Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective

Episteme

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 25-38

  List, Christian ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44349161340     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.25     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Austen-Smith David, & Banks Jeffrey (1996). Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review 90: 34–45.
2. Ben-Yashar Ruth, & Nitzan Shmuel (1997). The optimal decision rule for fixed-size committees in dichotomous choice situations: the general result. International Economic Review 38: 175–186.
3. Borland Philip (1989). Majority systems and the Condorcet jury theorem. Statistician 38: 181–189.
4. Bovens Luc, & Rabinowicz Wlodek (2005). Democratic Answers to Complex Questions: an Epistemic Perspective. Synthese, forthcoming.
5. Dietrich Franz (2005). Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems. Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
6. Dietrich Franz, & List Christian (2004). A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence. Synthese 142: 175–202.
7. Dietrich Franz, & List Christian (2005). Strategy-proof judgment aggregation. Working paper, LSE.
8. Dryzek John, & List Christian (2003). Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation. British Journal of Political Science 33(1): 1–28.
9. Estlund David (1994). Opinion leaders, independence and Condorcet's jury theorem. Theory and Decision 36: 131–162.
10. Giere Ronald (2002). Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures. Philosophy of Science 69: 637–644.
11. Goldman Alvin (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Goldman Alvin (2004). Group Knowledge versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology. EPISTEME 1: 11–22.
13. Goodin Robert E. (ed.) (1996). The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Grofman Bernard, Owen Guillermo, & Feld Scott (1983). Thirteen theorems in search of the truth. Theory and Decision 15: 261–278.
15. Knorr Cetina Karin (1999). Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
16. Ladha Krishna (1992). The Condorcet jury theorem, free speech and correlated votes. American Journal of Political Science 36: 617–634.
17. List Christian (2002). Two Concepts of Agreement. The Good Society 11(1): 72–79.
18. List Christian (2003). Distributed Cognition: A Perspective from Social Choice Theory. Presentation, Australian National University, London School of Economics, University of Liverpool.
19. List Christian (2005a). The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason. Ethics, forthcoming.
20. List Christian (2005b). The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions. Social Choice and Welfare 24(1): 3–32.
21. List Christian, & Pettit Philip (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18: 89–110.
22. List Christian, & Pettit Philip (2004). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared. Synthese 140(1-2): 207–235.
23. List Christian, & Pettit Philip (2005a). On the Many as One. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33(4): 377–390.
24. List Christian, & Pettit Philip (2005b). Group Agency and Supervenience. Working paper, LSE.
25. Nozick Robert (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press.
26. Pauly Marc, & van Hees Martin (2005). Logical Constraints on Judgment Aggregation. Journal of Philosophical Logic, forthcoming.
27. Pettit Philip (2001) Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma. Philosophical Issues (supplement to Nous) 11: 268–99.
28. Pettit Philip (2003). Groups with Minds of their Own. In Schmitt Fred (ed.). Socializing Metaphysics. New York: Rowan and Littlefield.
29. Rovane Carol (1998). The Bounds of Agency: An essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.