Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 97-116

  Duffy, John ^a   Ochs, Jack ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination problems; Dynamic games; Entry games; Equilibrium selection; Experiments; Global games; Speculative attacks; Strategic complementarities; Subgame perfection

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864324199     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.005     Document Type: Article

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