Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: Strategic interactions between R&D, defense and pre-emption

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 211, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 399-432

  Roy, Abhra ^a   Paul, Jomon Aliyas ^a  

^a KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890079013     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1431-3     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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