Laboratory Experiments on Conflict

The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Abbink, Klaus ^a  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Anarchy; Conflict literature; Human behavior; Laboratory experiments; Rent seeking model

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884593463     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0022     Document Type: Chapter

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