Tax compliance as a coordination game

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 297-312

  Alm, James ^a   McKee, Michael ^a,b  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination game; Tax compliance

Indexed keywords

EID: 2642579784     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.02.003     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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