Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 37, Issue 12, 2013, Pages 2446-2465

  Arifovic, Jasmina ^a   Hua Jiang, Janet ^b   Xu, Yiping ^c  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b BANK OF CANADA   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (China)

Author keywords

Bank runs; Coordination games; Evolutionary algorithm; Experimental studies

Indexed keywords

EID: 84887607797     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2013.06.016     Document Type: Article

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