Regulation and the evolution of corporate boards: Monitoring, advising, or window dressing?

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 167-193

  Helland, Eric ^a   Sykuta, Michael ^b  

^a CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043122542     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/380473     Document Type: Review

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