Causation at different levels: Tracking the commitments of mechanistic explanations

Biology and Philosophy

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 365-383

  Fazekas, Peter ^a,b   Kertész, Gergely ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b INSTITUTE OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE   (Hungary)

^c BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Autonomy; Downward causation; Mechanistic explanation; Reduction

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMY; KNOWLEDGE; PHILOSOPHY;

EID: 79956293508     PISSN: 01693867     EISSN: 15728404     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10539-011-9247-5     Document Type: Article

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