On US politics and IMF lending

European Economic Review

Volumn 50, Issue 7, 2006, Pages 1843-1862

  Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck ^a   Harr, Thomas ^a   Tarp, Finn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

IMF lending; Political factors

Indexed keywords

DEBT; DEVELOPING WORLD; DEVELOPMENT AID; FINANCIAL POLICY; IMF; LENDING BEHAVIOR; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 33745278917     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.07.001     Document Type: Article

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