Trading grid services - a multi-attribute combinatorial approach

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 187, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 943-961

  Schnizler, Björn ^a   Neumann, Dirk ^a   Veit, Daniel ^b   Weinhardt, Christof ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Auctions and bidding; Combinatorial exchange; Grid; Integer programming; Market engineering

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; COMPUTER SIMULATION; INTEGER PROGRAMMING; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

AUCTIONS AND BIDDING; COMBINATORIAL EXCHANGE; MARKET ENGINEERING;

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 36849086313     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.05.049     Document Type: Article

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