The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas

PLoS ONE

Volumn 8, Issue 6, 2013, Pages

  Hilbe, Christian ^a   Abou Chakra, Maria ^a   Altrock, Philipp M ^a,b   Traulsen, Arne ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

^b HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COLLECTIVE RISK DILEMMA; COOPERATION; COORDINATION; DISASTER; DYNAMICS; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; PSYCHOLOGICAL BALANCE; SOCIAL PROBLEM; TIME;

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; RISK; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; TIME FACTORS;

EID: 84879163218     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0066490     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ, Marotzke M, (2006) Stabilizing the earths climate is not a losing game: Supporting evidence from public goods experiments. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 103: 3994-3998.
2. Raihani N, Aitken D, (2011) Uncertainty, rationality and cooperation in the context of climate change. Climatic Change 108: 47-55.
3. Barrett S, Dannenberg A, (2012) Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 109: 17372-17376.
4. Summers LH, (2000) International financial crises: Causes, prevention, and cures. American Economic Review 90: 1-16.
5. Schelling TC (1960) The strategy of conict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
6. Milinski M, Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck HJ, Reed FA, Marotzke J, (2008) The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 105: 2291-2294.
7. Rapoport A, Eshed-Levy D, (1989) Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of greed and fear of being gypped. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 44: 325-344.
8. Wang J, Fu F, Wu T, Wang L, (2009) Emergence of social cooperation in threshold public good games with collective risk. Physical Review E 80: 016101.
9. Wang J, Fu F, Wang L, (2010) Effects of heterogeneous wealth distribution on public cooperation with collective risk. Physical Review E 82: 016102.
10. Santos FC, Pacheco JM, (2011) Risk of collective failure provides an escape from the tragedy of the commons. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 108: 10421-10425.
11. Greenwood G, (2011) Evolution of strategies for the collective-risk social dilemma relating to climate change. Europhysics Letters 95: 40006.
12. Chen X, Szolnoki A, Perc M, (2012) Averting group failures in collective-risk social dilemmas. Europhysics Letters 99: 68003.
13. Chen X, Szolnoki A, Perc M, (2012) Risk-driven migration and the collective-risk social dilemma. Physical Review E 86: 036101.
14. Abou Chakra M, Traulsen A, (2012) Evolutionary dynamics of strategic behavior in a collective-risk dilemma. PLoS Computational Biology 8: e1002652.
15. Diekmann A, (1985) Volunteer's dilemma. Journal of Conict Resolution 29: 605-610.
16. Archetti M, (2009) Cooperation as a volunteer's dilemma and the strategy of conict in public goods games. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 11: 2192-2200.
17. Weesie J, (1993) Asymmetry and timing in the volunteer's dilemma. Journal of Conict Resolution 37: 569-590.
18. Weibull JW (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.
19. Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
20. Nowak MA (2006) Evolutionary Dynamics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
21. Sigmund K (2010) The calculus of selfishness. Princeton Univ. Press.
22. Marx LM, Matthews SA, (2000) Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project. Review of Economic Studies 67: 327-358.
23. Taylor PD, Jonker L, (1978) Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences 40: 145-156.
24. Hartl D, Clark A (1997) Principles of Population Genetics. Sinauer Associates, Inc., Sunderland, Massachusetts, third edition.
25. Imhof LA, Nowak MA, (2006) Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process. Journal of Mathematical Biology 52: 667-681.
26. Ciccarelli JN & S N White (2009) Psychology. New Jersey: Pearson Education.
27. Palacios-Huerta I, Volij O, (2009) Field centipedes. American Economic Review 99: 1619-1635.
28. Kahneman D, Tversky A, (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47: 263-291.
29. Cookson R, (2000) Framing effects in public goods experiments. Experimental Economics 3: 55-79.
30. Santos FC, Vasconcelos V, Santos MD, Neves P, Pacheco JM, (2012) Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas. Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences 22: 1140004.
31. Drazen A, Grilli V, (1993) The benefit of crises for economic reforms. The American Economic Review 83: 598-607.
32. Gradstein M, (1992) Time dynamics and incomplete information in the private provision of public goods. Journal of Political Economy 100: 581-597.
33. Romano R, Yildirim H, (2001) Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective. Journal of Public Economics 81: 423-447.
34. Milinski M, Röhl T, Marotzke J, (2011) Cooperative interaction of rich and poor can be catalyzed by intermediate climate targets. Climatic Change 109: 807-814.
35. Tavoni A, Dannenberg A, Kallis G, Löschel A, (2011) Inequality, communication, and tha avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 108: 11825-11829.