On the robustness of preference aggregation in noisy environments

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 428-434

  Procaccia, Ariel D ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a   Kaminka, Gal A ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Computational complexity; Voting

Indexed keywords

NOISY ENVIRONMENTS; PREFERENCE AGGREGATIONS; THEORETICAL MODELS; VOTING; VOTING RULES;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; FUZZY CLUSTERING;

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS;

EID: 60349092967     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1329125.1329205     Document Type: Conference Paper

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