Item pricing for revenue maximization

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 50-59

  Balcan, Maria Florina ^a   Blum, Avrim ^a   Mansour, Yishay ^b  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Approximation algorithms; Combinatorial auctions

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; BEST APPROXIMATIONS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; EXPECTED REVENUE; FIXED PRICES; LOGARITHMIC APPROXIMATION; LOWER BOUNDS; MULTI-UNIT; POLYLOGARITHMIC; PRICING SCHEME; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; SOCIAL WELFARE; SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION; SUBMODULAR; VALUATION FUNCTION;

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COSTS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; ECONOMICS; ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; OPTIMIZATION; SALES;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77950889374     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1386790.1386802     Document Type: Conference Paper

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