Governance inseparability and the evolution of US biotechnology industry

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 197-219

  Argyres, Nicholas S ^a   Liebeskind, Julia Porter ^b  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Governance; Industry evolution; Transaction costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036159953     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00202-5     Document Type: Article

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