Public choice, energy regulation and deregulation

Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 419-449

  Rossi, Jim ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890637049     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781849804899.00023     Document Type: Chapter

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