How much to make and how much to buy? An analysis of optimal plural sourcing strategies

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 34, Issue 10, 2013, Pages 1145-1161

  Puranam, Phanish ^a   Gulati, Ranjay ^b   Bhattacharya, Sourav ^c  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

firm boundaries; mixed procurement; plural sourcing; tapered integration; theory

Indexed keywords

EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS; ESTIMATION BIAS; FIRM BOUNDARIES; MIXED PROCUREMENT; PLURAL SOURCING; SOURCING STRATEGIES; THEORY; TRANSACTION LEVEL;

INDUSTRY;

OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 84882448143     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2063     Document Type: Article

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