Notice-and-comment sentencing

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 97, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 1-71

  Bierschbach, Richard A ^a   Bibas, Stephanos ^b  

^a YESHIVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874443504     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (331)

1. See Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 288-97 (2002) (finding in empirical study that ordinary people assigned punishments based on the seriousness of the crime and the existence of mitigating factors, but paid little attention to the chance of detection or the amount of publicity)
2. John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660-71, 676 (2000) (finding in empirical study that ordinary people assigned punishments based on the wrongfulness of and moral outrage at the crime, but weighed the danger of future crime only in limited circumstances).
3. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)
4. accord Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
5. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1969, 1975 (1992).
6. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470-75 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) [hereinafter Barkow, Institutional Design]
8. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation of Powers]
9. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998)
10. Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005)
11. Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002) [hereinafter Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff]
12. Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587 (2010) [hereinafter Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit]
13. see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-207, 220-32 (1969) (suggesting ways to limit and structure prosecutorial discretion and to subject it to judicial review)
14. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981) (examining the nature and scope of prosecutorial discretion and proposing reforms for channeling discretion and enhancing accountability).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
16. 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
17. see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
18. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
19. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
20. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363-65
21. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-54.
22. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-02 (1995).
23. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (enumerating the rights waived during a federal guilty-plea colloquy).
24. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
25. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2)
26. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
27. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)
28. see also Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 (emphasizing the presence of a "strong factual basis for the plea" when accepting defendant's guilty plea despite his simultaneous protestation of innocence)
29. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43 (holding that waiver of rights cannot be presumed from a silent record).
30. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
31. Contra proferentem is the canon of construing ambiguities in contracts against the drafter. See, e.g., United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d Cir. 2002) (summarizing cases applying contra proferentem canon to plea agreements)
32. People v. Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d 891, 893-95 (Ill. 1998) (detrimental reliance)
33. see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (allowing parties to specify remedy for breach that operated in effect as waiver of double-jeopardy right)
34. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1984) (treating plea agreement as binding only when defendant pleads guilty in reliance on prosecutorial promise that the prosecution later breaches)
35. Abrogated on other grounds by Puckett v. United States 556 U.S. 129 (2009)
36. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (granting relief where defendant pleaded guilty in reliance on prosecutorial promise and prosecutor later breached that promise, albeit inadvertently).
37. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30 (2012)
38. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 390 (2d ed. 2005)
39. see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
40. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1), (3).
41. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 131-34 (2003).
42. See, e.g., David A. Starkweather, The Retributive Theory of "Just Deserts" and Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 872 (1992).
43. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1304 (1997)
44. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1505-17 (1993).
45. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 356-59 (2007) (allowing courts to presume within-Guidelines sentences reasonable, requiring less explanation for within-Guidelines sentences (particularly when the defendant and prosecutor do not argue for a different sentence), and affirming a brief statement of reasons).
46. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 231, 243-44 (2005) (finding, in an empirical study of nearly one thousand defendants, that defendants waived their rights to appeal in nearly two-thirds of all plea-bargained cases and that most of those waivers applied to appealing sentences as well as convictions).
47. See DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 760-61, 764 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that victims may appeal only if expressly authorized to do so by statute and that only Maryland and Utah authorize appeals of denials of victims' procedural rights, although several other states permit discretionary review of victims'-rights claims via the extraordinary writ of mandamus).
48. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983).
49. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910-11 (1992).
50. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1745 (1993) ("The credible threat of an aggressive defense that will not necessarily lead to acquittal . . . may provide a bargaining chip sufficient to persuade an otherwise recalcitrant prosecutor to bargain in good faith.")
51. see also Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1330-31 (2001) (observing that "white-collar criminals are harder for the government to pursue because they can raise enforcement costs with vigorous legal defenses starting early in investigations").
52. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1689-92 (2010).
53. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 922-23, 930-31 (2006).
54. See Francesca D. Bowman, Prob. Officers Advisory Grp. to the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Probation Officers Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 303, 305-06 (1996).
55. See Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1394-95 (2009) (discussing how broad appeal waivers license collusion and threaten the development of precedent).
56. For a particularly salient example of non-party effects of retail sentences, consider what some observers have dubbed a possible "Madoff effect" on recent white-collar sentences, involving a noticeable uptick in sentences of record-breaking severity since Bernard Madoff received a prison sentence of 150 years after pleading guilty to arguably the largest individual financial crime in U.S. history. See Amir Efrati, Possible Madoff Effect: Triple-Digit White-Collar Prison Sentences, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010, 2:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/19/possible-madoff-effect-triple- digit-white-collar-prison-sentences/ (describing three record-breaking white-collar sentences handed down in the months following Madoff's sentencing and noting belief among many legal scholars that the Madoff sentence "likely empowered other judges to impose enormous, symbolic sentences for fraudsters").
57. See, e.g., Thomas Michael McDonnell, Playing Beyond the Rules: A Realist and Rhetoric-Based Approach to Researching the Law and Solving Legal Problems, 67 UMKC L. REV. 285, 301 n.86 (1998)
58. Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 442 (1971)
59. Dominick R. Vetri, Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 900 (1964) (finding that forty-seven out of sixty-seven prosecutors questioned worked in offices without formal rules or procedures with respect to plea bargaining).
60. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 443 (2001) ("Unless the prosecutor alerts her constituents to policies and invites input, the public may remain uninformed. Prosecutors rarely publicize information on charging and plea bargaining policies on the ground that such openness would threaten law enforcement.").
61. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
62. See, e.g., SEC's Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding Proposed Settlement at 12-13, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011) (citing SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1984)).
63. See Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an S.E.C. Deal With Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at A1.
64. See Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333-34.
65. To be sure, unlike in the administrative penalty context, in all criminal cases, even the most mundane ones, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and analogous state rules require a judge accepting a plea to find that it has an adequate factual basis. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3)
66. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(f) nn. 21-22 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing the factual basis requirement of Rule 11 and comparable state rules). In practice, however, that requirement does little to ensure either that the actual facts surrounding the crime are fully disclosed or that the prosecutor's charging decision takes full and fair account of those facts.
67. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
68. See Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
69. See James D. Chesney, Citizen Participation on Regulatory Boards, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 125, 125-35 (1984)
70. Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Juries?, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 475-80 (1992).
71. See Jasper Y. Brinton, Some Powers and Problems of the Federal Administrative, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 135, 160-61 (1913) (discussing need for special training of administrative officials)
72. See BENJAMIN P. DE WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 299-318 (1915)
73. MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM IN AMERICA: 1880-1920, at 6-25 (1977)
74. RUSSELL STORY, THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL EXECUTIVE 218-20 (1918)
75. Morris L. Cooke, Scientific Management of the Public Business, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 488 (1915).
76. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154-55 (1938).
77. See Richard B. Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1676 (1975).
78. See Indust. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 615 (1980).
79. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
80. Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1972).
81. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2253-54 (2001) (tracing the rise of the regulatory state and the evolution of concerns about objectivity and legitimacy that accompanied it)
82. see also William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law-Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 172-80 (2009) (discussing the history and legal and political context of the development of public participation as a cornerstone of modern American administrative law).
83. Misso Servs. Corp., v. Small Bus. Admin., No. 81-0283, 1981 WL 30841, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1981).
84. See HARRY C. BOYTE, COMMONWEALTH: A RETURN TO CITIZEN POLITICS 131-33, 147-56 (1989)
85. MARY G. KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY APPROACH, 35-36, 84-96 (1981)
86. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22-44 (1970)
87. John Ladd, The Ethics of Participation, in XVI NOMOS: PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 98, 112-20 (J.R. Pennock & John R. Chapman eds., 1975)
88. Hannah F. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 343, 348 (1981).
89. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
90. see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[T]he very legitimacy of general policymaking performed by unelected adminsitrators depends in no small part on the openness, accessibility, and amenability of these officials to the needs and ideas of the public.")
91. Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d 188, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
92. It also will vary to at least some degree depending on the specific context, as the possibility of a gap between principal and agent interests, and the discounting of public values, will be more intense in some agency settings than in others. For an effort to sort out the times when external monitoring and public input will be most valuable as a supplement to agency expertise and professionalism, see Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 589-95 (2011).
93. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57-60 (1998).
94. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992).
95. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 418-20 (2007).
96. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can't Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 5, 6 (2009) (observing that "[f]or agency governance to be legitimate... administrative law must find ways to mediate [its] power," and that one critical mechanism for doing so in American administrative law is through "fostering public participation in agency decisionmaking")
97. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
98. REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
99. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2006)
100. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
101. RICHARD J. PIERCE, Jr. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.6a (5th ed. 2008).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
103. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(h) (2012) (requiring minimum of sixty-day comment period after FTC presiding officer places a recommended decision in rulemaking record)
104. 44 C.F.R. § 1.4(e) (2012) (FEMA policy to allow public sixty days for comment submission)
105. 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(2) (2012) (sixty-day comment period for proposed rules of the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior and National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and Department of Commerce relating to listing of endangered and threatened species).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
107. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
108. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
109. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
110. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
111. See United States v. N. S. Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977)
112. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
113. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52-54 (1983).
114. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (2006)
115. 5 U.S.C. § 564 (2006).
116. See generally NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (David M. Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 2d ed. 1995) (describing processes and communications from a number of successful and unsuccessful negotiated rulemakings).
117. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2 (2006)
118. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006). The Freedom of Information Act also grants members of the public widespread access to agency information, enhancing citizens' ability to make participation effective.
119. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
120. See, e.g., Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1612 (2006) (providing that the Secretary of Agriculture shall establish procedures to give the public adequate notice and an opportunity to comment on the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines applicable to Forest Service programs).
121. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND SERVICES: A REPORT OF THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD 44-45 (2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/ F3DB1F5C6EF90EE1852575C500589157/$File/EPA-SAB-9-012-unsigned.pdf (describing survey methods used in valuing ecosystem services)
122. Baruch Fischhoff, Ranking Risks, 6 RISK 191, 196-97 (1995) (describing EPA's use of state and local risk-ranking exercises to aid in priority determinations)
123. see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1508 & n.115 (2001) (discussing the Health Services Commission's use of public quality-of-life ratings in determining priority condition-treatment lists).
124. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2011-1, 2011-1 C.B. 259, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-01.pdf
125. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE TO ICE ATTORNEYS REVIEWING THE CBP, USCIS, AND ICE CASES BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/guidance- to-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf
126. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA'S FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL (FOM) (2009), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/ Directive-df/CPL-02-00-148.pdf. Many agencies adopt similar practices for a variety of informal and non-binding guidance documents.
127. see also Memorandum from Rob Portman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 13-18 (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf (requiring agencies to gather and accept public comments for "significant" guidance documents, but generally not requiring them to offer a public response).
128. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (2012).
129. See BRENT GARREN ET AL., HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB 207 (7th ed. 2000)
130. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4) (2006)
131. FTC Regulations, 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.34(c)-(e) (2012)
132. Consumer Product Safety Commission Regulations, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1118.20(e)-(g) (2012)
133. see also Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d) (2006)
134. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2006)
135. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2) (2006)
136. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2012) (adopting procedures for public comment on proposed consent judgments under CERCLA).
137. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(d) (2006).
138. See, e.g., PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
139. La. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n, FLCA v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
140. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)
141. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
142. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413-20
143. see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) ("An agency's view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis." (quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144. See Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
145. See INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996).
146. see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42-43.
147. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947).
148. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
149. See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("[P]ublic participation assures that the agency will have before it the facts and information relevant to a particular administrative problem... [and] increase[s] the likelihood of administrative responsiveness to the needs and concerns of those affected." (alterations in original) (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
151. see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 542 (2003) (describing the participatory shortcomings of policymaking by adjudication)
152. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 306-07 (2010) (describing the participatory benefits of policymaking by rulemaking).
153. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
154. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-30 (2001)
155. see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1998, at 8-9 (2001)
156. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).
158. Specifically, the Commission was subject only to section 553 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (2006). It was not subject to any of the other requirements in chapter 5 of the APA, such as 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 554-59. Nor was it subject to the Freedom of Information or the Government in the Sunshine Acts, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552b. Most significantly, it was not subject to the judicial review provisions in chapter 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.
159. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1643-44 (2012).
160. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 180-81 (1984)
161. see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(o), (p), (x) (requiring notice and comment, consultation, and statements of reasons for proposed Guidelines amendments). For an early assessment that proved to be overly optimistic
162. see Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 7-16, 22-23 (1991).
163. see also Samuel L. Buffone, Control of Arbitrary Sentencing Guidelines: Is Administrative Law the Answer?, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 137, 139 (1991) (Commission relied on "the instincts or political judgment of the individual commissioners rather than a sound empirical basis").
164. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15-18 (1988)
165. Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the "Junior Varsity Congress": A Call for Meaningful Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1202 (1999) ("The Commission... rarely justifies its guidelines, consistently avoids on-the-record decisionmaking, and operates unencumbered by the procedural safeguards that ensure the political legitimacy of other administrative agencies.").
166. Ronald F. Wright, Amendments in the Route to Sentencing Reform, 13 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 58, 64 (1994) (noting lack of open meetings by Commission's advisory committees and conclusory nature of the Commission's explanations for its final Guidelines, without the supporting factual evidence or responses to important comments typically offered by most rule-making agencies).
167. Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 229 (2005). The same problems infect some state guidelines.
168. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 36-37 tbl.4-1 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf (compiling descriptions of state sentencing guideline commissions, not all of which include members of the public).
169. See, e.g., Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1446-63 (2004) (examining reasons for prosecutorial declination decisions).
170. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
171. Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1972).
172. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991).
173. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1754-56 (2005) (discussing definitional spillovers inherent in rules and the impact they have on deterrence).
174. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-27.300 (1997). The most recent version of that policy instructs federal prosecutors ordinarily to charge and not drop the most serious readily provable offense. Id. But it goes on to identify factors that prosecutors may consider in assessing, case by case, how stringently to apply this policy when charging and plea bargaining.
175. See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 601-02 (2000) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation, and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1960)) (discussing how formally adopted policies can serve as "established starting points for reasoning, pointing the decision-maker in a specific direction without mandating a particular result" or precluding flexibility when circumstances dictate).
176. When prosecutors agreed to a deferred prosecution before filing a charge, there would be no hearing at which to review the decision. But judges could review post-charge deferred prosecution decisions at hearings on whether to adjourn the charge in contemplation of dismissal.
177. See, e.g., David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 n.16 (1992) (reviewing conceptions of legal decision-making as a dialogic activity).
178. See, e.g., John Koerner, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 785-86 (2009) (discussing arrest discretion).
179. "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)
180. see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468, 470 (1996) (requiring a high evidentiary threshold before a defendant can even obtain discovery to help prove a claim of racially selective prosecution)
181. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("This broad discretion [to decide whether to prosecute] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly illsuited to judicial review.")
182. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979) (finding no constitutional problem in allowing prosecutors to choose among overlapping charges with differing penalties, absent unconstitutional discrimination).
183. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
184. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1027-42 (2005).
185. See Lagares, 601 A.2d at 704.
186. E.g., State v. Vasquez, 609 A.2d 29, 32 (N.J. 1992).
187. see also Lagares, 601 A.2d at 704-05
188. Vasquez, 609 A.2d at 32.
189. See, e.g., N.J. DEP'T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL DIRECTIVE NO. 1998-1: PROSECUTING CASES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE DRUG REFORM ACT (1998), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/agdir.pdf
190. N.J. DEP'T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING CASES UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (1998), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/agguid.pdf.
191. see also N.J. DEP'T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 (2004 REVISIONS), available at http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcj/agguide/brimage-all.pdf.
192. See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1087, 1094 n.31 (2005) (discussing the speed with which the New Jersey Attorney General promulgated the guidelines).
193. See Michael M. O'Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 484 (2009) (discussing feedback loops that could flow from meaningful sentencing explanations on the record).
194. See RUSSELL D. HAUGE, OFFICE OF KITSAP CNTY. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, MISSION STATEMENT AND STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES 1 (2007), available at http://www.kitsapgov.com/pros/StandardsGuidelines2007.pdf.
195. cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 227 (2001) (stating that deference to administrative authority may be shown by an agency's power to "engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking").
196. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 136 tbl.1 (2008) (laying out some of the most common reasons for declining to bring charges).
197. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.... This recognition of the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.").
198. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 564 (1978) ("[T]he discretion of American prosecutors lends itself to inequalities and disparities of treatment because of disagreements concerning issues of sentencing policy.... It may also lead to a general perception of unfairness, arbitrariness and uncertainty and may even undercut the deterrent force of the criminal law.").
199. At the federal level, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) does something similar with its annual Unified Regulatory Agenda, which it publishes in the Federal Register. The Unified Regulatory Agenda compiles the regulatory agendas from all federal entities that have regulations under development or review. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)
200. see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2011)
201. Christopher Demuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 15, 16 (2011) (discussing history of OIRA's approach to the annual agenda).
202. See also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 98-120 (1975)
203. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST 513 (1965)
204. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 423-28 (1974)
205. Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 502 (1971), for examples of other earlier and notable proposals to use rulemaking to guide and constrain police practices. For examples of more modern takes on the issue
206. see Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 658-63 (1997) (discussing the role of guidelines in community and problem-oriented policing)
207. David Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1271-79 (2002) (discussing the evolution-or lack thereof-of police rulemaking in the Fourth Amendment context since Professor Amsterdam's 1974 article)
208. and David Sklansky Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005) (connecting evolving conceptions of democracy to jurisprudential and academic approaches to policing).
209. See Mary Patrice Brown & Steven E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1076-84 (2006) (discussing the role of such considerations in both informal and formal plea bargaining).
210. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 56-57, 94-95 (1998) (describing the Federal Guidelines as "simply a compilation of administrative diktats" because "the Commission almost never explains the reason behind a particular Guidelines rule").
211. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 724 (2009) (observing that existing approaches to appellate review of the Guidelines run "counter to ordinary principles of administrative law")
212. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 758-87 (2005) (contrasting the failures of the insular U.S. Sentencing Commission with the successes of the more inclusive Minnesota, Washington, and North Carolina commissions).
213. see also Dale Parent, What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 YALE L.J. 1773, 1775-77 (1992) (discussing Minnesota guidelines)
214. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357-58 (2007) (explaining how feedback, input, and reasoned responses from the Sentencing Commission enables the Guidelines to evolve).
215. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b) (2006).
216. Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58 (explaining how the reasoned sentencing judgments of individual judges contribute to the Guidelines' evolution).
217. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), (C) (2006) (stating Sentencing Commission's goals of promoting fairness and equal treatment while maintaining flexibility and reflecting advancements in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to criminal justice)
218. See U.S. Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (setting aside FCC civil penalty schedule for failure to conform to notice-and-comment procedures under the APA)
219. Rules of Practice for FAA Civil Penalty Actions, 55 Fed. Reg. 7980, 7980 (Mar. 6, 1990) (inviting public comment on changes to rules of practice regarding FAA's civil penalty authority)
220. Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,882, 39,882 (July 3, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 19, 27) (requesting comments regarding the EPA's proposed inflation adjustment to civil monetary penalties)
221. Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 72 Fed. Reg. 13,592 (Mar. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100) (promulgating final rule of Mine Safety and Health Administration revising civil penalty assessment regulations and incorporating revisions suggested during notice-and-comment period)
222. Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories, Supplier's Declaration of Conformity, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,327, 62,337 (Oct. 20, 2008) (seeking comment regarding OSHA's administration of a Supplier's Declaration of Conformity system for policing the safety of certain products in the workplace, including comments on the use of penalties to sanction "inaccurate or incomplete information")
223. see also Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 869, 872-73 (2012) (reviewing civil penalty guidelines of the Mine Safety and Health Administration and FCC). Even when agencies do not use the formal notice-and-comment procedure, they frequently publish detailed but non-binding guidelines, which they periodically revise based on experience and informal input from stakeholders.
224. Cf. Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (observing that the need for an agency to explain itself and distinguish analogous cases is "particularly acute" when the agency makes policy through case-by-case adjudication, because it ensures predictability, intelligibility, and equal treatment).
225. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (discussing agencies' ability to establish policies through general rules or "the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards")
226. See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 180-82 (2005) (discussing how reason-giving and appellate review can function as a feedback tool in sentencing, engaging courts in an extended conversation between sentencing commissions and legislatures)
227. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (authorizing courts to accept, reject, or defer decisions on charge or stipulated-sentence bargains until after the court reviews the presentence report).
228. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (allowing any "person... adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning of an agency's organic statute to seek judicial review of agency action).
229. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
230. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
231. Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
232. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
233. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 119-28 (2011) (describing the anchoring effect, which causes a decision-maker to rank options based on one piece of information and then adjust upward or downward, giving the initial anchor inordinate influence on the final outcome)
234. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 23-24 (2008) (describing the same effect).
235. See, e.g., Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision Making and Information Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSON-ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805, 820 (1975) (finding that while in hypothetical cases judges relied most heavily on a defendant's local ties in setting bail, in actual cases prosecutors' recommendations were the single most important determinant of judges' bail decisions).
236. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 496-504 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing preparation of presentence investigation reports).
237. See, e.g., Scott Atlas, How Can We Be Sure?, 29 LITIGATION 1, 1-2 (2003) (reviewing types of mitigating evidence at sentencing).
238. See Denny Chin, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1567 (2012) (describing typical submissions from the parties and interested persons before sentencing)
239. Tess Lopez, Make the Sentencing Process Work for You, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 59-60 (describing items defense counsel should prepare during the presentence process).
240. See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 299-305 (2003) (discussing victim participation at sentencing).
241. See generally Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187, 195 (1995).
242. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383 (2002).
243. See generally David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 296-97 (2001).
244. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 88-89 (2004).
245. at least, that is, where the guidelines or policies were the product of open, participatory, and reasoned processes. Where they resulted from closed, insular, and opaque processes that failed to address significant input, evidence, and criticism, some deviations, whether in response to comments or not, might be appropriate. Cf. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101-02 (2007) (authorizing district courts to disregard the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' 100-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio for sentencing).
246. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 412-16, 432-40 (2011) [hereinafter Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0] (discussing strategies for facilitating effective online commentary, including the use of both trained moderators and systemic design components to stratify and manage information and comments)
247. Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in Rule-making, 31 PACE L. REV. 382, 393-416 (2011) [hereinafter Farina et al., 140 Characters or Less] (describing case studies involving a pilot Rulemaking 2.0 project, Regulation Room, that uses web technologies, including Facebook, Twitter, and others, to inform stakeholders of proposed rulemakings and facilitate their participation and comments).
248. Many jurisdictions already provide some version of this process for resolving disputed issues of fact relating to sentencing. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 10:4 (3d ed. 2004)
249. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(g) (5th ed. 2009). In the Second Circuit, for instance, such hearings are known as Fatico hearings.
250. See United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979).
251. See, e.g., Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence Reports: Multi-Tasking at Sentencing, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 544, 574-76 (1995).
252. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(B) (2006) (providing that applications for use of new drugs shall be denied if the drug is found to be "unsafe")
253. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2006) ("The [Federal Communications] Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby... shall grant to any applicant therefore a station license provided for by this chapter.").
254. Section 3553(a)(2) provides, "[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider... the need for the sentence imposed-(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
255. See Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts About Argument by Hypothetical, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 819-23 (2000).
256. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995) (comparing lay views with substantive criminal code provisions on a variety of criminal law issues).
257. The Supreme Court's jury sentencing cases reflect just this notion. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 994-1002 (2003)
258. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-20 (1968) (explaining capital jury's sentencing role as "express[ing] the conscience of the community" and "speak[ing] for the community").
259. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 175-76 (2004) (noting that retribution, rather than consequentialist goals, is central to popular punishment judgments)
260. Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good-Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737 (2012) (confirming that substantial numbers of respondents are willing to modify sentences significantly based on factors such as remorse, apology, forgiveness, and restitution).
261. See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1770-72 (2012) (discussing difficulty of specifying appropriate weighting of sentencing factors ex ante through general rules)
262. see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 43 (1996) ("Any simple, general, and monistic or singlevalued theory of a large area of the law... is likely to be too crude to fit with our best understandings of the multiple values that are at stake in that area.").
263. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1545 (1988) (discussing how injection of public perspectives and information into agency policymaking helps to determine the public's "preferences about preferences")
264. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 124-27 (2001) (arguing that rules adopted through the use of negotiated rulemaking have greater legitimacy and public acceptance)
265. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 73 (2000) (discussing how popular participation informs the course of deliberation in a deliberative democracy, "combin[ing] popular responsiveness with a high degree of reflection and exchange among people with competing views").
266. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a "Republican" Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444, 469-70 (1996) (discussing ways in which federal judges "are frequently overly insulated from popular values").
267. Six states retain jury sentencing in non-capital cases. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004).
268. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 992-95 (2003)
269. Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 350-53 (2003).
270. See Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 749 (2010) (discussing differences between plea and petit juries)
271. See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison with American Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 239, 243 (1970).
272. See LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
273. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34, 46-51 (1983).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
275. See Conn. Light & Power, Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
276. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
277. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (allowing any "person... adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning of an agency's organic statute to seek judicial review of agency action)
278. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org. Inc., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (liberally interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 702's "adversely affected or aggrieved" language).
279. Michael M. O'Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 2163 (2010).
280. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).
281. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
282. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (2003).
283. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1328-29 (2003).
284. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 292, 294 (1996) ("Sentencing discounts to cooperators may thus be the only way to get critical testimony in a large class of cases worth prosecuting.")
285. see also Ronald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance Departures: Valuable Tool or Dangerous Weapon?, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 41, 42, 44 (1999) (offering example in which the threat of mandatory federal drug sentences, coupled with the prospect of cooperation discounts, outweighed gang members' fears about the risks of cooperating).
286. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation's Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 903, 920-24 (2010)
287. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 398-400 (2003)
288. see also Interview: Clarence Aaron, FRONTLINE: SNITCH, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/cases/aaron.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (recounting example of a defendant convicted based on cooperation by his friends and cousin)
289. Interview: Joey Settembrino, FRONTLINE: SNITCH, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/snitch/cases/joey.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (recounting example of a defendant convicted based on cooperation by his friend).
290. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Defending Substantial Assistance: An Old Prosecutor's Meditation on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfield-Kramer Report, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 45, 48-49 (1999)
291. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) (requiring prosecutorial substantial-assistance motion as prerequisite for imposing sentencing below statutory mandatory minimum)
292. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2011) (authorizing judges to offer substantial-assistance discounts upon motion of the prosecutor).
293. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 952 (1999).
294. See, e.g., Ian Fisher, Testing of a President: The Mother; Mother's Legal Vulnerability is Seen as Motive for Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at A16.
295. At least some prosecutors' offices, such as U.S. Attorneys' offices, already have such policies, although they are formulated behind closed doors and not made public. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 125-30 (1994).
296. Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581 (2009).
297. See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 389-90 (2005).
298. see also Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 52-58 (2010)
299. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 720 n.82 (2005) (noting that California's prison guard union "poured money into the campaign for the anti-recidivist statute").
300. see also William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356 (1997) (criticizing negotiated rulemaking on the ground that it "establish[es] privately bargained interests as the source of putative public law").
301. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 173 (2003) (discussing interest-group participation in high-profile criminal law policy issues)
302. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 443-44 (2000).
303. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
304. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 669 (1984)
305. see also Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 686 (2006) ("Ordinarily, enforcement strategies are closely guarded secrets, since disclosure undermines their efficacy and deterrence value.")
306. Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 452 (2008).
307. see Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975)
308. and Mario Merola, Modern Prosecutorial Techniques, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 232, 237-40, 251-58 (1980) (publishing some details of Bronx County District Attorney's Office's internal screening and plea-bargaining procedures).
309. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 603-04 (1996).
310. See Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 307-08 (1991)
311. Ann Dryden White, Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data, 94 Q.J. ECON. 57, 79 (1980).
312. see also Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1318-19 (1997) (noting in an empirical study of negotiated rulemaking that "the EPA recommends formal negotiation only when the parties are 'reasonably few in number,'" and that "the EPA rules that affect the broadest number of organizations have never been selected for negotiated rulemaking" (citation omitted))
313. Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 30, 46 (1982) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking "can reduce the time and cost of developing regulations," but that "negotiation would not work" where "even several individuals could not represent the interests" of all of the industrial or other sectors affected by a rule)
314. Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 437 n.109 (arguing that "for negotiated rulemaking to be effective, the number of affected interests must be relatively small (less than 20-25) and the interests of the parties should be those that they are willing to trade off and compromise"). In small jurisdictions in which on-the-ground policymakers are already plugged into local concerns from a crosssection of the community-think, for instance, of a rural jurisdiction in which the local prosecutor, judge, police, defense attorney, and townsfolk generally know one another-much of what we propose might already be occurring informally one way or another, making the case for reform less pressing.
315. Peter M. Shane, Empowering the Collaborative Citizen in the Administrative State: A Case Study of the Federal Communications Commission, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 483, 498-500 (2011) (reviewing Internet-based tools for broadening the range of public input in FCC rulemakings).
316. Here too, the use of social media, including social networking sites like Facebook, and other Internet-based strategies, might expedite such outreach, although more research still needs to be done on how effectively to use such tools. See generally id. (surveying current issues in agency rulemaking context). For recent examples of the burgeoning literature on this subject, see Cliff Lampe et al., Motivations to Participate in Online Communities, PROC. 28TH INT'L CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 1927 (2010), available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753616.
317. Jennifer Preece & Ben Shneiderman, The Reader-To-Leader Framework: Motivating Technology-Mediated Social Participation, 1 AIS TRANSACTIONS ON HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 13 (2009), available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/thci/ vol1/iss1/5/.
318. see also United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 219, 226-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing potential use of advisory juries by courts).
319. Readers generally skeptical of the value of participation in administrative law will be skeptical of our proposals as well. Whether participation has any place in administrative law generally is a much larger question that we do not take on here. Our point is more limited: rightly or wrongly, administrative law is premised on the virtues of participation as a response to some of the pathologies of the administrative state. Those same pathologies infect criminal sentencing. It is thus worth thinking seriously about how that same framework maps onto criminal justice, and onto real-world sentencing in particular.
320. See, e.g., NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW & POLICY 821 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that "usually... [parole] guidelines have been issued by the parole board itself," with little legislative or other oversight)
321. ASS'N OF PAROLING AUTHS. INT'L, PAROLE BOARD SURVEY 2003, at 7 (2004), available at http://www.apaintl.org/documents/surveys/2003.pdf (finding in a survey of fifty-two parole boards, including those of forty-four states and several territories, that more than half did not use any formal set of written guidelines or assessment instruments in making release decisions)
322. Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329 app. at 376 (2009) (detailing exemptions from state notice-and-comment laws for rules related to prisoners and prison conditions, including rules governing parole).
323. The factors governing parole release decisions are broad and varied. They include things like the offender's participation in prison programs; infractions of prison rules; job opportunities upon release; family ties; the seriousness of the original offense; expressions of remorse and repentance; the risk of recidivism; and the views of victims, community members, prosecutors, or sentencing judges. See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 170032, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 4-14 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=820 (describing how state boards approach parole decisions and listing factors that shape those decisions)
324. see also Miller v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (App. Div. 2010) (noting the parole board's consideration of "the petitioner's institutional record, including his disciplinary record, program accomplishments, academic achievements, and post-release living arrangements, as well as the violent circumstances of his crime, his criminal history, and his continued claim of innocence" in making its release decision (citations omitted)). Today, as a practical matter, dangerousness and other public safety factors top the list.
325. See Joshua Stengel, Parole's Function, Purpose, and Role in the Criminal Justice System, NAT'L INST. CORRECTIONS (Aug. 30, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://community.nicic.gov/blogs/parole/archive/2010/08/30/paroles-function- purpose-and-role-in-the-criminal-justice-system.aspx (describing how risk assessment and public safety concerns have begun to dominate release decisions).
326. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1345-51 (2008) (connecting declines in clemency and pardon rates both to concerns about unreviewable, arbitrary, and capricious exercises of executive discretion and to tough-on-crime politics).
327. See Presidential Clemency Actions by Administration: 1945 to Present, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/actions-administration.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2011) (documenting steady decrease in presidential grants of clemency petitions from 36% under President Nixon to 1.8% under President George W. Bush)
328. Eric R. Johnson, Doe v. Nelson: The Wrongful Assumption of Gubernatorial Plenary Authority over the Pardoning Process, 50 S.D. L. REV. 156, 179 (2005) (observing that "[a] similar downward trend" to the one at the federal level "can be found at the state level")
329. Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 36, 37 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (citing a survey of commutations from 1995 to 2003 that found that "most states averaged fewer than one hundred commutations per state, with thirty-four states... having dispensed twenty or fewer").
330. As David Ball notes, these and similar questions raised by parole are especially amendable to some form of public input, which could help "determine whether releasing an individual would be 'worth it,' with all the vague, value- and policy-laden implications that phrase entails." W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 395, 408 (2011). The same holds true for clemency, at least insofar as it should serve the public's and not the executive's purely private or political interests. Whether an executive's application of clemency guidelines should be subject to any sort of explanation or judicial review requirements is a separate question. For an argument that they should not be.
331. Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) American "Revolution in Punishment Theory," 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1120 (2010-2011) (discussing how parole juries could bring laypersons' sense of justice to parole release decisions).