henri Barkey offers a compelling case when he suggests that the 1980 coup saved the economic reform package. These policies, which Turgut Özal developed, had actually been slated for implementation in January 1980 but partisan political battles delayed and ultimately threatened their realization. See Henri J. Barkey, The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 180.
355. Haldun Gülalp, "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party", The Muslim World 89, no. 1 (January 1999):27.
356. M. Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey", Comparative Politics 30, no. 1 (October 1997):72.
357. "RP Explains Its 'Just Order'", trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, December 5, 1995, 1-2;
358. see also Necmettin Erbakan, Just Economic Order (in Turkish), (Ankara: Semih Ofset Matbaacilik, 1991).
359. See Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism, vol. 1 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
360. Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identity", Middle East Report 199 (spring 1996):12.
361. As Jenny B. White argues, by the 1990s, Refah had taken the place the Turkish Left had historically occupied. See Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).
362. "Erbakan Favors Islamic Union over European Union", Turkish Daily News, February 16, 1995.
363. "RP Explains Its 'Just Order'", 4.
364. "Erbakan Reads Government Program at Assembly", Ankara TRT Television Network, July 3, 1996, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, July 5, 1996.
365. Birand, Shirts of Steel, 147-153. The compensation for both officers and civilian employees of the Turkish military establishment is not commensurate with that of their counterparts in the private sector.
366. Serdar Şen, Armed Forces and Modernism (in Turkish) (Istanbul, 1996), 159-162.
367. Semih Vaner, "The Army", in Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives, ed. Irving C. Schick and Ertuǧrul Ahmet Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 253.
368. Karabelias, "Evolution of Civil-Military Relations", 140-141.
369. Interview with a Western official, Ankara, June 12, 2000.
370. Ömer Taspinar, "Kemalist Identity in Transition: A Case Study of Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey" (Ph. D. diss., Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2001), 217.
371. "Turkish Nationalism, Islamic Movement, and Muslim Identity-Case Study: Necmettin Erbakan and the Turkish Welfare Party", UASR Regional Report 2 (Springfield, VA: UASR Publishing Group, 2000), 9-10.
372. Murat CD emrik, "The Unnoticed Face of the Milli Görüş Movement (MGM): Nationalism", unpublished manuscript (n. d.).
373. For a complete text of the speech, see New Istanbul, New Turkey, New World (in Turkish), October 10, 1993, 71-77.
374. Interview with a former senior Turkish government official, Ankara, June 6, 2000.
375. See, for example, Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military;
376. Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic", Armed Forces and Society 22, no. 4 (summer 1996):619-642;
377. Aylin Güney, "The Military, Politics and Post-Cold War Dilemmas in Turkey", in Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy, ed. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (London: Zed Book, 2002), 162-175.
378. Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 139-140.
379. Interview with a Turkish military officer, Ankara, July 5, 2000.
380. Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam", 36.
381. Necmettin Erbakan, cited in Hebar Abdullah, "Turks Wary of EU Membership, Islamist Welcomes Intervention", I-View, September 15, 2000.
382. "I Have Not Changed" (interview with Necmettin Erbakan by Sedat Ergin, in Turkish), Hürriyet, February 22, 1996.
383. Muzaffer Bal, "Erbakan: The Military Forces Will Welcome the RP Government", (in Turkish), Milliyet, December 15, 1995.
384. For a discussion of Milli Görüs, see Birol A. Yeşilada, "The Refah Party Phenomenon in Turkey", in Comparative Political Parties and Party Elites: Essays in Honor of Samuel J. Eldersveld, ed. Birol A. Yeşilada (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 123-150.
385. Bal, "Erbakan"
386. Interview, Ankara, July 5, 2000. One middle-ranking officer indicated that although he yearns for democracy and civilian control, he would not hesitate to intervene if he and his colleagues deemed it necessary to preserve Kemalism. Interview with a Turkish military officer, Washington, DC, March 5, 2002.
387. Hayri Birler, "Military Prosecutor Warns against RP Victory", Turkish Daily News, November 28, 1994.
388. Sezai Sengun, "The Army Warns Erbakan about Reactionaryism" (in Turkish), Hürriyet, July 24, 1996. Interestingly, the military's response represented a dynamic that was not new. In 1987, for example, the military effectively short-circuited Turgut Özal's public discussion of civil society and the need for less state (i.e. military) supervision with the timely release of a report outlining the threat of fundamentalism.
389. Interview with a Turkish military officer, Washington, DC, May 10, 2001.
390. Dieter Bednarz and Paul M. Schumacher', 'The Country Will Explode" (interview with Necmettin Erbakan of the Refah Partisi), der Spiegel, June 16, 1996, 136-140, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
391. Bal, "Erbakan"
392. For a complete discussion of vernacular politics, see White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey.
393. See Asli Aydintaşbaş, "The Malaise of Turkish Democracy", Middle East Report 209 (winter 1998):34.
394. "RP Ready for a Referendum on Constitutional Reforms", Turkish Daily News, June 15, 1995.
395. Birand quotes one officer telling him, "I measure a politician not by his education but by the priority he gives to country and nation. Politicians are not concerned 'for the state' as much as we are. They talk about Atatürk's principles and all that only because they're wary of us or afraid of some reaction⋯", Birand, Shirts of Steel, 75-76.
396. Jenny B. White, "Pragmatists or Ideologues? Turkey's Welfare Party in Power", Current History 96, no. 606 (January 1997):30.
397. Sengun, "The Army Warns Erbakan about Reactionaryism"
398. Yeşilada, "The Refah Party Phenomenon", 139.
399. On the importance of the bureaucracy during the Ottoman period, see Ahmet Ö. Evin, "Bureaucracy", Private View 1, no. 2 (spring-summer 1996):47-51;
400. Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey", 347-374;
401. and Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" Daedalus 102, no. 1 (Winter 1973):169-190.
402. Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", in Islam in the Political Process, ed. James Piscatori (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 147.
403. The officers' concern with the bureaucracy is part of a pattern that emerged in the 1950s as the Demokrat Partisi sought to replace those bureaucrats affiliated with the Republican People's Party with its own activists. Notwithstanding the 1960 coup d'état, which banned DP supporters, packing the bureaucracy with party activists became a common practice over the following three decades as representatives from across Turkey's political spectrum (including Islamists) were placed throughout the state's administrative structures. In subsequent coups, but particularly that of 1980, the military expressed its dismay over what it believed to be the deleterious effects of the politicization of the bureaucracy. See, Ersin Kalaycioǧlu, "The Logic of Contemporary Turkish Politics", MERIA Journal 1, no. 3 (September 1997):10;
404. Yeşilada, "The Refah Party Phenomenon", 130;
405. Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey", Middle East Journal 50, no. 1 (winter 1996):45;
406. Sunar and Toprak, "Islam and Politics", 430-432;
407. General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 12 September in Turkey: Before and After (Ankara: Ongun Kardeşler Printing House, 1982).
408. "Transformation of the Welfare Party", Turkish Daily News, October 14, 1996.
409. Ayla Ganioǧlu, "Erbakan RP Seen as Harmful to Coalition", Turkish Daily News, July 15, 1996.
410. Ismail Küçükkaya, "Interesting Appointments", (in Turkish), Sabah, August 11, 1996.
411. White, "Pragmatists or Ideologues?" 29.
412. Interview with a Western official, Ankara, June 16, 2000.
413. "Erbakan on New Initiatives for Defense Industry", Ankara TRT Television, August 2, 1996, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, August 8, 1996.
414. Interview with a Western government official, Ankara, April 7, 2000.
415. Interview with a retired Turkish military officer, Istanbul, April 28, 2000.
416. Interview with a Turkish military officer, Ankara, July 5, 2000.
417. Tolga Şardan, "The MGK's Report on Reactionaryism" (in Turkish), Milliyet, February 27, 1997.
418. Niyazi Günay, "Implementing the 'February 28' Recommendations: A Scorecard", Washington Institute Research Note no. 10, May 2001.
419. Oya Armutçu and Sezai Sengun, "RP Engaged in Reactionary Activities" (in Turkish), Hürriyet, June 11, 1997.
420. "Three Visas from the Military" (in Turkish), Milliyet, May 9, 2000;
421. "NSC Can Enlarge" (in Turkish), Milliyet, July 25, 2000;
422. interview with a Turkish military officer, July 5, 2000 (Ankara).
423. "MGK Advisor Reacts to the Seventh EU Package", ZAMAN, July 29, 2003;
424. "Turkish General Slams EU-Linked reform Curbing Military's Power", EU Business, August 8, 2003, www.eubusiness.com/afp/030825170303. quksi3vb.
425. "Refah Party Deputy Leader Gül Interviewed on Party Policy", Milliyet, February 28, 1995, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 6, 1995.
426. "Is It a Waning Influence?" Economist, June 12, 2003.
427. For more on the Turkish military's internal service codes, see Saban Iba, National Security State: Global and Turkish Documents on National Security Ideology and Institutions (In Turkish), (Istanbul: Civiyazilari, 1998).
428. Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 105.
429. "Pakistan: Transition to Democracy?" International Crisis Group Report no. 40, October 3, 2002, 21.
430. James T. Quinlivan, "Coup Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East", International Security 24, no. 2 (fall 1999):131-165.
431. See J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
432. See Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1987);
433. William F. Hickman, Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982). This is the same kind of dynamic that befell the Iraqi military during the U. S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
434. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 (January 1996):39-55.
435. For a complete discussion of the relationship between business and the state, particularly in Tunisia, see Eva Bellin, Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
436. See Steven A. Cook, "The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform", Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005):91-102.
437. Thomas Carothers, "Recent U. S. Experience in Democracy Promotion", IDS Bulletin 26, no. 2(1995):62-69;
438. Gordon Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform (London: Palgrave, 2001);
439. Olav Stokke, "Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and the State of the Art", in Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. Olav Stokke (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 1-87.
440. Annual Report 2003-2004 and "Citizens Rights and Democracy" (in Arabic), National Democratic Party, September 2004.