Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility

Scientific Reports

Volumn 4, Issue , 2014, Pages

  Chen, Xiaojie ^a   Perc, Matjaž ^b  

^a INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARIBOR   (Slovenia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATION; GAME; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL MODEL;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; MODELS, THEORETICAL; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY;

EID: 84894682735     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20452322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/srep04161     Document Type: Article

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