Banking panics and policy responses

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 57, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 404-419

  Ennis, Huberto M ^a   Keister, Todd ^b,c  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^c EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Bank runs; Limited commitment; Suspension of convertibility; Time consistency

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952646406     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.005     Document Type: Article

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