Dynamic and nonuniform pricing strategies for revenue maximization

SIAM Journal on Computing

Volumn 42, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 2424-2451

  Chakraborty, Tanmoy ^a   Huang, Zhiyi ^a   Khanna, Sanjeev ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design; Combinatorial auctions; Dynamic pricing; Revenue maximization

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; DYNAMIC PRICING; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; PRICING PROBLEMS; PRICING STRATEGY; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; VALUATION FUNCTION;

COMMERCE; COSTS; DYNAMICS; MACHINE DESIGN; SALES;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 84890532440     PISSN: 00975397     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/100787799     Document Type: Article

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