Choosing demands strategically: The distribution of power, the distribution of benefits, and the risk of conflict

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 43, Issue 6, 1999, Pages 705-726

  Werner, Suzanne ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033275925     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043006002     Document Type: Article

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