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Philosophical Studies

Volumn 154, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 79-104

  Bennett, Karen ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

Composition; Constitution; Dependence; Fundamentality; Grounding; Supervenience

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955056576     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9703-8     Document Type: Article

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