Real options and investment incentives

Real Options and Investment Incentives

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-119

  Friedl, Gunther ^a  

^a JOHANNES GUTENBERG UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891462322     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-48268-0     Document Type: Book

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