Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 93, Issue 3-4, 2009, Pages 392-402

  Alm, James ^a   Jackson, Betty R ^b   McKee, Michael ^c  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^c Appalachian State University   (Canada)

Author keywords

Social norms; Tax audits; Tax compliance

Indexed keywords

EID: 61549140406     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.007     Document Type: Article

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