James is polite and punctual (and useless): A Bayesian formalisation of faint praise

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 2013, Pages 414-429

  Harris, Adam J L ^a   Corner, Adam ^b   Hahn, Ulrike ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Argumentation; Bayesian probability; Belief revision; Persuasion; Pragmatics; Testimony

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888005685     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.801367     Document Type: Article

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