Crime, punishment, and politics: An analysis of political cycles in criminal sentencing

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 95, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 741-756

  Berdejó, Carlos ^a   Yuchtman, Noam ^b  

^a LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886030065     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: 15309142     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00296     Document Type: Article

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