Simulating combinatorial auctions with dominance requirement and loll bids through automated agents

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 211-228

  Avenali, Alessandro ^a   Bassanini, Anna ^a  

^a SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

Author keywords

Auction rules; Combinatorial auctions; Multi agent systems; Simulation

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

AUCTION RULES; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; COMBINATORIAL BIDDING; COMBINATORIAL FORMATS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33846033573     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2006.09.008     Document Type: Article

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