Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background Beliefs

Episteme

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 232-247

  Staley, Kent W ^a  

^a SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010164502     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3366/epi.2010.0205     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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