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Volumn 142, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 28-47

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

Author keywords

Bank contracts; Bank runs; Private record keeping; Self interested banker

Indexed keywords


EID: 50249170326     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.011     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (18)

References (8)
  • 1
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    • D. Andolfatto, E. Nosal, N. Wallace, The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model, J. Econ. Theory, forthcoming.
    • D. Andolfatto, E. Nosal, N. Wallace, The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model, J. Econ. Theory, forthcoming.
  • 2
    • 0000646935 scopus 로고
    • The role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements
    • Calomiris C., and Kahn C. The role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements. Am. Econ. Rev. 81 (1991) 497-513
    • (1991) Am. Econ. Rev. , vol.81 , pp. 497-513
    • Calomiris, C.1    Kahn, C.2
  • 3
    • 47749120440 scopus 로고
    • Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
    • Diamond D. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Rev. Econ. Stud. 51 (1984) 393-414
    • (1984) Rev. Econ. Stud. , vol.51 , pp. 393-414
    • Diamond, D.1
  • 4
    • 85010390101 scopus 로고
    • Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity
    • Diamond D., and Dybvig P. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419
    • (1983) J. Polit. Econ. , vol.91 , pp. 401-419
    • Diamond, D.1    Dybvig, P.2
  • 5
    • 0037950053 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
    • Green E., and Lin P. Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation. J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23
    • (2003) J. Econ. Theory , vol.109 , pp. 1-23
    • Green, E.1    Lin, P.2
  • 6
    • 0001105013 scopus 로고
    • Monitoring the monitor: an incentive structure for a financial intermediary
    • Krasa S., and Villamil A.P. Monitoring the monitor: an incentive structure for a financial intermediary. J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992) 197-221
    • (1992) J. Econ. Theory , vol.57 , pp. 197-221
    • Krasa, S.1    Villamil, A.P.2
  • 7
    • 0037302022 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium Bank Runs
    • Peck J., Shell K., and Equilibrium Bank Runs. J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123
    • (2003) J. Polit. Econ. , vol.111 , pp. 103-123
    • Peck, J.1    Shell, K.2
  • 8
    • 0002229079 scopus 로고
    • Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking: the Diamond-Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously
    • Wallace N. Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking: the Diamond-Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously. Federal Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quart. Rev. 12 (1988) 3-16
    • (1988) Federal Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quart. Rev. , vol.12 , pp. 3-16
    • Wallace, N.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.