Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 300-317

  Garratt, Rod ^a   Keister, Todd ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Banking panics; Bayesian updating; Demand deposits; Experimental coordination games

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349270509     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.009     Document Type: Article

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