Constitutionally tailoring punishment

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 112, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 397-452

  Bierschbach, Richard A ^a   Bibas, Stephanos ^b  

^a YESHIVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84889059037     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (470)

1. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435 (2008); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). But cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-52 (1949) (refusing to apply special procedural rules to death penalty cases under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
2. U.S. 466 (2000); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
3. S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
4. (Consolidated opinion). Miller was consolidated with Jackson v. Hobbs for argument and the Court's decisions and opinions for both appear together. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455. References to Miller throughout this Article refer to both cases.
5. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
6. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
7. Richard S. Frase, Graham's Good News-and Not, 23 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 54 (2010).
8. Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of Years?, 86 Tul. L. Rev. 309 (2011).
9. Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescence, 15 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 285 (2012).
10. Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, "'Death Is Different' No Longer": Graham v. Florida and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 327.
11. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion in part); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
12. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1041-1044 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation of Powers]
13. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 873-874 (2009) [hereinafter Barkow, Institutional Design].
14. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 106-112 (2003) [hereinafter Barkow, Recharging the Jury].
15. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1318-1332 (1998).
16. 12. Importantly, we do not purport to offer an intentionalist or motivational account of the cases. We do not, in other words, claim that the cases consciously and consistently mean to advance the vision of criminal justice that we put forth. Our interpretive claim is more modest: that, whatever the intentions or motivations behind the cases and the views of the individual justices themselves, the decisions at their cores cohere around the shared set of values that we describe.
17. William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 72-73, 83-84 (2011).
18. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1196 (2009).
19. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1049; see 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics fig.C, U.S. Sent'g Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/FigureC.pdf (last visited May 13, 2013) (indicating that federal guilty plea rates for the years 2008-2012 ranged between 96 and 97 percent).
20. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Ford-ham L. Rev. 2117, 2125 (1998).
21. Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1587, 1596-1600 (2010).
22. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1707-1708 (2010).
23. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 1471, 1498-1500 (1993).
24. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph 91, 123-127 (2003).
25. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 729-730 (2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Administering Crime].
26. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1030.
27. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 552-557 (2001).
28. Stuntz, supra note 19, at 547.
29. Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 27-28 (1997).
30. The story of the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act, in which the Department of Justice successfully lobbied for restrictions on and prosecutorial approval of downward departures under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, is just one of many illustrations.
31. Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 58 Duke L.J. 2087, 2098-2099 (2009).
32. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 19, at 728 & n.25 (providing additional examples).
33. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 19, at 728; Stuntz, supra note 19, at 537.
34. Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 47 (2012).
35. Fisher, supra note 18, at 210-19; Beale, supra note 21, at 27-28.
36. Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1124, 1152 (2005).
37. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 199, 200-214 (1993).
38. Jeremy Travis & Sarah Lawrence, Urban Inst. Justice Policy Ctr., Beyond the Prison Gates: The State of Parole in America 4-7 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310583_Beyond_prison_gates.pdf.
39. Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1745, 1750-1751 (2012) (discussing the dramatic decline in discretionary parole during recent decades).
40. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (dealing with deportation as a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction).
41. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 13-16 (2012).
42. Between 1976 and 1999, the fraction of parole releases that were discretionary fell from 65 percent to 24 percent; in other words, more than three-quarters of parole releases are now automatic by operation of law. Travis & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 4-5.
43. W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 395, 397-398 (2011).
44. Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1781-82.
45. Alexandra Marks, For Prisoners, It's a Nearly No-Parole World, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 10, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0710/p1s4.html.
46. Michael M. O'Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1247, 1248 (2011) (noting a "precipitous decline" in the availability of parole in the last three decades of the twentieth century).
47. Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency 36, 37.
48. (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (citing a survey of commutations from 1995 to 2003 that found that "most states averaged fewer than one hundred commutations... with thirty-four states... having dispensed twenty or fewer"); Presidential Clemency Actions by Administration: 1945 to Present, U.S. Dep't Just., http://www.justice.gov/pardon/actions_administration.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2011) (documenting steady decrease in presidential grants of clemency petitions from 36 percent under President Nixon to 1.8 percent under President George W. Bush).
49. U.S. 551 (2005).
50. U.S. 304 (2002).
51. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion).
52. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 364-366, 372-78 (1995) (discussing the Court's goal of ensuring deserved punishment in capital sentencing and its doctrinal efforts to implement it).
53. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
54. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21.
55. Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677, 721-730 (2005) (discussing the role of desert in the Supreme Court's substantive proportionality cases).
56. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding that a sentence of twenty-five years to life for the theft of three golf clubs was "not grossly disproportionate and therefore [did] not violate the Eighth Amendment[]" (emphasis added)); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (rejecting a requirement of individualized sentencing in noncapital cases and holding that a sentence of LWOP for a first-time felon convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine was not disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment).
57. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023-26 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-17; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295-96 (plurality opinion).
58. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-86 (1976) (plurality opinion).
59. Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 58, 58-59 (2010) (discussing the "purposes of punishment test" and stating that the Court has resisted commitment to a specific theory of punishment).
60. Carol S. Steiker, Commentary, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a "Rational Understanding" of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 285, 290 (2007) ("In the [Eighth Amendment] morass... one theme has remained consistent: the Court insists that the Constitution is agnostic when it comes to penological purposes.").
61. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 370 (1988); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82 (1987); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6-7, 14 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion).
62. Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 283, 301-302 (1991) (observing that Lockett's individ-ualization requirement "contains no reference to any particular moral theory or theories" and instead embraces a principle of "moral neutrality").
63. Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 989, 1011 (1996) (discussing the "laissez-faire character" of the capital sentencing mitigation inquiry).
64. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 Yale L.J. 835, 853 (1992).
65. (Reviewing Beverly Lowry, Crossed Over: A Murder, a Memoir (1992)) (noting that "there is no substantive limitation at all on a defendant's ability to present" or the sentencer's discretion to consider mitigating factors when making an individualized determination of whether to impose a death sentence).
66. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-28; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
67. Cf. Youngjae Lee, Desert, Deontology, and Vengeance, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 1141, 1142 (2011) (largely endorsing "[Paul] Robinson's view that the criminal law's desert judgments should... closely resemble ordinary intuitions of desert").
68. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 177-199 (2004).
69. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 588-593 (1992).
70. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991).
71. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) ("To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability."), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); Bilionis, supra note 42, at 290 ("[A]ll mandatory schemes by their nature circumscribe the range of moral considerations that are taken into account in an individual case to those which happen to be reflected in the substantive criminal law's doctrinal provisions.").
72. U.S. 280, 301, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
73. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
74. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-24 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995-96 (1991).
75. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requiring statutorily defined aggravating circumstances before capital punishment may be constitutionally imposed).
76. Douglas Berman, Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 429, 431 (2010) ("[Legislators] must specify with some precision what particular aggravating circumstances make a particular crime 'death-worthy.'").
77. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 373-89 (discussing how capital sentencing statutes attempt to channel sentencer discretion and narrow the class of death-eligible offenders).
78. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (forbidding the death penalty for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (forbidding execution of mentally retarded defendants); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (forbidding execution of insane defendants); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1977) (plurality opinion) (forbidding the death penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman).
79. Berman, supra note 51, at 432.
80. Alyssa Connell Lareau & Grant Henrichsen Willis, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Capital Punishment, 90 Geo. L.J. 1838, 1845-1847 (2002).
81. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204-07 (1976) (discussing Georgia's statutory requirement for a trial court to review a jury's verdict for the death penalty against the facts of the case before affirming the penalty's imposition, as well as the Georgia Supreme Court's "sentence-review function"); see also Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 (2008) ("When the punishment of any person has been fixed at death, the court shall, before imposing sentence, direct a probation officer of the court to thoroughly investigate the history of the defendant and any and all other relevant facts, to the end that the court may be fully advised as to whether the sentence of death is appropriate and just."); Berman, supra note 51, at 431.
82. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Improving Criminal Justice: How Can We Make the American Criminal Justice System More Just?, 95 Judicature 59, 59 (2011) ("In Illinois... shocking revelations about innocent men on death row led first to a moratorium on executions, and eventually to the abolition of capital punishment altogether.").
83. Jonathan J. Cooper, Ore. Governor Bans Death Penalty for Rest of Term, Wash. Times (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/23/ore-governor-bans-death-penalty-rest-term (reporting on Oregon governor John Kitzhaber's decision to issue a reprieve to any prisoner facing execution).
84. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (emphasizing the importance of a state's automatic appellate review of death sentences in determining whether the state's death penalty statute is constitutional); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 371-96 (reviewing the constitutional framework for regulation of capital punishment).
85. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990) ("[T]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that meaningful appellate review of death sentences promotes reliability and consistency."); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("[S]ince the judge found, in disagreement with the jury, that the evidence did not establish any mitigating circumstance, and since the presentence report was the only item considered by the judge but not by the jury, the full review of the factual basis for the judge's rejection of the advisory verdict is plainly required."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 ("The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.").
86. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 275, 277, 295 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 378-89.
87. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467-68 (2012); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
88. Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1782-85.
89. Supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
90. Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1752-66.
91. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 ("By removing youth from the balance... [laws mandating LWOP sentences] prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionally punishes a juvenile offender."); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027-30 ("By denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person's value and place in society. This judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender's capacity for change and limited moral culpability.").
92. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
93. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 ("[T]he State must... give [juvenile, nonhomicide] defendants... some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."); see also Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1776 (observing that Graham "diversif[ied] sentencing across time and institutions").
94. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-30.
95. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 2469.
96. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 37.
97. Waiver or transfer is a necessary prerequisite for bringing criminal charges against juveniles tried as adults.
98. Nat'l Research Council & Inst. of Med.
99. Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice 206-209 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001).
100. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
101. Martha Rossiter, Comment, Transferring Children to Adult Criminal Court: How to Best Protect Our Children and Society, 27 J. Juv. L. 123, 126, 128-131 (2006) (reviewing and critiquing mandatory waiver laws).
102. Melissa A. Scott, Comment, The "Critically Important" Decision of Waiving Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Who Should Decide?, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 711, 712, 728-729 (2004) (reviewing factors to be considered in waiver decisions).
103. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(a) (2009) (restricting the state's use of juvenile delinquency proceedings to cases involving juveniles under age fifteen or juveniles under age eighteen whose conduct would have constituted a misdemeanor if committed by an adult); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (2012) (providing criminal court with exclusive jurisdiction over children ages thirteen to seventeen who are alleged to have committed certain serious felonies).
104. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2473; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025-26 (2010).
105. Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 681, 718-720 (1998).
106. (Noting "the possibly unanticipated interplay" of waiver and mandatory punishment statutes "often contained in disparate sections of a State's statute books" and observing that "it is unclear whether legislators comprehend the actual consequences of their radical measures to overhaul criminal justice").
107. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
108. That is particularly true for elected state judges faced with a juvenile who has committed a serious crime.
109. Quoting Patrick Griffin et al., Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting 5 (2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf.
110. Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 783, 806 (2000) ("[T]he state can use the potential for transfer and the ability to appeal transfer decisions as a bargaining chip.").
111. Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1254, 1267 (1996) (discussing the incentives for even innocent juveniles to take pleas that will keep them in juvenile court).
112. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 364-403 (exhaustively reviewing the development of the Court's capital punishment case law).
113. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 540-41 (4th ed. 1873)); see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999) (noting the jury's historical "power to thwart Parliament and Crown").
114. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 30, 304; Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 48-65; see also Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 Ind. L.J. 731, 750-68 (2010).
115. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230-33 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
116. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77.
117. Indeed, as we discuss below, modern juries do not even know the potential sentences that their verdicts will authorize. See infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
118. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
119. U.S. 625, 640 (1980).
120. Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury 1200-1800, at 313-15, 360 (1985) (analyzing the history of jury discretion together with official acquiescence in the exercise of that discretion).
121. John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 54-55 (1983).
122. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); see also Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311, 382 (2003) (arguing that "[b]ecause of its ability to render individualized judgments and to reconcile conflicting views through deliberation rather than aggregation," the jury is best suited for making democratically and morally legitimate sentencing judgments).
123. William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830, at 28-29 (2d ed. 1994).
124. Kyron Huigens, Correspondence, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 811, 818 (2002).
125. Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 85. Judges also lack juries' insulation from appellate review at the behest of the government. See id. at 48-49, 60-61.
126. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 350; see also Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 72-93 & nn.178-81.
127. That is not to say that juries have worked perfectly in practice or that they are essential in the abstract to fair punishment. See infra text accompanying notes 151-152.
128. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000); accord Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (establishing that "the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence" ultimately imposed).
129. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312-13; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
130. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483, 487, (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-26 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. (Majority opinion).
133. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. (Quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. (Scalia, J., concurring).
136. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 745 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
137. U.S. Const. amends. VI, VIII.
138. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy stressed that the Eighth Amendment neither guaranteed nor required their eventual release; nor did the Court establish any criteria to guide release decisions. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 2034 (2010).
139. Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1759-64.
140. Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 75, 77 (2010).
141. Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1757-59.
142. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2053-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court acknowledges that such sentences will deter future juvenile offenders, at least to some degree, but rejects that penological goal, not as illegitimate, but as insufficient."); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 621 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's contention that the goals of retribution and deterrence are not served by executing murderers under 18 is... transparently false.").
143. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999-1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). As Justice O'Connor observed in Ewing v. California, decisions about penological purposes are generally seen as legislative choices to which reviewing courts owe deference, particularly under principles of federalism. 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion) ("Our traditional deference to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution 'does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.'" (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
144. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032-33.
145. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
146. Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1779-82.
147. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495-96 (2000).
148. Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1232, 1242 (1995) ("The general rule in federal and most state judicial systems is that neither the judge nor advocates should inform the jury of the sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict.").
149. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 580 (1994) (noting the "principle that jurors are not to be informed of the consequences of their verdicts"). While states are permitted to use jury sentencing, only six states use it in noncapital cases.
150. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 885, 886 (2004).
151. Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 723, 736-737 (1993) (arguing that a mere fact-finding function for the criminal jury would make it an "imperfect check[] on the possible abuse of power by legislators, prosecutors, or law enforcement officials").
152. Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 465, 468 (2002).
153. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16.
154. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, 1488-1492, 1546 app. A (2001) (cataloguing repeated instances in which courts left legislatures leeway to adopt pro-prosecution rules and noting that many legislatures in fact did so); supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
155. Bibas, supra note 115, at 472.
156. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004) ("If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty.... We do not understand how Apprendi can possibly work to the detriment of those who are free... to render it inapplicable.").
157. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
158. U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (plurality opinion). The Court has made similar observations numerous times since. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824-25 (1991).
159. Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1783-84, 1783 n.177.
160. Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 44-45.
161. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1035-40, 1042-43; Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 107-10, 116.
162. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1037-38.
163. This difficulty with a strict formalist approach is not limited to criminal justice. It plagues every attempt to rigidly enforce the separation of powers in the modern administrative state.
164. Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 11 (1994) (defending the rigidity of formalism while acknowledging that its strict application would render the administrative state unconstitutional).
165. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 526 (1987) ("[F]ormalism... is simply incapable of describing the government we have.").
166. Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 9, at 895-906.
167. Bilionis, supra note 10, at 1327-32.
168. No reference to process-oriented or structural approaches to criminal law scholarship would be complete without mention of the late William Stuntz, whose work broadly unpacked the political economy of modern criminal justice and constitutional criminal procedure. For a sampling of Stuntz's highly influential work in the field, see Stuntz, supra note 13; Stuntz, supra note 19.
169. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (2006).
170. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1 (1997).
171. In another article published seven years earlier, Bilionis praised the Woodson/Lock-ett/Eddings doctrine as providing a way for courts to remain agnostic among competing theories of punishment while empowering sentencers to exercise morally appropriate judgment in imposing the death penalty. He saw the need for rationality and predictability at a systemic level as quite consistent with giving sentencers discretion to judge moral appropriateness in individual cases. Bilionis, supra note 42, at 286-87. That article did not, however, connect these Lockett-specific insights to a broader understanding of the structure of modern criminal justice, checks and balances, or the design of noncapital sentencing.
172. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 74-79.
173. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 129-133 (1998).
174. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1682-1684, 1703-06, 1717-20 (2012) (discussing the evolution of the jury's role as a check against the sovereign in the Magna Carta and the incorporation of these English ideas into American law).
175. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293-95 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
176. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 721, 731 (2008) (criticizing the Court's treatment of the death penalty for offenders with mental disabilities).
177. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 426-38.
178. Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1643, 1647-1648 & nn.18-23 (1993) (collecting criticisms).
179. Berman, supra note 51, at 432-33.
180. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 397-98.
181. As David Ball observes, Apprendi gestured in that direction initially.
182. W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 117, 141-142 (2011).
183. The Court emphasized both the Sixth Amendment and due process aspects of its holding, relying on what it called "[In re] Winship's due process and associated jury protections." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000); see also id. at 469 ("The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that... an increase in the maximum prison sentence... be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."). Winship, in turn, took a functional and flexible approach to due process, balancing the interests at stake and requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for juvenile commitment proceedings as an aspect of fundamental fairness. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970); see also Ball, supra, at 138-39.
184. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 350; see also Bilionis, supra note 10, at 1302.
185. Paul H, Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 709, 715-717 (2010).
186. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 24, at 1134-36, 1151 tbl.
187. Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 95-97, 104-106 (1998)
188. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 72-89 (1996).
189. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)
190. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he definition of crimes generally has not been thought automatically to dictate what should be the proper penalty.") Note
191. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record.... treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferenti-ated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.").
192. Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 Geo. L.J. 387, 433 (2002).
193. Bowers, supra note 17, at 1701-02.
194. Supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
195. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 353 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)).
196. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012)
197. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 2032-33 (2010).
198. Supra notes 31, 111 and accompanying text.
199. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 353.
200. Supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
201. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 359
202. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1153, 1158-1159 (2002).
203. Charles O. Betts, Jury Sentencing, 2 Crime & Delinq. 369, 372 (1956)
204. Charles W. Webster, Jury Sentencing-Grab-Bag Justice, 14 Sw. L.J. 221, 228-29 (1960)
205. Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 45 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 24-29 (1994).
206. For further elaboration of our vision of a polyphonic conversation including a range of lay as well as expert voices and the distinctive strengths of each, see Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 20-24.
207. Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1197, 1203-1212 (2007).
208. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 294-317 (2002)
209. Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 104-88 (1997)
210. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 273-314 (8th ed. 2011).
211. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox 3 (Ivan R. Dee 1993) (1953).
212. Berlin builds his distinction on the ancient Greek poet Archilocus's saying: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." Id. Hedgehog thinkers and writers, such as Plato and Hegel, are monistic, viewing the world through the lens of a single defining idea or value. Foxes, like Aristotle and Shakespeare, see complexity in the world and resist reducing it to a single idea. Id. at 3-4.
213. That is not to say that other approaches would not be possible. A retributivist might, for instance, vest power in a legislature to establish a broad ranking of the retributive punishments available for various types of crimes, and in a judge, to work within that framework to tailor specific punishments to each defendant based on the particular moral circumstances of his crime.
214. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 6, 12, 18-20 (2000)
215. Discussing interplay between legislative specification and adjudicative discretion in laying down rules for grading of offenses in accordance with the community's sense of justice. But as Michael Cahill observes, most re-tributivists have not approached the issue that way, hewing instead to a philosopher-king approach.
216. Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 815, 819 & n.13 (2007).
217. Even if one disagrees with our normative stance, one could still accept the interpretive claims put forth in this Article; the two claims are analytically independent. One could, in other words, agree with us that the Court is making the turn we describe in the constitutional law of noncapital sentencing but disagree that the turn is normatively desirable.
218. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 401 (1958).
219. This is, of course, a common feature of pluralistic approaches that respect multiple competing substantive commitments.
220. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 387-394
221. Discussing the relationship between democratic pluralism and First Amendment reform.
222. Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Constitutionalism 14 (Nov. 7, 2012)
223. Unpublished manuscript, (on file with authors) (discussing the "multiple commitments" inherent in pluralistic approaches to religious freedom doctrine and explaining that "there is no obvious way to prioritize
224. Pluralism in Economics: New Perspectives in History and Methodology (Andrea Salanti & Ernesto Screpanti eds., 1997).
225. For a more complete defense of this point, see Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 20-24.
226. Posner, supra note 154, at 279
227. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169, 180 (1968)
228. Developing a classic economic model of deterrence.
229. On the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules.
230. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
231. Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1973)
232. Dan Markel, Luck or Law: Is Indeterminate Sentencing Unconstitutional? (May 24, 2013) Unpublished manuscript (on file with authors).
233. Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 289 (2005)
234. Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1383, 1408 (2002)
235. Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1445 (2004).
236. Cahill, supra note 156, at 836 (reviewing retributive approaches to criminal justice and concluding that they struggle to offer any "firm rules about how to implement substantive criminal law").
237. Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1801, 1810-1827 (1999)
238. B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death Sentence: Why Capital Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1115 (2001)
239. Arguing that an offender's manifestation of the "trilogy" of guilt, remorse, and penance should alter his punishment.
240. Don C. Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker 130 (2d ed. 1981)
241. Arguing that the penal system should improve an offender's future welfare through treatment.
242. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 4-6 (2d ed. 2008) (Observing that an offender deserves the punishment resulting from his freely willed choice to break the law)
243. Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice 49 (1976) (Rejecting the rehabilitative approach as unjust)
244. Frank Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Incapacitation 42-59, 131-72 (1995)
245. Discussing the public benefits of incapacitation and deterrence
246. Kyron Huigens, Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 33 (2003) (Criticizing consequentialism's rejection of value judgments in determining punishment).
247. Moore, supra note 154, at 153-87
248. Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in The Future of Imprisonment 83 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004)
249. Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 1061, 1067-68.
250. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 857-58 (1978) (Culpability-centered approach)
251. Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 272-297 (1975) (Harm-centered approach)
252. David Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 356 (1987) (Agency-based "forced choice" approach).
253. Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment, 42 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 437, 443-446 (2006) [hereinafter Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility]; Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 284, 295-97 (2002); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 Law & Hum. Behav. 659, 667, 676 (2000).
254. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility, supra note 169, at 443-445
255. Darley, supra note 169, at 674-675.
256. Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 77, 94-96 (2013).
257. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) ("[I]f petitioner's sentence forecloses some 'flexible techniques' for later reducing his sentence... there remain the possibilities of retroactive legislative reduction and executive clemency.").
258. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (stating that when a judge decides whether to impose the death penalty, "the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance") Note
259. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298-99 (1976) (plurality opinion) (observing that "mandatory death penalty statutes ha[ve] been renounced by American juries and legislatures," and that these "enactments reflect attempts by the States to retain the death penalty in a form consistent with the Constitution") Note
260. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he constitutional test [for determining just punishment] is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards.... The jury also is a significant reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.").
261. Henry Hart again put it well when he observed that the value trade-offs involved in criminal justice "do not present themselves... in an institutional vacuum." Hart, supra note 158, at 402. Thus, "each agency of decision must take account always of its own place in the institutional system and of what is necessary to maintain the integrity and workability of the system as a whole. A complex of institutional ends must be served... as well as a complex of substantive social ends." Note
262. Frank O. Bowman, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367, 374-376 (2010)
263. John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 235, 241-246 (2006).
264. Pfaff, supra note 174, at 241-46.
265. Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 Yale L.J. 1773, 1786 (1992)
266. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 771-787 (2005) (Reviewing Minnesota's, Washington's, and North Carolina's experiences)
267. Richard S. Frase, Panel Remarks, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 425, 425-426 (2000) (Noting that state sentencing guidelines have been more successful than the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
268. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
269. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295-97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
270. Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 333, 341 (2004)
271. Bibas, supra note 115, at 470-74
272. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1158-1173 (2001) [Hereinafter Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding].
273. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
274. Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 179, at 1150-70.
275. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1189 (1991).
276. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989)).
277. Citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Bran-deis, J., dissenting).
278. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261, 264 (2005).
279. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007)
280. Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1631, 1667-1681 (2012) (Explaining how Booker and its progeny have fostered interbranch dialogue on federal sentencing policy, "permitting the courts to communicate with the Commission (and with each other) in a transparent and effective manner").
281. Rita, 551 U.S. at 369-73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
282. Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-65. Justice Breyer, who dissented in Apprendi, authored the Court's remedial opinion in Booker as well as its opinion in Rita.
283. Rita, 551 U.S. at 353-54.
284. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007).
285. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247-50 (2011).
286. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2041-42 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
287. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2489 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
288. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
289. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2007) (allowing appellate courts to presume that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable in light of the sentencing judge's role in exercising discretion, "subject[ing] the defendant's sentence to... thorough adversarial testing," weighing whether the case falls beyond the heartland of typical cases, and setting forth reasons for the sentence imposed).
290. See, e.g., S.B. 850, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012) (requiring a sentencing court to make findings on the record regarding seven specified factors-including the impact of an offense on victims and the community, evidence of culpability, and age-related characteristics such as maturity, mental capacity, criminal sophistication, and potential for rehabilitation-before imposing LWOP on a minor convicted of murder); S.B. 635, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2012 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012) Note
291. Requiring a sentencing court to hold a special hearing and to make findings on the record concerning the presence or absence of any mitigating circumstances submitted by a defendant-including age, immaturity, inability to appreciate the consequences of one's conduct, and peer pressure exerted by family or friends-before imposing LWOP on a minor convicted of murder.
292. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 401, 426-29.
293. Arguing that the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence has amounted to "nothing more than a modest, ad hoc series of limitations" in response to particular state practices.
294. While incrementalism in constitutional adjudication can sometimes roughly approximate that approach, other judicial systems embrace it more directly. The European Court of Human Rights' "margin of appreciation" doctrine is one example.
295. Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion Under the European Convention on Human Rights (2000), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-17(2000).pdf (Describing the doctrine).
296. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-talism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 292-323 (1998) (Advocating the decentralization of power to promote experimentation by leaving lower-level governmental institutions free to set goals and choose means, subject to national oversight and pooling of information).
297. As Kyron Huigens explains, "The existence of discretion, somewhere in the system, to make a context-sensitive evaluation of the offender's conduct and character is intrinsic to criminal law because context-specific, retrospective assessments of the offender and his wrongdoing are intrinsic to just punishment." Huigens, supra note 90, at 818.
298. David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & Econ. 591, 603-609 (2005)
299. Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 1, 24-25 (1998)
300. Samara Marion, Justice by Geography? A Study of San Diego County's Three Strikes Sentencing Practices from July-December 1996, 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 29, 37 (1999).
301. Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1334-1335, 1340-44, 1351-53, 1360-63 (2008).
302. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 119-128 (2011)
303. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1128-1130 (1974).
304. Bibas, supra note 23, at 92, 125-26, 163-64, 220 n.19 (discussing racial-impact studies and related moratoria) Note
305. James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1607, 1654-1655, 1657 (2006) (discussing moratoria)
306. Robert J. Norris et al., "Than That One Innocent Suffer": Evaluating State Safeguards Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1301, 1354-57 & tbl.5 (2010/2011) (Discussing innocence commissions)
307. The Innocence Project, Criminal Justice Reform Commissions: Case Studies, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Criminal_Justice_Reform_Commissions_Case_Studies.php (last visited June 3, 2013) (discussing innocence commissions)
308. The Innocence Project, Fix the System: Access to DNA Testing, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/DNA-Testing-Access.php (last visited June 3, 2013) (discussing access to DNA testing)
309. Sources cited supra note 55 (discussing death penalty moratoria in Illinois and Oregon).
310. For discussions of how courts and sentencing commissions can do so and have done so, with a particular focus on the experience in New Jersey.
311. Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1087 1090-1093 (2005)
312. Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1010, 1027-1042 (2005) [Hereinafter Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs].
313. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Criminal Procedures 1364, 1373-1374 (4th ed. 2011).
314. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1196 tbl.1 (2005).
315. Supra Section I.A.
316. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1024-28, 1047-49.
317. Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9 at 107
318. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 37-56.
319. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 294 n.29 (1976) (plurality opinion).
320. Bibas, supra note 115, at 466, 474.
321. Supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
322. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 370-72 (explaining the benefits of providing the jury more information about possible sentences).
323. Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 Yale L.J. 1355, 1377 (1999) (Reviewing Stith & Cabranes, supra note 140).
324. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 40-47.
325. Ball, supra note 30, at 407-10;
326. Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) American "Revolution in Punishment Theory", 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 1113, 1120 (2011) (Discussing how parole juries could bring laypersons' sense of justice to parole release decisions).
327. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 8, 57
328. Ala. Code § 12-22-150 (LexisNexis 2012)
329. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.2(b)
330. Cal. Penal Code § 1239 (West 2004)
331. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-35 (2008)
332. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 177.055 (2011)
333. Federal Habeas Manual § 9B:27 (2012) (reviewing automatic appeal statutes for capital cases).
334. Bibas, supra note 23, at 45-48
335. Stuntz, supra note 19, at 535-38, 550-52
336. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2549 (2004).
337. Indeed, prosecutors blocked the initial version of a California law, which would have impeded charge bargaining for many serious crimes, until it was watered down to allow prosecutors to evade it through early charge bargaining.
338. Candace McCoy, Politics and Plea Bargaining: Victims' Rights in California 29-31 (1993).
339. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474-75 (2012).
340. Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 436, 479 (1980)
341. Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure, 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 361, 365 (1986) ("If a system of bargaining is to survive, the prosecutor must be allowed to carry through on the threats made in the bargaining process.").
342. Cf. Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 110-16.
343. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 Emory L.J. 377, 444 (2005)
344. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 370-73.
345. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-69
346. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2000)
347. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requiring individualized consideration at capital sentencing).
348. We have argued at greater length for a similar approach to sentencing elsewhere.
349. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 38-46, 48 (advocating a nonmandatory guideline system that would extend to prosecutors' charging decisions).
350. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (allowing reviewing courts to take into account the extent of any departure from the federal guideline range and to require more significant justifications for major departures than for minor ones) Note
351. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-53 (2007) (authorizing appellate courts to apply a presumption of reasonableness to within-guideline sentences).
352. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs, supra note 206, at 1030-31, 1042 (describing a New Jersey reform that employs such a "departure structure").
353. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' departure provision was originally intended to function much in this way.
354. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 186, at 1638-39, 1641.
355. Wright, supra note 215, at 1377 ("A standard report could inform jurors of the average sentence imposed for persons convicted of the same crimes as the defendant, and for persons who have a similar criminal record. The report... could even describe the distribution of sentences....") Note
356. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 368-69 (suggesting that "[s]tatistics could be compiled at the county, district, or state level" and provided to jurors during sentencing deliberations) Note
357. Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 359, 404 (2005) (Stating that the court could "inform[] sentencing jurors of the historical range of sentences imposed for similar crimes and defendants").
358. E.g., Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 19, at 717-18
359. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs, supra note 206, at 1036-42.
360. William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & Pol. 305, 317-321, 334-36 (2011).
361. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c) (2005) (amended 2012).
362. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-10 (2007).
363. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
364. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 Geo. L.J. 103, 135 (1998)
365. "The peak ages for criminal activity are the late teens and early twenties."
366. James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Policy, in Crime and Public Policy 619, 624
367. James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2d ed. 2011
368. "Typical offenders commit most of their crimes when they are in their early twenties, and very few after they reach their forties."
369. U.S. Dep't of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006-Statistical Tables 16 tbl.3.1 (rev. 2010) (showing that 73 percent of all felony convicts were under the age of forty at the time of sentencing), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
370. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 Crime & Just. 1, 31 (2006)
371. "There may be... justifications for confining [thirty- or forty-year-old] offenders for extended periods; but from an incapacitative perspective, such sentences are expensive, inefficient, and largely ineffective." Note
372. Beres & Griffith, supra note 234, at 136-37.
373. A few courts have already taken tentative steps down this path in the context of reviewing denials of discretionary parole.
374. Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 287, 296 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting "an extremely strong claim" that a parole board's consistent refusal to grant release based solely on the circumstances of the original crime is arbitrary and irrational), aff'd, 449 F. App'x 51 (2d Cir. 2011) Note
375. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the "immutable circumstance" of the original offense will not "inevitably sup-port[] the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety" in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence (emphasis omitted)).
376. People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 881 (Ct. App. 2010) (agreeing with a juvenile defendant's contention that his "sentence of 84 years to life constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it amounts to a de facto sentence of life without parole").
377. Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, U.S. Dep't of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates 1 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf
378. "At midyear 2005 more than half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem....") Note
379. Christopher J. Mumola & Jennifer C. Karberg, U.S. Dep't of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drug Use and Dependence, State and Federal Prisoners, 2004, at 2 (rev. 2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudsfp04.pdf
380. Stating that 33 percent of state prisoners and 26 percent of federal prisoners reported being under the influence while committing a crime.
381. N.Y. Correct. Law § 805 (McKinney Supp. 2013) (stating that a prisoner "serving a sentence with a minimum term of not more than eight years" who successfully completes a treatment program "shall be granted parole release at the expiration of his minimum term") Note
382. cf. 28 C.F.R. § 2.60(b) (2012) (making certain prisoners eligible for advancement of their presumptive release dates after "successful completion of a residential substance abuse program of at least 500 hours").
383. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 1205, 1209-1215 (1998)
384. Describing the advent of drug treatment courts as an alternative to imprisonment conditioned on the offender's successful adherence to and completion of a drug treatment program.
385. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) ("Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to [impose LWOP] in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how these differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.").
386. Barkow, supra note 203, at 1351-52
387. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 995
388. Standen, supra note 17, at 1501.
389. Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 260, 263-264 (1995).
390. As former Chief Judge Sol Wachtler famously quipped, a grand jury would "indict a ham sandwich." Note
391. Marcia Kramer & Frank Lombardi, New Top State Judge: Abolish Grand Juries & Let Us Decide, Daily News, Jan. 31, 1985, at 3.
392. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 952 (1983)
393. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1152-1153 (2008)
394. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (upholding plea bargains whereby a defendant's "plea may have been induced by promise of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or a reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial").
395. U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of the Pardon Attorney, Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction, available at http://www. justice.gov/pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf.
396. For a discussion of how poorly prosecutorial elections work in practice to illuminate the issues and check prosecutorial policy decisions.
397. Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 581, 583 (2009).
398. For our argument for publishing prosecutors' policies and making them accountable and reviewable ex ante.
399. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 40-47.
400. Cf. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 48-58, 106 (2002)
401. Describing how a more reasoned and structured prosecutorial screening process could lead to more accurate and "honest" charging and bargaining decisions.
402. Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1439, 1453 (2004).
403. Deniz Anginer et al., Should Size Matter When Regulating Firms? Implications from Backdating of Executive Options, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 22-23 (2012)
404. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 261, 299-173 (2011) ("[W]hite collar prosecutions bring significant favorable media attention.").
405. Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 295, 324-338, 360-61 (2006)
406. Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 Crime & Just. 43 (1998)
407. Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435 (2010).
408. Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Ban, 14 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 3-8 (2005)
409. Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control After District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 383, 405-406 (2009).
410. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2006) (providing for the deportability of any alien convicted of any law "relating to a controlled substance" other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana).
411. Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn't Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1393, 1399-1402 (2011) (Discussing the deportation issues raised by Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)).
412. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 703-709 (2002)
413. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 131-134 (2009).
414. That artificial divorce of collateral consequences from criminal cases is slowly changing.
415. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486-87 (2010) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense lawyers to advise clients accurately about the likelihood of deportation before they plead guilty).
416. Appleman, supra note 81, at 750-68
417. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Essay, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85, 141-144 (2004)
418. Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 801, 872-878 (2003) (Proposing plea panels focused on the fairness and voluntariness of plea waivers).
419. Arthur Rossett & Donald R. Cressey, Justice by Consent: Plea Bargains in the American Courthouse 155 (1976)
420. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1948 (1992).
421. Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347, 408-410 (1999).
422. Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. Times, July 16, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 20 (reporting that Lynne Abraham, Philadelphia's district attorney, "seeks death virtually as often as the law will allow," but also that her office "does it to get a plea to life and a death-qualified jury" (quoting Robert E. Colville, district attorney, Allegheny County) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
423. Mike Tolson, Part 1: A Deadly Distinction-Harris County Is a Pipeline to Death Row, Hous. Chron., Feb. 4, 2001, at A1
424. "If the death penalty substantively fits a given crime and I have enough stuff so that a jury will give it, tell me why I shouldn't prosecute it." (quoting John B. Holmes, former district attorney, Harris County) (internal quotation marks omitted).
425. Rachel Barkow advocates a similar review system (using either individual prosecutors or a panel) on separation-of-functions grounds for all charging, bargaining, and cooperation decisions.
426. Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 9, at 901, 915-17.
427. This charging unit would thus resemble a more limited version of not only Main Justice's procedures for authorizing capital charges but also the centralized charging unit in the New Orleans District Attorney's Office. For an excellent explanation and evaluation of how that office's charging unit worked under former District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr., see Wright & Miller, supra note 245, at 61-64.
428. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50, 85-105 (1968)
429. Documenting various ways prosecutors overcharge to induce guilty pleas); see also Bowers, supra note 17, at 1707-08 (noting prosecutors' incentives to resolve most cases quickly.
430. Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 416 ("If the sum total of death-eligible offenders reasonably corresponded to the number of persons that were actually sentenced to death, the state would fulfill the narrowing requirement.").
431. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
432. Richard S. Frase, The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, in Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy 83, 91 (Arie Freiberg & Karen Gelb eds., 2008)
433. Describing how prison capacity acted as a restraint on the Minnesota Sentencing Commission and how "any member, constituency or interest group that proposed greater severity for one group of offenders was asked to identify other offenders who could receive correspondingly reduced severity") Note
434. Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 391, 392 (1995)
435. Explaining that "Minnesota... established a 'resource constraint'" policy in which "the projected effects of sentencing standards [must] be compatible with available and planned prison resources".
436. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Their Effects, in The Sentencing Commission and Its Guidelines 16, 18-19 (1987)
437. Dale G. Parent, Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines 28 (Daniel J. Freed ed., 1988)
438. Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 Crime & Just. 1, 35-36 (2000)
439. Discussing the perceived trade-off of imprisonment-preventing crime but hardening criminals-as applied to violent and nonviolent offenders.
440. Tonry, supra note 264, at 399 (discussing the imprisonment trade-off in the context of diversion programs for minor crimes).
441. David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 Neb. L. Rev. 486, 548-53, 549 fig.2, 552 fig.3, 553 tbl.4 (2002)
442. David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 661, 698-700, 699 tbl.1, 700 tbl.2 (1983).
443. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Religion, and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988-1997, 81 Or. L. Rev. 39, 81-91 (2002)
444. Providing statistics showing how often juries return death sentences given the presence or absence of certain aggravating factors.
445. Chelsea Creo Sharon, The "Most Deserving" of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 223, 248 (2011)
446. "It is unlikely that any one aggravating factor could capture the kind of extreme culpability capable of provoking near-universal death sentencing among jurors." Note
447. For discussions of how New Jersey's and Florida's charging policies evolved and what they accomplish, see sources cited supra note 206.
448. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 125, 192-193 (2008).
449. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 38-40.
450. W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentences, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 893, 903, 916, 970 (2009)
451. Ball, supra note 30, at 399-400.
452. Ball, supra note 30, at 399-400.
453. Berman, supra note 51, at 437.
454. Supra note 30, at 408 (discussing the irreducibly normative nature of parole release decisions and the jury's role in making normative release judgments). To further push back against parole boards' lopsided incentives, parole juries could be encouraged "to think in terms of whether it is more important to keep this person in prison for another period of years or whether we should use that money to hire another teacher, fix another road, hire another police officer, or lower taxes".
455. Berman, supra note 51, at 437-38.
456. Release from Prison: European Policy and Practice (Nicola Padfield et al. eds., 2010) (reviewing European approaches to parole release).
457. Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1785-87.
458. See, e.g., In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (Cal. 2008) (holding that where "evidence of the inmate's rehabilitation and suitability for parole... is overwhelming," the original circumstances of the offense and conviction will not "inevitably support[]" denying parole (emphasis omitted)).
459. George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 212, 213 (2004)
460. Describing methods whereby judges would petition the president for clemency.
461. Joanna M. Huang, Correcting Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency, 60 Duke L.J. 131, 156-165 (2010)
462. Reviewing modern cases in which judges recommended clemency in their written opinions and requested that their opinions be sent to the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
463. Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 153, 155-156 (2009).
464. As with parole boards, such commissions could be encouraged or required explicitly to take costs and benefits into account in their recommendations.
465. Huang, supra note 276, at 152-57.
466. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1099, 1128 (2005) (Reviewing Richard H. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law (2003)
467. Amar, supra note 181, at 1132 (arguing that "[a] close look at the Bill [of Rights] reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with language of rights" in order to empower popular majoritarian sovereignty).
468. Charles, supra note 279, at 1128.
469. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 197
470. Arguing that the Warren Court's top-down, judicially enforced individual rights approach to criminal procedure has outlived its usefulness and is impeding reform in an era of greater minority enfranchisement and new approaches to community policing.