A mechanism for supporting collective innovation: The open contract-based challenge

Information Systems and e-Business Management

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 541-568

  Avenali, Alessandro ^a   Battistella, Cinzia ^b   Matteucci, Giorgio ^a   Nonino, Fabio ^a  

^a SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF UDINE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Collective innovation; Combinatorial auctions; Crowdsourcing; Incomplete contracts; Multi attribute auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888042934     PISSN: 16179846     EISSN: 16179854     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10257-012-0208-6     Document Type: Article

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