A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 114, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 88-103

  Pitchford, Rohan ^a   Snyder, Christopher M ^b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Contribution games; Gradualism; Hold up problem; Incomplete contracts; Investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347662290     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00120-0     Document Type: Article

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