Appointment delay and the policy environment of the National Transportation Safety Board

Administration and Society

Volumn 37, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 679-694

  Nixon, David C ^a   Bentley, Roisin M ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Appointment; Independent regulatory commission; Selection; Vacancy

Indexed keywords

EID: 30444459327     PISSN: 00953997     EISSN: 15523039     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095399705282881     Document Type: Review

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