How do public companies adjust their board structures?

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 23, Issue , 2013, Pages 108-127

  Cicero, David ^a   Wintoki, M Babajide ^b   Yang, Tina ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^c VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Board reform; Board structure; Corporate governance; D23; Dynamic adjustment; Endogeneity; G34; G38; K22; M14; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883616905     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.08.001     Document Type: Article

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