An experiment on sequential rent-seeking

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 405-426

  Weimann, Joachim ^a   Yang, Chun Lei ^b   Vogt, Carsten ^a  

^a OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b RESEARCH CENTER FOR HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

C91; C92; D72; Experiment; Exploitation; Fairness; Reciprocity; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042780019     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00083-9     Document Type: Article

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