Epistemic dependence in interdisciplinary groups

Synthese

Volumn 190, Issue 11, 2013, Pages 1881-1898

  Andersen, Hanne ^a   Wagenknecht, Susann ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878543415     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0172-1     Document Type: Article

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