On the path dependence of tax compliance

European Economic Review

Volumn 65, Issue , 2014, Pages 90-107

  Bruttel, Lisa ^a   Friehe, Tim ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experiment; Path dependence; Reference dependence; Tax compliance

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; INCOME; PROBABILITY; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 84888396697     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.11.002     Document Type: Article

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