The five worst (and five best) American criminal codes

Northwestern University Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-62

  Robinson, Paul H ^a   Cahill, Michael T ^a   Mohammad, Usman ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0042407940     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (396)

1. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
2. To do so would be something like selling a "fundamentals of wrestling" course at a World Championship Wrestling convention - in some trades, even the "professionals" show little devotion to craftsmanship.
3. The United States, each of the fifty states individually, and the District of Columbia all have criminal codes, for a total of fifty-two.
4. For a discussion of the functions, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 125, 138-42 (1997).
5. For a general discussion of the distinction between rules of conduct and principles of adjudication, see Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (1990).
6. This is a Model Penal Code phrase. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12(2) (1962).
7. ROBINSON, supra note 4, app. A, § 3 (Injury to a Person).
8. As will become clear later, however, sometimes substantive decisions directly affect the efficacy of the code's communicative or structural power - as, for example, when the legislature drafts numerous specific, trivial offenses that undermine the code's authority and clarity. See generally infra Part IV.
9. For any number of reasons, the systematic injustices from code provisions on which we focus may not actually occur. For example, prosecutors or judges may refuse to apply the code as written, or juries may refuse to follow jury instructions derived from the code's rule. But a criminal code has failed, and deserves criticism, when injustice or failures of justice are avoided only because of decision makers' exercise of discretion, especially where avoiding injustice requires the decision maker to refuse to follow the law as written.
10. We expect that our five criteria, and our exposition in this Part of their basis, will be relatively uncontroversial in terms of identifying traits of a criminal code. It is certainly possible, however, that there are additional such traits that we neglected, or that reasonable minds may differ over the proper emphasis to give one goal relative to others. For a fuller discussion of the functions and goals of criminal statutes, see generally ROBINSON, supra note 4; GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (2d ed. 1961); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (1994); and Robinson, supra note 5.
11. We expect that our five criteria, and our exposition in this Part of their basis, will be relatively uncontroversial in terms of identifying traits of a criminal code. It is certainly possible, however, that there are additional such traits that we neglected, or that reasonable minds may differ over the proper emphasis to give one goal relative to others. For a fuller discussion of the functions and goals of criminal statutes, see generally ROBINSON, supra note 4; GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (2d ed. 1961); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (1994); and Robinson, supra note 5.
12. We expect that our five criteria, and our exposition in this Part of their basis, will be relatively uncontroversial in terms of identifying traits of a criminal code. It is certainly possible, however, that there are additional such traits that we neglected, or that reasonable minds may differ over the proper emphasis to give one goal relative to others. For a fuller discussion of the functions and goals of criminal statutes, see generally ROBINSON, supra note 4; GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (2d ed. 1961); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (1994); and Robinson, supra note 5.
13. We expect that our five criteria, and our exposition in this Part of their basis, will be relatively uncontroversial in terms of identifying traits of a criminal code. It is certainly possible, however, that there are additional such traits that we neglected, or that reasonable minds may differ over the proper emphasis to give one goal relative to others. For a fuller discussion of the functions and goals of criminal statutes, see generally ROBINSON, supra note 4; GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (2d ed. 1961); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (1994); and Robinson, supra note 5.
14. See infra Appendix A, Question 1, for a summary list of these factors.
15. For example, the legislature may modify the length of the sentencing range for an offense grade without considering uncodified offenses falling within that grade. At the very least, the existence of uncodified offenses would make such legislative tasks considerably more difficult.
16. This is especially significant given the categories of offenses that most commonly fall outside criminal codes: narcotics and firearms offenses. Absent a clear legislative statement, the proper requisite culpability level with respect to significant elements of these offenses - e.g., whether a substance is in fact the controlled substance in question, how much of that substance is in one's possession, whether one's weapon is automatic or semiautomatic - will be far from obvious.
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05(1).
18. See id. § 2.01(3)(b) (specifically, the Code discusses a duty otherwise imposed by "law").
19. See e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 4.4, at 107 (2d ed 1995); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, at 284 (1986) ("Generally one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to himself.... A moral duty to take affirmative action is not enough to impose a legal duty to do so."); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 197 § 3.4 (1997).
20. See e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 4.4, at 107 (2d ed 1995); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, at 284 (1986) ("Generally one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to himself.... A moral duty to take affirmative action is not enough to impose a legal duty to do so."); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 197 § 3.4 (1997).
21. It is, perhaps, no mere rhetorical coincidence that the reflexive response of any American over the age of three to nearly any accusation is to say, "I didn't do anything!"
22. It also furthers the notice objective to structure the code in such a way that relevant definitions are easily found and are not duplicative of one another. As with the objective of ensuring that all offenses are codified, this requirement benefits both the citizenry (by making notification easier) and the legislature (by making later review and revision easier). For example, if a code defines ubiquitous terms such as "intent" or "serious bodily injury" in one place rather than in several places, the reader knows to apply the same definition whenever she encounters that term, and the legislature can more easily revise the definition of that term with reassurance that the revision will apply throughout the code. Cf. supra section II.A.1.
23. In practical terms, effective communication would also demand that the code is actually available and accessible to the public. Because evaluation of codes according to this factor would require external research into matters falling outside the four corners of the codes themselves, such an assessment is outside the range of our immediate project and of this Article. For this reason, although it appears on our Evaluation Form, it is bracketed to indicate that it did not guide our actual decision making. See infra Appendix A at 2.F. Still, states' success in satisfying this goal could and should be a subject for future research. Empirical questions on this matter would include: how do state governments make their criminal codes available to citizens? Are these methods effective? Interesting policy questions arise in this area as well. For example, should state governments place their criminal codes on the Internet, where access is easy and the cost of provision is low, or would problems of authenticity and reliability overwhelm the utility of this method? The Evaluation Form also acknowledges the relevance of, but "brackets" as outside the scope of our project, other elements of codes' presentation in published form - such as the provision or absence of internal cross-references - over which the legislative body could have no practical control, even though they might impact on the effectiveness of the code's communication.
24. See infra Appendix A.
25. Of course, to some extent, this notion would require that justification rules be simple in their substance as well as in the manner of their expression. We seek to take no opinion as to the proper content of the rules, however; indeed, as we point out later, overly simple justification rules are at cross purposes to the goal of accuracy in liability determinitions. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Here we merely wish to emphasize the importance of articulating those rules in an especially lucid way. (The Natural conflict between rules of conduct and principles of adjudication over how detailed thr justification rules should be can best be resolved by having separate codes, as one of us has argued elsewhere. See ROBINSON. supra note 4, at 188-90.).
26. That most criminal codes failto express justification rules clearly or concisely may be a sign that code drafters have not differentiated between justification defenses (which relate to conduct) and excuse defenses (which relate to blameworthiness). See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3 (defining justification defenses subjectively; a person is "justifiable" if she "believes" that circumstances exist that would make her conduct justified).
27. See generally supra subpart II.A.
28. See infra Appendix A.
29. See supra text accompanying note 7.
30. Indeed, it has been argued that provision of notice regarding rules of adjudication is entirely irrelevant and possibly even counterproductive. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). We do not support the notion of keeping the adjudication principles from the public. In an open society like ours, they are bound to become public at some time. Any effort to hide them from the public will only produce a cynicism about the system that cannot help but undercut the code's credibility with the public.
31. At the same time, however, there are certain provisions that relate both to conduct and to adjudication, namely justification rules, which exempt objective acts (rather than subjective actors) from liability, but frequently do so on the basis of the reasonableness of the actor's presumed motivations. Because of the interplay of act and intention in the context of justifications, added complexity makes them better in terms of adjudicative accuracy but worse in terms of providing notice or expecting principled compliance. For example, the extremely detailed justification defenses in the Model Penal Code may serve the adjudication function well, but they are far too complex to actually be known and applied correctly by the actor when she acts See. e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3, §§ 3.04-3.05.
32. It may seem curious that we are again discussing the rules of conduct, even though this criterion of analysis purports to evaluate the rules of adjudication. This is so because the presence of conduct rules that do not comport with public sensibilities regarding what conduct should be criminalized operates to undermine the code's adjudicative power. Though undesirable in themselves, these offenses may adequately or even admirably fulfill the functions of a code with respect to rules of conduct; i.e., they may be well-organized and clearly articulated, such that the code has done its duty in notifying the public of their existence. Their presence in the code will, however, reduce the adjudicative accuracy of the code because it will guarantee, or at least raise the possibility, that persons undeserving of the stamp of criminal sanction will nonetheless be adjudged liable by a judicial decision maker. In other words, whatever one might think about the activities outlawed by trivial offenses - most of which are, in fact, socially undesirable - they do not merit the moral stigma (or the judicial resources) involved in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, trivial offenses are undesirable not only because those activities themselves are minor or morally insignificant, but because their existence subverts the moral and social power of the criminal code as a whole. However slight its effect on the public, to criminalize the trivial is to trivialize the criminal.
33. See infra Appendix A.
34. On the other side of this issue lies the possibility that a code will fail to criminalize conduct that does deserve criminal sanction. Such "gaps" are exceedingly rare, however. The only recurring example of failure to criminalize conduct that (we would argue) warrants a criminal conviction is the refusal of some codes to provide generally for the punishment of negligent homicide. In keeping with generally shared moral intuitions and strongly held convictions regarding the significance of resulting harm, see infra note 34 and accompanying text, it is improper for a code to lack such a provision.
35. This is particularly true at the law enforcement level and especially so during a time in which the "broken windows" theory of crime prevention advocates zealous enforcement of relatively minor crimes. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998).
36. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12. This general defense ensures a baseline level of moral credibility for a criminal code, as it guarantees against prosecution for insufficiently grave conduct.
37. See id. § 5.01.
38. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 14-27 (1995).
39. Imposition of criminal liability under a strict liability or negligence standard has been widely criticized, and rightly so, for it satisfies neither the consequentialist nor the retributivist theory of criminal law. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.3(a); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.8, at 348-49 & nn.32-33 ("For the most part, the commentators have been critical of strict-liability crimes.") (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 423-24 (1958); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 228-30. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea III - The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
40. Imposition of criminal liability under a strict liability or negligence standard has been widely criticized, and rightly so, for it satisfies neither the consequentialist nor the retributivist theory of criminal law. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.3(a); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.8, at 348-49 & nn.32-33 ("For the most part, the commentators have been critical of strict-liability crimes.") (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 423-24 (1958); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 228-30. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea III - The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
41. Imposition of criminal liability under a strict liability or negligence standard has been widely criticized, and rightly so, for it satisfies neither the consequentialist nor the retributivist theory of criminal law. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.3(a); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.8, at 348-49 & nn.32-33 ("For the most part, the commentators have been critical of strict-liability crimes.") (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 423-24 (1958); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 228-30. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea III - The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
42. Imposition of criminal liability under a strict liability or negligence standard has been widely criticized, and rightly so, for it satisfies neither the consequentialist nor the retributivist theory of criminal law. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.3(a); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.8, at 348-49 & nn.32-33 ("For the most part, the commentators have been critical of strict-liability crimes.") (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 423-24 (1958); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 228-30. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea III - The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
43. Imposition of criminal liability under a strict liability or negligence standard has been widely criticized, and rightly so, for it satisfies neither the consequentialist nor the retributivist theory of criminal law. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.3(a); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.8, at 348-49 & nn.32-33 ("For the most part, the commentators have been critical of strict-liability crimes.") (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 423-24 (1958); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 228-30. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea III - The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
44. See. e.g., 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.12(h), at 419 (noting "a growing dissatisfaction with the felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrines, concerning which there is a slowly-emerging trend toward legislative abolition"); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, §§ 7.5(h), 7.13(e); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 730-36. See generally Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985).
45. See. e.g., 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.12(h), at 419 (noting "a growing dissatisfaction with the felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrines, concerning which there is a slowly-emerging trend toward legislative abolition"); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, §§ 7.5(h), 7.13(e); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 730-36. See generally Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985).
46. See supra sections II.A.2. and II.C.2.
47. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 4.9; 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 5.4; ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 407-14.
48. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 4.9; 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 5.4; ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 407-14.
49. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 6.7(b); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 5.1; ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 549-54.
50. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 6.7(b); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 5.1; ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 549-54.
51. See infra Appendix A.
52. Note that the actual sentences that attach to a given "grade" will generally have little significance for the inquiry into the code's consistency. For example, if a code has six felony grades (say, "A" through "F"), and all of the "A" felonies seem both similarly serious and more serious than any "B" felonies, and so on for each grade, then the analysis is essentially over. The actual sentencing provisions for any given grade are then irrelevant except (perhaps) insofar as the sentences for one grade vary greatly from the sentences for the next closest grade, thus amplifying the significance of the legislature's decision to place an offense in one grade rather than another (and making "mistakes" costlier).
53. Within this category, codes that not only fail to provide sentence grades but that also provide only maximum sentences for offenses fare even worse under the consistency standard. Although the maximum sentence, when compared with other maxima for other offenses, signals the relative seriousness of the offense in the legislature's opinion, the absence of a minimum sentence forecloses any assurance that "more serious" crimes will in fact be punished more seriously. That is, absent a statutory minimum, a violator of a "high-grade" crime can still be given a "low-grade" penalty, so appropriate punishment is not guaranteed. The same, of course, holds true for states that have grading systems, but whose offense grades reflect only sentencing maxima rather than ranges of appropriate sentences. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-20 (Law. Co-op. 1995). This marks a second exception to the general rule that it is unnecessary to look behind offense grades to the sentences associated with those grades.
54. For evidence that there is a widely shared and strongly held general public belief in the significance of resulting harm, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, and ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. For evidence that there is a widely shared and strongly held general public belief in the significance of resulting harm, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, and ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
56. For a discussion of these goals, see generally supra Part I.
57. For a discussion of these criteria and the more specific factors we eventually employed to evaluate codes according to each criterion, see generally supra Part II.
58. For a copy of the final Evaluation Form, see infra Appendix A.
59. But note our caveat, see infra note 248 and accompanying text, that criminal codes generally could do a better job of articulating and announcing conduct rules if they segregated such rules into a separate code of conduct.
60. See infra Appendix A.
61. See id.
62. Of course, additional problems could lower a code's score even further, and a code could receive a very low score without having any of the specific problems we highlighted. For example, on Question 5, a code with no offense grading system could not receive a score higher than 2.0, but could certainly receive a score below 2.0, and a code that did have a grading system could also receive a score of 2.0 or lower because of other shortcomings. In short, satisfaction of a requirement was necessary, but not sufficient, to receive a score above the maximum set out by the requirement.
63. For Question 1, we mandated that a code's score could not exceed 2.0 if that code either allowed for the punishment of uncodified crimes or failed to include justification defenses. Obviously, a code with both of these failings would receive an even lower score. It is important to note, though, that "maximum of 2.0" is not the same as "automatic 2-point reduction," although it might have the same effect as the latter rule in specific cases. Thus, a code that violated two "maximum of 2" requirements would not automatically receive a score of 0, nor does the fact that a violator of a "maximum of 2" rule actually received a 2.0 indicate that that code is otherwise perfect and would have received a score of 4.0 but for that violation. This distinction is especially sensible if we assume that the gains from codification have diminishing marginal utility such that the shift from 0 to 2 represents a more meaningful accomplishment than the move from 2 to 4. Note at the same time, though, that - as with an object approaching the speed of light - marginal gains, even if less important, are often more difficult as a score approaches 4.0. The shift from 0 to 1 is therefore usually both easier and more important than the shift from 3 to 4. For Question 2, we imposed a maximum score of 2.0 for any code whose organization was incomprehensible or arbitrary, and a maximum score of 1.0 for any code lacking a distinct "general part" for basic principles governing all offenses. Paralleling Question 1's justification requirement, no code could receive a score above 2.0 on Question 3 if it failed to include excuse and nonexculpatory defenses. A code employing "criminal negligence," rather than a stricter baseline such as "criminal recklessness," as its standard culpability requirement could receive a score no higher than 2.5 on Question 4. Finally, there were two scoring rules for Question 5: a maximum score of 2.5 for any code lacking an offense grading system, and a maximum score of 2.0 for any code that did not make a clear grading distinction between inchoate and completed offenses.
64. See generally supra Part II.
65. This work was done not only by the co-authors but by all members of the Seminar. See supra note
66. All rescoring and other quality control work was overseen directly by the three co-authors.
67. For especially wide-ranging or subjective factors, we developed sets of "test offenses" to which the scorer would refer in order to place each code into the proper basket. This would guarantee consistent, neutral review of each of the codes on the same terms. Factors for which the basket-placement process relied on "test offenses" are noted on the Form provided in Appendix A, as are the test offenses employed for each such factor.
68. The use of a numbered-basket shorthand to make crude initial comparisons should not be confused with an effort to "score" or quantify each factor individually. Although the scoring of each code for each question was numerical, and each question was given equal weight when tabulating a total score for each code, the individual factors relating to each question were not assigned definitive scores, objectively weighted, or "added up" to ascertain the score for the question. Case-by-case determinations were made regarding a code's satisfaction of each factor and the factor's relative significance in fixing a score for the code. The ultimate focus was always on arriving at a holistic evaluation of the code's performance in relation to the abstract concerns addressed by the question and, importantly, in relation to other codes' performances. The nature of the project, after all, involved both a cardinal measurement (how close is this code to the "perfect 4" for the question?) and an ordinal ranking (is this code better or worse than the other real-world legislative efforts?).
69. These were matched only by their counterparts for Question 3.
70. Then again, if the low score results from failure to define terms, the state's criminal law will indeed qualify as a "code," but in the cryptographic rather than the legislative sense. The current project does not value the sort of codes that are difficult to "crack," however.
71. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-1 (1994).
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-02-01(1) (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(a)(Vernon 1994).
73. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-02-01(1) (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(a)(Vernon 1994).
74. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-02-01(1) (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(a)(Vernon 1994).
75. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-02-01(1) (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(a)(Vernon 1994).
76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-02-01(1) (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(a)(Vernon 1994).
77. Unfortunately, hardly any other states do so. Moreover, not even the four states cited go so far as to define the specific affirmative duties, failure to perform which will subject a person to criminal liability.
78. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 233 (1995); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996) ("No conduct or omission constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this code or under another statute.").
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 233 (1995); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996) ("No conduct or omission constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this code or under another statute.").
80. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-1 (West 1995) ("Liability for the Commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (1) The omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (2) A duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-01(2) (1997) ("A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless the person has a legal duty to perform the act."). This language - "imposed by law" or "legal duty" - may embrace judge-made, as well as statutory, law.
81. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-1 (West 1995) ("Liability for the Commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (1) The omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (2) A duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-01(2) (1997) ("A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless the person has a legal duty to perform the act."). This language - "imposed by law" or "legal duty" - may embrace judge-made, as well as statutory, law.
82. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-1 (West 1995) ("Liability for the Commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (1) The omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (2) A duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-01(2) (1997) ("A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless the person has a legal duty to perform the act."). This language - "imposed by law" or "legal duty" - may embrace judge-made, as well as statutory, law.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.1 (Lexis 1999).
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 461-471 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 627:1-:9 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 9.01-9.63 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-401 to -406 (1999).
85. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 461-471 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 627:1-:9 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 9.01-9.63 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-401 to -406 (1999).
86. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 461-471 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 627:1-:9 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 9.01-9.63 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-401 to -406 (1999).
87. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 461-471 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 627:1-:9 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 9.01-9.63 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-401 to -406 (1999).
88. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 461-471 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 627:1-:9 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 9.01-9.63 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-401 to -406 (1999).
89. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1996) (providing for "competing harms"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 9.22 (West 1994).
90. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1996) (providing for "competing harms"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 9.22 (West 1994).
91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1996) (providing for "competing harms"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 9.22 (West 1994).
92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1996) (providing for "competing harms"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 9.22 (West 1994).
93. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1995).
94. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (Law. Co-op. 1992); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-3 (1994).
95. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (Law. Co-op. 1992); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-3 (1994).
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-610 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
97. See. e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (ironically entitling provision "murder defined," but not defining the term "murder").
98. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18-805 (aggravated arson), -905 (aggravated assault), -907 (aggravated battery), -6101 (rape), -8006 (DUI) (Michie 1997).
99. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504.1 (1996).
100. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4101 (1996).
101. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 1995).
102. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b) (West 1995).
103. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-1 (West 1995).
104. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example, Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
105. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example, Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
106. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example, Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
107. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example, Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
108. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example, Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
109. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example, Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
110. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example, Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
111. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example, Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
112. As another example, Utah has an extensive general definition section in the general part of its code and additionally employs sections such as § 76-6-101, which defines terms, like "property" and "habitable structure," relating specifically to offenses against property.
113. See supra section II.B.2.
114. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (1994).
115. W. VA. CODE § 61-1-8 (1997).
116. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-701, -701.5 (Michie 1994).
117. For instance, the ten lowest-scoring states on Question 2 all lack justification defenses in their criminal codes.
118. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409 (1995).
119. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-19 (1995).
120. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.209, 215, 219 (1997).
121. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 608 (1999).
122. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1023-1024 (1998).
123. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-1 to -7 (2000).
124. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 to -103 (1994).
125. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-117 (1994).
126. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13H (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment).
127. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13J (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment).
128. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13K (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment).
129. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment).
130. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 15 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment).
131. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 18A (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of life imprisonment; minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment).
132. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-408 (1999).
133. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-8(b) (1994).
134. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 701-109 (Michie 1994).
135. See MINN. STAT. § 609.035 (1987).
136. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07.
137. Of course, some forms of homicide may merit more or less serious punishment than others, but this is a matter for the rules of adjudication, not the rules of conduct. Indeed, this example highlights the difficulties - both practical and conceptual - that attend the mistake of complicating the rules of conduct in order to make adjudicatory distinctions. Mississippi would better serve the notice function as to conduct if it had a single homicide provision ("thou shall not kill") and another, more complex set of provisions setting out the punishment for various homicides that were considered more or less blameworthy.
138. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 9 (Law Co-Op. 1992).
139. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 12 (Law Co-Op. 1992).
140. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 387 (1996).
141. See MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 388 (1996).
142. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.546, .547, .552 (West 1991).
143. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.552b (West 1991).
144. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.548 (West 1991).
145. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.549 (West 1991).
146. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.550 (West 1991).
147. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.551 (West 1991).
148. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.547, .550 (West 1991).
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-18 (Lexis 1999); see also, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265 § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (catchall manslaughter provision); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-4 to -5 (1997) (voluntary and involuntary manslaughter provisions).
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-18 (Lexis 1999); see also, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265 § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (catchall manslaughter provision); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-4 to -5 (1997) (voluntary and involuntary manslaughter provisions).
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-18 (Lexis 1999); see also, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265 § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (catchall manslaughter provision); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-4 to -5 (1997) (voluntary and involuntary manslaughter provisions).
152. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (Michie 1999).
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
154. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101 (Michie 1999).
155. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-206 (Michie 1994);
156. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-206 (Michie 1994);
157. 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-5 to -8 (West 1999);
158. Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.016 (1999);
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2 (West 1995);
160. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (1997);
161. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 6.03 (West 1994);
162. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
163. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 704.10, 701.4 (West 1993).
164. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8 (Michie Supp. 1999).
165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1999).
166. Until recently, Oklahoma had a similar provision. In 1998, however, Oklahoma amended the statute to replace the word "idiot" with a more thorough elaboration of the diminished capacity defense. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152(3) (West Supp. 1999).
167. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4 (West 1995).
168. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8 (West 1995).
169. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West 1995).
170. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (West 1995).
171. See N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:2-12 (West 1995).
172. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1995).
173. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-11 (West 1995).
174. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-1 (West Supp. 1999).
175. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6 (West Supp. 1999).
176. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-1 to -3, 5/7-11 to -14 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
177. See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 562.031-.086 (West 1999).
178. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-218 to -237 (Michie 1994).
179. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-708 to -803 (1999).
180. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8.01-.07 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
181. The codes of Florida, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia contain none of the general adjudicatory provisions noted in the text.
182. For example, Arkansas has a provision governing causation, but that provision is not especially clear or thorough: Causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant operating either alone or concurrently with another cause unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant clearly insufficient. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-205 (Michie 1997).
183. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 702-214, -215 (Michie 1994). Other provisions set out specific rules governing the legal standard of causation in cases involving recklessness, negligence, and strict liability. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-216, -217 (Michie 1994).
184. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 702-214, -215 (Michie 1994). Other provisions set out specific rules governing the legal standard of causation in cases involving recklessness, negligence, and strict liability. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-216, -217 (Michie 1994).
185. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-221 to -224 (Michie 1994).
186. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-233 to -235 (Michie 1994).
187. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-226 (Michie 1994).
188. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-227, -228 (Michie 1994).
189. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:2-3, -6, -7, -10 (West 1995) (covering, respectively, causation, complicity, corporate liability, and consent).
190. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-505, -601 to -607 (1999) (consent; complicity, and corporate liability).
191. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-05, 03-01 to -04 (1997) (causation; complicity, and corporate liability).
192. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b)(1) (West 1995).
194. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
195. HAW. REV. STAT ANN. § 704-400 (Michie 1999)
196. See infra subpart IV.F and Part V. Moreover, although for each of our final two criteria it is difficult for a code to score well, only for this criterion is it so easy for a state to score very poorly. See infra text accompanying note 191.
197. MD ANN CODE. art. 27, § 158A (1996); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-358 (1999) (crimnalizing violation of certain contracts between landlord and tenant for some counties only).
198. MD ANN CODE. art. 27, § 158A (1996); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-358 (1999) (crimnalizing violation of certain contracts between landlord and tenant for some counties only).
199. See MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, §§ 70-70B (1996).
200. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.494 (West 1991).
201. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.337 (West 1991).
202. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.532 (West 1991).
203. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.542 (West 1991).
204. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41 (West 1991); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? SEVENTEEN CASES THAT CHALLENGED THE LAW (1999) (providing stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, and crime).
205. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41 (West 1991); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? SEVENTEEN CASES THAT CHALLENGED THE LAW (1999) (providing stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, and crime).
206. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-380.1 (1999).
207. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 597g (West 1998). California amended this provision, although not significantly, in 1994. See 1994 Cal. Stat., 1st Ex. Sess., c.8 § 1. If anything, this manifest willingness to tinker around the edges of insignificant penal laws reflects more poorly on a state than the legislative sloth to which those laws' continued existence is normally attributable - especially when there are more substantial shortcomings warranting attention. See e.g., supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (regarding California's "idiot" defense).
208. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 597g (West 1998). California amended this provision, although not significantly, in 1994. See 1994 Cal. Stat., 1st Ex. Sess., c.8 § 1. If anything, this manifest willingness to tinker around the edges of insignificant penal laws reflects more poorly on a state than the legislative sloth to which those laws' continued existence is normally attributable - especially when there are more substantial shortcomings warranting attention. See e.g., supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (regarding California's "idiot" defense).
209. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 597g (West 1998). California amended this provision, although not significantly, in 1994. See 1994 Cal. Stat., 1st Ex. Sess., c.8 § 1. If anything, this manifest willingness to tinker around the edges of insignificant penal laws reflects more poorly on a state than the legislative sloth to which those laws' continued existence is normally attributable - especially when there are more substantial shortcomings warranting attention. See e.g., supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (regarding California's "idiot" defense).
210. W. VA. CODE § 61-10-21 (1997).
211. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 437.030 (Michie 1999) (prohibiting challenge to duel or acceptance of challenge; minimum sentence six months); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.171-.172 (West 1991); cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.320 (West 1991) (making "second" to duel "accessory before the fact to crime of murder" if death results).
212. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 437.030 (Michie 1999) (prohibiting challenge to duel or acceptance of challenge; minimum sentence six months); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.171-.172 (West 1991); cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.320 (West 1991) (making "second" to duel "accessory before the fact to crime of murder" if death results).
213. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 437.030 (Michie 1999) (prohibiting challenge to duel or acceptance of challenge; minimum sentence six months); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.171-.172 (West 1991); cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.320 (West 1991) (making "second" to duel "accessory before the fact to crime of murder" if death results).
214. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-15-104 (Michie 1997) (establishing sentence of two months to one year "at hard labor");
215. see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.173 (West 1991).
216. Hawaii, for example, deems fit to include the regulation of cigarette packages in its criminal code: Prohibited cigarette sales of less than twenty. (1) It shall be unlawful to sell single cigarettes or packs of cigarettes containing less than twenty cigarettes. It further shall be unlawful to sell cigarettes other than in sealed packages originating with the manufacturer and bearing the health warning required by law. (2) As used in this section, "to sell" include [sic]: to solicit and receive an order for; to have or keep, or offer, or expose for sale; to deliver for value or in any other way than purely gratuitously; to peddle; to keep with intent to sell; and to traffic in. (3) "Sale" includes every act of selling as defined in [subsection (2)]. (4) Any person who violates subsection (1), shall be fined not more than $2,500 for the first offense. Any subsequent offense shall subject the person to a fine of not less than $100 and not more than $5,000. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1257 (Michie Supp. 1997).
217. Michigan itself does not have a general reckless endangerment provision.
218. States whose criminal codes include no definition of the term $attempt$ include, but are not limited to, West Virginia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Maryland, and New Mexico.
219. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-7 (2000). "Any overt act" is too thin a conduct element for attempt, in part because it fails to provide an actor with a reasonable opportunity to change his mind during even the preparation stage. Unfortunately, the higher-ranking criminal codes under Question 4 do not fare much better with respect to this factor. Instead of the "overt act" requirement, these states - following the uncharacteristically questionable guidance of the Model Penal Code, § 5.01 - usually employ the only marginally more rigorous definition of attempt as any "substantial step" toward the perpetration of an offense. "Substantial step" may be too thin a conduct element since merely preparatory acts may be considered substantial steps in an attempt to commit a crime, despite the fact that the defendant changed his mind after preparing to commit the crime (but does not satisfy the requirements of a renunciation defense). The more important objection to the substantial step is that it conflicts with widely held community intuitions that would not impose criminal liability, even of an inchoate type, until a person had done much more than a substantial step. See
220. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-7 (2000). "Any overt act" is too thin a conduct element for attempt, in part because it fails to provide an actor with a reasonable opportunity to change his mind during even the preparation stage. Unfortunately, the higher-ranking criminal codes under Question 4 do not fare much better with respect to this factor. Instead of the "overt act" requirement, these states - following the uncharacteristically questionable guidance of the Model Penal Code, § 5.01 - usually employ the only marginally more rigorous definition of attempt as any "substantial step" toward the perpetration of an offense. "Substantial step" may be too thin a conduct element since merely preparatory acts may be considered substantial steps in an attempt to commit a crime, despite the fact that the defendant changed his mind after preparing to commit the crime (but does not satisfy the requirements of a renunciation defense). The more important objection to the substantial step is that it conflicts with widely held community intuitions that would not impose criminal liability, even of an inchoate type, until a person had done much more than a substantial step. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 34, at 14-27. The Model Penal Code aggravates this gap with community views by generally grading inchoate offenses the same as the completed offense, also in conflict with community views. See id. at 20, 181-88.
221. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-7 (2000). "Any overt act" is too thin a conduct element for attempt, in part because it fails to provide an actor with a reasonable opportunity to change his mind during even the preparation stage. Unfortunately, the higher-ranking criminal codes under Question 4 do not fare much better with respect to this factor. Instead of the "overt act" requirement, these states - following the uncharacteristically questionable guidance of the Model Penal Code, § 5.01 - usually employ the only marginally more rigorous definition of attempt as any "substantial step" toward the perpetration of an offense. "Substantial step" may be too thin a conduct element since merely preparatory acts may be considered substantial steps in an attempt to commit a crime, despite the fact that the defendant changed his mind after preparing to commit the crime (but does not satisfy the requirements of a renunciation defense). The more important objection to the substantial step is that it conflicts with widely held community intuitions that would not impose criminal liability, even of an inchoate type, until a person had done much more than a substantial step. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 34, at 14-27. The Model Penal Code aggravates this gap with community views by generally grading inchoate offenses the same as the completed offense, also in conflict with community views. See id. at 20, 181-88.
222. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (a) (West 1994). Similarly, Minnesota, while requiring only the "substantial step" of the Model Penal Code formulation, nonetheless curtails the thinness of the conduct requirement by requiring "an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime." MINN. STAT. § 609.17(1) (1987).
223. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (a) (West 1994). Similarly, Minnesota, while requiring only the "substantial step" of the Model Penal Code formulation, nonetheless curtails the thinness of the conduct requirement by requiring "an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime." MINN. STAT. § 609.17(1) (1987).
224. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (defining attempt to include only "conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense").
225. The following jurisdictions have no general part: Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia.
226. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501 (1999) (defining culpability terms); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (1996) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00 (McKinney 1998) (same).
227. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501 (1999) (defining culpability terms); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (1996) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00 (McKinney 1998) (same).
228. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501 (1999) (defining culpability terms); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (1996) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00 (McKinney 1998) (same).
229. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b) (Michie 1998).
230. See OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115 (1997).
231. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Michie 1994).
232. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-33 (Michie Supp. 1999).
233. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (1972 & Supp. 1999).
234. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-27 (1972 & Supp. 1999).
235. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-29 (1972).
236. Such provisions are typically found outside the state's criminal code. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982). For a summary of the common criticisms of such rules, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173(h) (1984).
237. Such provisions are typically found outside the state's criminal code. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982). For a summary of the common criticisms of such rules, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173(h) (1984).
238. Such provisions are typically found outside the state's criminal code. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982). For a summary of the common criticisms of such rules, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173(h) (1984).
239. See e.g., KANS. CRIM. CODE ANN. §§ 21-3401(b), 21-3436 (West 1995).
240. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3.a(3) (West Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01.1.c (1997).
241. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3.a(3) (West Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01.1.c (1997).
242. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b).
243. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
244. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
245. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
246. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
247. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
248. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
249. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
250. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
251. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
252. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
253. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
254. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
255. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
256. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
257. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
258. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
259. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
260. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
261. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
262. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
263. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
264. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
265. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
266. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
267. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
268. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
269. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
270. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
271. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
272. See e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (LAW. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
273. The Model Penal Code includes provisions covering the following defenses: involuntary act (§ 2.01(1)) ignorance or mistake (§ 2.04), intoxication (§ 2.08), duress (§ 2.09), military orders (§ 2.10), consent (§ 2.11), de minimis infractions (§ 2.12), entrapment (§ 2.13), public duty (§ 3.03), protection of self (§ 3.04) protection of others (§ 3.05), protection of property (§ 3.06), law enforcement (§ 3.07), special responsibility (§ 3.08), mental disease or defect (§ 4.01), immaturity (§ 4.10), and choice of evils (§ 3.02) States adopting the MPC's "choice of evils" defense sometimes refer to it as the "necessity" defense See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (West 1994).
274. The Model Penal Code includes provisions covering the following defenses: involuntary act (§ 2.01(1)) ignorance or mistake (§ 2.04), intoxication (§ 2.08), duress (§ 2.09), military orders (§ 2.10), consent (§ 2.11), de minimis infractions (§ 2.12), entrapment (§ 2.13), public duty (§ 3.03), protection of self (§ 3.04) protection of others (§ 3.05), protection of property (§ 3.06), law enforcement (§ 3.07), special responsibility (§ 3.08), mental disease or defect (§ 4.01), immaturity (§ 4.10), and choice of evils (§ 3.02) States adopting the MPC's "choice of evils" defense sometimes refer to it as the "necessity" defense See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (West 1994).
275. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 702-200, -218 to -220, -230 to -237, 704-400 (1994).
276. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4 (West 1995).
277. Tennessee, for example, managed to score a 3.35 under Question 4 despite the fact that it lacked immaturity, consent, military orders, de minimis, and entrapment defenses. In fact, Texas managed to obtain a 3.8 under Question 4 (slightly above the score given to the MPC for this question) despite the fact that its code did not contain any military orders, consent, or de minimis defenses.
278. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-8.07 (West 1994).
279. For example, a code that imposed a maximum five-year sentence for rape or murder, or a minimum five-year sentence for jaywalking, would confine discretion in a harmful way and be worse than a code with no sentencing provisions at all.
280. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
281. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 9 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
282. One wonders whether such casuistic hair-splitting in a code covers more bases or fewer; with distinctions like this, would it be a defense to argue that one's behavior was neither a "boxing match" nor a "prize fight," but merely a "pugilistic exhibition"?
283. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.102.11 (West Supp. 1999).
284. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.250 (Michie 1998).
285. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-90, 16-1-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999). But cf. S.C.CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) (exempting certain offenses from classification).
286. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-90, 16-1-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999). But cf. S.C.CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) (exempting certain offenses from classification).
287. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
288. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-601 (West 1989).
289. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor categories, and 1 "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misdemeanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "unclassified felonies," 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and 1 "violation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, 1 "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrug" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-20(a) (West Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
290. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor categories, and 1 "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misdemeanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "unclassified felonies," 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and 1 "violation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, 1 "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrug" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-20(a) (West Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
291. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor categories, and 1 "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misdemeanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "unclassified felonies," 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and 1 "violation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, 1 "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrug" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-20(a) (West Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
292. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor categories, and 1 "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misdemeanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "unclassified felonies," 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and 1 "violation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, 1 "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrug" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-20(a) (West Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
293. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor categories, and 1 "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misdemeanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "unclassified felonies," 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and 1 "violation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, 1 "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrug" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-20(a) (West Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
294. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor categories, and 1 "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misdemeanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "unclassified felonies," 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and 1 "violation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, 1 "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrug" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-20(a) (West Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
295. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor categories, and 1 "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misdemeanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "unclassified felonies," 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and 1 "violation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, 1 "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrug" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-20(a) (West Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
296. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor categories, and 1 "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misdemeanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "unclassified felonies," 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and 1 "violation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, 1 "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrug" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-20(a) (West Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
297. The codes of California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming do not grade offenses - or, at most, divide them only into felonies and misdemeanors - but instead provide maximum and minimum sentences within each offense provision itself. Idaho has a provision referring to three degrees of felony, see IDAHO CODE § 18-111A (Michie 1997), but proceeds to provide specific sentences for each offense without assigning the offenses to a category. See IDAHO CODE § 18-111 (Michie 1997).
298. The codes of California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming do not grade offenses - or, at most, divide them only into felonies and misdemeanors - but instead provide maximum and minimum sentences within each offense provision itself. Idaho has a provision referring to three degrees of felony, see IDAHO CODE § 18-111A (Michie 1997), but proceeds to provide specific sentences for each offense without assigning the offenses to a category. See IDAHO CODE § 18-111 (Michie 1997).
299. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-8 to -9 (Michie 1996).
300. See. e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58 (Michie 1996) (armed robbery; sentence of five years to life imprisonment); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Michie 1996) (grand larceny; sentence of 1 to 20 years' imprisonment).
301. See. e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58 (Michie 1996) (armed robbery; sentence of five years to life imprisonment); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Michie 1996) (grand larceny; sentence of 1 to 20 years' imprisonment).
302. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
303. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
304. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
305. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
306. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
307. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
308. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
309. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
310. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
311. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
312. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
313. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
314. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception of certain specific serious offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A" felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes). Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes are to be punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (attempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
315. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-7 (1999).
316. See. e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (1996) (arson); IOWA CODE §§ 711.1, 712.1 (2000) (robbery and arson); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1997) (assault); MASS. COMP. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (1999) (assault).
317. See. e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (1996) (arson); IOWA CODE §§ 711.1, 712.1 (2000) (robbery and arson); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1997) (assault); MASS. COMP. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (1999) (assault).
318. See. e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (1996) (arson); IOWA CODE §§ 711.1, 712.1 (2000) (robbery and arson); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1997) (assault); MASS. COMP. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (1999) (assault).
319. See. e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (1996) (arson); IOWA CODE §§ 711.1, 712.1 (2000) (robbery and arson); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1997) (assault); MASS. COMP. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (1999) (assault).
320. These offense categories were not randomly chosen. To avoid a searching review of every factor used by any code in grading any offense - a project that would clearly involve an enormous amount of research and a considerable number of subjective value judgments - a limited number of offenses were selected to form the basis for the evaluation of codes under this factor. Seeking categories that were themselves significant, reflected a reasonable array of offense types (e.g., offenses against property as well as the person), and would likely demonstrate a variety of legislative decisions as to grading factors, we selected the following: assault, sexual assault, arson, robbery, and theft. Robbery and sexual assault are not used for purposes of illustration in the text, the former because it provides few examples of differences among states, and the latter because it displays so many differences across states as to be unwieldy for purposes of clear summary.
321. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12A (1997).
322. See id. § 12A-1.
323. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1023 (1998).
324. See id. § 1024.
325. See id. § 2701.
326. North Carolina's code provides a specific provision for the assault on a handicapped person, but assigns aggravated assaults against the handicapped the same grade (class F felony) as other aggravated assaults. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-32.1,-32.4 (1996).
327. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.4 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.1 (2000) 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2712 (1999).
328. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.4 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.1 (2000) 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2712 (1999).
329. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.4 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.1 (2000) 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2712 (1999).
330. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.89 (1970).
331. See id. § 750.88.
332. See id. § 750.86.
333. Id. § 750.84.
334. See id. § 750.87.
335. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, .02, .04 (West 2000).
336. See KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3718(b) (West 1995) (creating three grades of punishment based on extent of damage to property); id. § 21-3719(b) (recognizing potential harm to human life as aggravating factor); see also. e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-38-301 to 302 (Michie 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to 824 (1997).
337. See KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3718(b) (West 1995) (creating three grades of punishment based on extent of damage to property); id. § 21-3719(b) (recognizing potential harm to human life as aggravating factor); see also. e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-38-301 to 302 (Michie 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to 824 (1997).
338. See KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3718(b) (West 1995) (creating three grades of punishment based on extent of damage to property); id. § 21-3719(b) (recognizing potential harm to human life as aggravating factor); see also. e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-38-301 to 302 (Michie 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to 824 (1997).
339. See MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 8 (1997).
340. See id. § 9.
341. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-402 (1996) (burning one's own property; maximum punishment of fifteen years' imprisonment), with D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000) (arson; penalty of one to ten years' imprisonment).
342. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-402 (1996) (burning one's own property; maximum punishment of fifteen years' imprisonment), with D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000) (arson; penalty of one to ten years' imprisonment).
343. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 1-2 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.010 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-301 (1999) (defining arson to include "knowingly damag[ing] any structure by means of a fire or explosion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1998).
344. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 1-2 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.010 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-301 (1999) (defining arson to include "knowingly damag[ing] any structure by means of a fire or explosion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1998).
345. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 1-2 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.010 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-301 (1999) (defining arson to include "knowingly damag[ing] any structure by means of a fire or explosion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1998).
346. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 1-2 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.010 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §
347. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 1-2 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.010 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-301 (1999) (defining arson to include "knowingly damag[ing] any structure by means of a fire or explosion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1998).
348. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 1-2 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.010 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-301 (1999) (defining arson to include "knowingly damag[ing] any structure by means of a fire or explosion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1998).
349. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 1-2 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.010 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-301 (1999) (defining arson to include "knowingly damag[ing] any structure by means of a fire or explosion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1998).
350. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1(b)(1) (1997) (applying the same offense to "any building or structure intended for habitation or lodging in whole or in part, regularly or occasionally, and shall include, but not be limited to, any house, apartment, hotel, dormitory, hospital, nursing home, jail, prison, mobile home, house trailer, modular home, factory-built home or self-propelled motor home" and to "any garage, shop, shed, barn or stable"); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000) (including in arson "bum[ing] or attemp[ing] to bum any dwelling, or house, barn, or stable adjoining thereto, or any store, barn, or outhouse, or any shop, office, stable, store, warehouse, or any other building, or any steamboat, vessel, canal boat, or other watercraft, or any railroad car, the property, in whole or in part, of another person, or any church, meetinghouse, schoolhouse, or any of the public buildings in the District"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 2 (1999) (applying the same offense for burning "a meeting house, church, court house, town house, college, academy, jail or other building which has been erected for public use, or a banking house, warehouse, store, manufactory, mill, barn, stable, shop, outhouse or other building, or an office building, lumber yard, ship, vessel, street car or railway car, or a bridge, lock, dam, flume, tank, or any building or structure or contents thereof").
351. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1(b)(1) (1997) (applying the same offense to "any building or structure intended for habitation or lodging in whole or in part, regularly or occasionally, and shall include, but not be limited to, any house, apartment, hotel, dormitory, hospital, nursing home, jail, prison, mobile home, house trailer, modular home, factory-built home or self-propelled motor home" and to "any garage, shop, shed, barn or stable"); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000) (including in arson "bum[ing] or attemp[ing] to bum any dwelling, or house, barn, or stable adjoining thereto, or any store, barn, or outhouse, or any shop, office, stable, store, warehouse, or any other building, or any steamboat, vessel, canal boat, or other watercraft, or any railroad car, the property, in whole or in part, of another person, or any church, meetinghouse, schoolhouse, or any of the public buildings in the District"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 2 (1999) (applying the same offense for burning "a meeting house, church, court house, town house, college, academy, jail or other building which has been erected for public use, or a banking house, warehouse, store, manufactory, mill, barn, stable, shop, outhouse or other building, or an office building, lumber yard, ship, vessel, street car or railway car, or a bridge, lock, dam, flume, tank, or any building or structure or contents thereof").
352. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1(b)(1) (1997) (applying the same offense to "any building or structure intended for habitation or lodging in whole or in part, regularly or occasionally, and shall include, but not be limited to, any house, apartment, hotel, dormitory, hospital, nursing home, jail, prison, mobile home, house trailer, modular home, factory-built home or self-propelled motor home" and to "any garage, shop, shed, barn or stable"); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000) (including in arson "bum[ing] or attemp[ing] to bum any dwelling, or house, barn, or stable adjoining thereto, or any store, barn, or outhouse, or any shop, office, stable, store, warehouse, or any other building, or any steamboat, vessel, canal boat, or other watercraft, or any railroad car, the property, in whole or in part, of another person, or any church, meetinghouse, schoolhouse, or any of the public buildings in the District"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 2 (1999) (applying the same offense for burning "a meeting house, church, court house, town house, college, academy, jail or other building which has been erected for public use, or a banking house, warehouse, store, manufactory, mill, barn, stable, shop, outhouse or other building, or an office building, lumber yard, ship, vessel, street car or railway car, or a bridge, lock, dam, flume, tank, or any building or structure or contents thereof").
353. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (1998).
354. NEV. REV. STAT. 205.005 (1997).
355. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.03(e) (West 2000).
356. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
357. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
358. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
359. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
360. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
361. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
362. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
363. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
364. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
365. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
366. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
367. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
368. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
369. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
370. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
371. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
372. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
373. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
374. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
375. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1)(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 184-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
376. For example, Massachusetts grades thefts based only on whether the victim is over 65 years of age. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 19 (1999).
377. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(f)(2) (1996).
378. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(f)(1) (1996).
379. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-301(7) (1999) (value over $500, maximum 10 years; value under $500, maximum six months).
380. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.356 (1998) (value over $100, maximum 10 years; value under $100, misdemeanor offense).
381. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994) (value over $500, maximum 10 years; value under $500, maximum one year).
382. See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-13 (1997) (value over $1,000, maximum 10 years; value under $1,000, maximum one year).
383. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2501, 2502 (1998) (value over $500, maximum 10 years; value under $500, maximum one year); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2577 (1998) (imposing penalties for distinct crime of §retail theft§: value over $100, maximum 10 years; value under $100, maximum six months). In addition to creating an even larger disparity between potential punishments on either side of an arbitrary line, Vermont's §retail theft§ provision itself indicates the recognition of an irrelevant grading factor.
384. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2501, 2502 (1998) (value over $500, maximum 10 years; value under $500, maximum one year); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2577 (1998) (imposing penalties for distinct crime of §retail theft§: value over $100, maximum 10 years; value under $100, maximum six months). In addition to creating an even larger disparity between potential punishments on either side of an arbitrary line, Vermont's §retail theft§ provision itself indicates the recognition of an irrelevant grading factor.
385. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-41 (1994). The maximum increases to 10 years' imprisonment, a $2,000 fine, or both, if the item is stolen from a place of worship. See id.
386. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-41 (1994). The maximum increases to 10 years' imprisonment, a $2,000 fine, or both, if the item is stolen from a place of worship. See id.
387. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-43 (1994). The maximum increases to one year of imprisonment, a $2,000 fine, or both, if the item is stolen from a place of worship. See id.
388. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-43 (1994). The maximum increases to one year of imprisonment, a $2,000 fine, or both, if the item is stolen from a place of worship. See id.
389. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-49 (1994) (fine of $5 to $25 and imprisonment for 5 to 20 days).
390. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-55 (1994) (fine of up to $100, imprisonment for up to three months, or both).
391. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-58 (1994) (fine of up to $100, imprisonment for up to three months, or both).
392. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-59 (1994).
393. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-53 (1994).
394. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-51 (1994).
395. The Model Penal Code would score in this group: overall 16.55 (Q1 3.65, Q2 3.2, Q3 4.0, Q4 3.7, Q5 2.0).
396. For example, we are persuaded that a state can more effectively communicate its rules of conduct to ordinary people by segregating its code of conduct from its code of adjudication. See Robinson, supra note 5, at Parts III and IV. But given how dramatic a change this would be from current usage, which combines these two functions in a single code, we thought it inappropriate to reduce a state's score for failure to follow such a course.