Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared

Erkenntnis

Volumn 78, Issue SUPPL.2, 2013, Pages 277-297

  Ylikoski, Petri ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891893583     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9513-9     Document Type: Article

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