Microcredit under the microscope: What have we learned in the past two decades, and what do we need to know?

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 5, Issue , 2013, Pages 487-519

  Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak ^a,b,c,d  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

credit markets; group lending; impact evaluations

Indexed keywords

EID: 84882652452     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-082912-110220     Document Type: Review

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