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Argumentation and social epistemology
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1 See, for example, Alvin Goldman, 'Argumentation and Social Epistemology', The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 27-49; Liaisons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Hull, Science as a Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
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1 See, for example, Alvin Goldman, 'Argumentation and Social Epistemology', The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 27-49; Liaisons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Hull, Science as a Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
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1 See, for example, Alvin Goldman, 'Argumentation and Social Epistemology', The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 27-49; Liaisons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Hull, Science as a Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
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1 See, for example, Alvin Goldman, 'Argumentation and Social Epistemology', The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 27-49; Liaisons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Hull, Science as a Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
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(1990)
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Longino, H.1
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1 See, for example, Alvin Goldman, 'Argumentation and Social Epistemology', The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 27-49; Liaisons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Hull, Science as a Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
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Social Epistemology
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Fuller, S.1
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2 See, for example, Marcel LaFollette, Stealing into Print (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and U.S. Science Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); William Broad and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Frederick Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1992); and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, The Ethics of Scientific Research (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994).
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Stealing into Print
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LaFollette, M.1
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2 See, for example, Marcel LaFollette, Stealing into Print (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and U.S. Science Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); William Broad and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Frederick Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1992); and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, The Ethics of Scientific Research (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994).
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Chubin, D.1
Hackett, E.2
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9
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New York: Simon & Schuster
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2 See, for example, Marcel LaFollette, Stealing into Print (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and U.S. Science Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); William Broad and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Frederick Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1992); and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, The Ethics of Scientific Research (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994).
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Broad, W.1
Wade, N.2
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0004072790
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New York: Guilford Press
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2 See, for example, Marcel LaFollette, Stealing into Print (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and U.S. Science Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); William Broad and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Frederick Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1992); and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, The Ethics of Scientific Research (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994).
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(1992)
The Scientific Attitude, 2nd Ed.
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Grinnell, F.1
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0004106144
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Boston: Rowman & Littlefield
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2 See, for example, Marcel LaFollette, Stealing into Print (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and U.S. Science Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); William Broad and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Frederick Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1992); and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, The Ethics of Scientific Research (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994).
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(1994)
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Shrader-Frechette, K.1
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85029962555
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Panel on scientific responsibility and the conduct of research
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Washington: National Academy Press
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3 See, for example, Panel on Scientific Responsibility and the Conduct of Research, Responsible Science: Ensuring the Integrity of the Research Process (Washington: National Academy Press, 1992); House of Representatives Committee on Space, Science, and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 28 June (1990), No. 73, Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office).
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13
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85029967803
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Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 28 June, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office
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3 See, for example, Panel on Scientific Responsibility and the Conduct of Research, Responsible Science: Ensuring the Integrity of the Research Process (Washington: National Academy Press, 1992); House of Representatives Committee on Space, Science, and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 28 June (1990), No. 73, Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office).
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(1990)
Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research
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14
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67649189598
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Foundations of social epistemics
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op. cit., note 1, and 'Social Epistemology, Interests and Truth', unpublished manuscript
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4 For a discussion of these different approaches, see Goldman's essay 'Foundations of Social Epistemics', in Liaisons, op. cit., note 1, pp. 179-208, and 'Social Epistemology, Interests and Truth', unpublished manuscript.
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Liaisons
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Goldman1
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Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
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5 For a defense of objectivism in epistemology, see Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). For a defense of objectivism in the philosophy of science, see Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989).
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Epistemology and Cognition
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Goldman1
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5 For a defense of objectivism in epistemology, see Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). For a defense of objectivism in the philosophy of science, see Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989).
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Howson, C.1
Urbach, P.2
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0004172069
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6 For a non-objectivist approach to science, see Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), Harry Collins, Changing Order (London: Sage, 1985), Fuller, op. cit., note 1, and Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For a critique of non-objectivist approaches to epistemology and the philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Ron Giere, Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 1.
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Laboratory Life
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Latour, B.1
Woolgar, S.2
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18
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London: Sage
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6 For a non-objectivist approach to science, see Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), Harry Collins, Changing Order (London: Sage, 1985), Fuller, op. cit., note 1, and Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For a critique of non-objectivist approaches to epistemology and the philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Ron Giere, Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 1.
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(1985)
Changing Order
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Collins, H.1
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19
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0003972299
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note 1
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6 For a non-objectivist approach to science, see Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), Harry Collins, Changing Order (London: Sage, 1985), Fuller, op. cit., note 1, and Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For a critique of non-objectivist approaches to epistemology and the philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Ron Giere, Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 1.
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Social Epistemology
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Fuller1
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20
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0003963504
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Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press
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6 For a non-objectivist approach to science, see Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), Harry Collins, Changing Order (London: Sage, 1985), Fuller, op. cit., note 1, and Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For a critique of non-objectivist approaches to epistemology and the philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Ron Giere, Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 1.
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Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge
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21
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0004245984
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Chicago: University of Chicago Press
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6 For a non-objectivist approach to science, see Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), Harry Collins, Changing Order (London: Sage, 1985), Fuller, op. cit., note 1, and Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For a critique of non-objectivist approaches to epistemology and the philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Ron Giere, Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 1.
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(1990)
Science and Relativism
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Laudan, L.1
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22
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0004314753
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Chicago: University of Chicago Press
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6 For a non-objectivist approach to science, see Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), Harry Collins, Changing Order (London: Sage, 1985), Fuller, op. cit., note 1, and Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For a critique of non-objectivist approaches to epistemology and the philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Ron Giere, Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 1.
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(1988)
Explaining Science
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Giere, R.1
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23
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0004307309
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note 1
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6 For a non-objectivist approach to science, see Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), Harry Collins, Changing Order (London: Sage, 1985), Fuller, op. cit., note 1, and Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For a critique of non-objectivist approaches to epistemology and the philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Ron Giere, Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 1.
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The Advancement of Knowledge
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Kitcher1
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24
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op. cit., note 5
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7 For a defense of normativism in epistemology, see Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, op. cit., note 5. For a defense of normative philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, 'Normative Naturalism', Philosophy of Science 57 (1990), 44-59, and Philip Kitcher, 'The Naturalists Return', The Philosophical Review 101 (1992), 53-114. My approach to epistemology and the philosophy of science draws heavily on the work of Goldman, Kitcher and Laudan.
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Epistemology and Cognition
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Goldman1
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25
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Normative naturalism
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7 For a defense of normativism in epistemology, see Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, op. cit., note 5. For a defense of normative philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, 'Normative Naturalism', Philosophy of Science 57 (1990), 44-59, and Philip Kitcher, 'The Naturalists Return', The Philosophical Review 101 (1992), 53-114. My approach to epistemology and the philosophy of science draws heavily on the work of Goldman, Kitcher and Laudan.
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(1990)
Philosophy of Science
, vol.57
, pp. 44-59
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Laudan, L.1
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26
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The naturalists return
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My approach to epistemology and the philosophy of science draws heavily on the work of Goldman, Kitcher and Laudan
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7 For a defense of normativism in epistemology, see Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, op. cit., note 5. For a defense of normative philosophy of science, see Larry Laudan, 'Normative Naturalism', Philosophy of Science 57 (1990), 44-59, and Philip Kitcher, 'The Naturalists Return', The Philosophical Review 101 (1992), 53-114. My approach to epistemology and the philosophy of science draws heavily on the work of Goldman, Kitcher and Laudan.
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(1992)
The Philosophical Review
, vol.101
, pp. 53-114
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Kitcher, P.1
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8 For defense of a non-normative approach, see David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976).
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(1976)
Knowledge and Social Imagery
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Bloor, D.1
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9 Goldman, Liaisons, op. cit., note 1.
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Liaisons
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The Advancement of Knowledge
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op. cit., note 6
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Science and Relativism
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What is naturalized epistemology?
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edited by James Tomberlin Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview
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11 For further defense of epistemology's normative stance, see Jaegwon Kim, 'What is Naturalized Epistemology?', Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 2, edited by James Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 7.
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note 7
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11 For further defense of epistemology's normative stance, see Jaegwon Kim, 'What is Naturalized Epistemology?', Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 2, edited by James Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1988), and Kitcher, op. cit., note 7.
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The Philosophical Review
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Kitcher1
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12 For more on this issue, see Stephen Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
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(1990)
The Fragmentation of Reason
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Stich, S.1
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34
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13 For more on proximate aims, see William Lycan, Judgement and Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, op. cit., note 5.
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(1988)
Judgement and Justification
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Lycan, W.1
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op. cit., note 5
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13 For more on proximate aims, see William Lycan, Judgement and Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, op. cit., note 5.
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Epistemology and Cognition
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14 Goldman, Liaisons, op. cit., note 1.
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Liaisons
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Goldman1
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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16 For an interesting perspective on this issue, see R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
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(1980)
Moral Thinking
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Hare, R.M.1
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39
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0003945869
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Chicago: University of Chicago Press
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17 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Robert Merton, The Sociology of Science (New York: Free Press, 1973).
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(1962)
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
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Kuhn, T.1
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0003655519
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New York: Free Press
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17 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Robert Merton, The Sociology of Science (New York: Free Press, 1973).
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(1973)
The Sociology of Science
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Merton, R.1
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0004072790
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op. cit., note 2
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19 See Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, op. cit., note 2, and Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage Books, 1984).
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The Scientific Attitude
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Grinnell1
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44
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0004204677
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note 17 also defends ethical codes for scientists
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20 I do not claim that my proposed code is entirely original, since various scientific disciplines have adopted their own codes. Merton (op. cit., note 17) also defends ethical codes for scientists.
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The Sociology of Science
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Merton1
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45
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The murky Borderland between scientific intuition and fraud
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21 Ullica Segerstrale, 'The Murky Borderland Between Scientific Intuition and Fraud', International Journal of Applied Ethics 5 (1990), 11-20.
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International Journal of Applied Ethics
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, pp. 11-20
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Segerstrale, U.1
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note 17
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23 See Merton, op. cit., note 17. In his Sociological Ambivalence (New York: Free Press, 1976), Merton discusses how conflicts of institutional and social norms arise in science.
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The Sociology of Science
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Merton1
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47
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0004255917
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New York: Free Press, Merton discusses how conflicts of institutional and social norms arise in science
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23 See Merton, op. cit., note 17. In his Sociological Ambivalence (New York: Free Press, 1976), Merton discusses how conflicts of institutional and social norms arise in science.
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(1976)
Sociological Ambivalence
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48
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0003926193
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Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
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24 The history of Soviet science illustrates the importance of freedom and openness in science. Freedom and openness were severely limited from the 1920s to the 1960s and Soviet science suffered as a result. Soviet geneticists were not allowed to do or publish any research that contradicted the views of Lysenko and they were not permitted to learn about Mendelian genetics. Lysenko's views were accepted for political reasons in that they reinforced Marxist theories concerning the malleability of human nature. Mendel's view were banned because they undermined this political ideology. See D. Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). For more on scientific freedom, see Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1975), Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New York: Harper & Row, 1956). Longino and Kitcher both stress the importance of freedom, op. cit., note 1. For recent treatment of this issue, see M. Ross Quillian. 'A Content-Independent Explanation of Science's Effectiveness', Philosophy of Science 61 (1994), 429-448.
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(1970)
The Lysenko Affair
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Joravsky, D.1
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49
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0004187130
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London: Verso
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24 The history of Soviet science illustrates the importance of freedom and openness in science. Freedom and openness were severely limited from the 1920s to the 1960s and Soviet science suffered as a result. Soviet geneticists were not allowed to do or publish any research that contradicted the views of Lysenko and they were not permitted to learn about Mendelian genetics. Lysenko's views were accepted for political reasons in that they reinforced Marxist theories concerning the malleability of human nature. Mendel's view were banned because they undermined this political ideology. See D. Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). For more on scientific freedom, see Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1975), Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New York: Harper & Row, 1956). Longino and Kitcher both stress the importance of freedom, op. cit., note 1. For recent treatment of this issue, see M. Ross Quillian. 'A Content-Independent Explanation of Science's Effectiveness', Philosophy of Science 61 (1994), 429-448.
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(1975)
Against Method
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Feyerabend, P.1
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50
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0004213702
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New York: Harper & Row
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24 The history of Soviet science illustrates the importance of freedom and openness in science. Freedom and openness were severely limited from the 1920s to the 1960s and Soviet science suffered as a result. Soviet geneticists were not allowed to do or publish any research that contradicted the views of Lysenko and they were not permitted to learn about Mendelian genetics. Lysenko's views were accepted for political reasons in that they reinforced Marxist theories concerning the malleability of human nature. Mendel's view were banned because they undermined this political ideology. See D. Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). For more on scientific freedom, see Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1975), Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New York: Harper & Row, 1956). Longino and Kitcher both stress the importance of freedom, op. cit., note 1. For recent treatment of this issue, see M. Ross Quillian. 'A Content-Independent Explanation of Science's Effectiveness', Philosophy of Science 61 (1994), 429-448.
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(1956)
Science and Human Values
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Bronowski, J.1
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51
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0003804682
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note 1
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24 The history of Soviet science illustrates the importance of freedom and openness in science. Freedom and openness were severely limited from the 1920s to the 1960s and Soviet science suffered as a result. Soviet geneticists were not allowed to do or publish any research that contradicted the views of Lysenko and they were not permitted to learn about Mendelian genetics. Lysenko's views were accepted for political reasons in that they reinforced Marxist theories concerning the malleability of human nature. Mendel's view were banned because they undermined this political ideology. See D. Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). For more on scientific freedom, see Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1975), Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New York: Harper & Row, 1956). Longino and Kitcher both stress the importance of freedom, op. cit., note 1. For recent treatment of this issue, see M. Ross Quillian. 'A Content-Independent Explanation of Science's Effectiveness', Philosophy of Science 61 (1994), 429-448.
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Science as Social Knowledge
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A content-independent explanation of science's effectiveness
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24 The history of Soviet science illustrates the importance of freedom and openness in science. Freedom and openness were severely limited from the 1920s to the 1960s and Soviet science suffered as a result. Soviet geneticists were not allowed to do or publish any research that contradicted the views of Lysenko and they were not permitted to learn about Mendelian genetics. Lysenko's views were accepted for political reasons in that they reinforced Marxist theories concerning the malleability of human nature. Mendel's view were banned because they undermined this political ideology. See D. Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). For more on scientific freedom, see Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1975), Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New York: Harper & Row, 1956). Longino and Kitcher both stress the importance of freedom, op. cit., note 1. For recent treatment of this issue, see M. Ross Quillian. 'A Content-Independent Explanation of Science's Effectiveness', Philosophy of Science 61 (1994), 429-448.
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27 I discuss these principles in more depth in a book I am writing tentatively titled Research Ethics.
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28 One other social condition assumed here is that the public is generally not qualified to assess scientific knowledge claims; these claims need to be evaluated by experts. When scientists report results to the public before they have been evaluated by other scientists, they risk embarrassing the scientific community and misleading the public if it turns out the results are not valid. The debate over cold fusion provides a salient example of the dangers of reporting results to the public too soon. See J. Huizenga, Cold Fusion: The Scientific Fiasco of the Century (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1992).
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29 This view is analogous to W. D. Ross' view of moral rules: see The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). The issue of conflicts is discussed by Merton in Sociological Ambivalence, op. cit., note 23.
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29 This view is analogous to W. D. Ross' view of moral rules: see The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). The issue of conflicts is discussed by Merton in Sociological Ambivalence, op. cit., note 23.
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Merton1
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30 Philip Hilts, 'Tobacco Firm Withheld Results of 1983 Research', The New York Times, 1 April 1994, A1.
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31 The view developed here is similar to the view Alan Gewirth develops in 'Professional Ethics: The Separatist Thesis', Ethics 96 (1986), 282-300.
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32 See W. Anderson, 'Human Gene Therapy: Why Draw a Line?', Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (1989), 81-93.
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33 See David Suzuki and Paul Knudson, Genethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
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35 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Rudi Volti, Society and Technological Change, 3rd ed. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995).
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35 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Rudi Volti, Society and Technological Change, 3rd ed. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995).
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36 Of course, some sciences, such as astrophysics, are more epistemic in their orientation, while others, such as medicine, are more practical in their orientation, but this observation does not affect my general point.
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38 I discuss this point in more depth in my book Research Ethics.
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New York: Guilford Press
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39 It is not my intention to review or discuss the extensive literature on the history, sociology, and psychology of science in this essay, since I am only attempting to sketch a philosophical approach to research ethics. However, I will mention the following references for the interested reader: William Shadish and Steve Fuller (eds), The Social Psychology of Science (New York: Guilford Press, 1994); Michael Mulkay, Sociology of Science (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991); Steve Fuller, Marc De Mey, Terry Shinn, and Steve Woolgar (eds), The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); John Ziman, An Introduction to Science Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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The Social Psychology of Science
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Shadish, W.1
Fuller, S.2
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Indianapolis: Indiana University Press
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39 It is not my intention to review or discuss the extensive literature on the history, sociology, and psychology of science in this essay, since I am only attempting to sketch a philosophical approach to research ethics. However, I will mention the following references for the interested reader: William Shadish and Steve Fuller (eds), The Social Psychology of Science (New York: Guilford Press, 1994); Michael Mulkay, Sociology of Science (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991); Steve Fuller, Marc De Mey, Terry Shinn, and Steve Woolgar (eds), The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); John Ziman, An Introduction to Science Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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Sociology of Science
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Mulkay, M.1
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71
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Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
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39 It is not my intention to review or discuss the extensive literature on the history, sociology, and psychology of science in this essay, since I am only attempting to sketch a philosophical approach to research ethics. However, I will mention the following references for the interested reader: William Shadish and Steve Fuller (eds), The Social Psychology of Science (New York: Guilford Press, 1994); Michael Mulkay, Sociology of Science (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991); Steve Fuller, Marc De Mey, Terry Shinn, and Steve Woolgar (eds), The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); John Ziman, An Introduction to Science Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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(1989)
The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science
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Fuller, S.1
De Mey, M.2
Shinn, T.3
Woolgar, S.4
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72
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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39 It is not my intention to review or discuss the extensive literature on the history, sociology, and psychology of science in this essay, since I am only attempting to sketch a philosophical approach to research ethics. However, I will mention the following references for the interested reader: William Shadish and Steve Fuller (eds), The Social Psychology of Science (New York: Guilford Press, 1994); Michael Mulkay, Sociology of Science (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991); Steve Fuller, Marc De Mey, Terry Shinn, and Steve Woolgar (eds), The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); John Ziman, An Introduction to Science Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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(1984)
An Introduction to Science Studies
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Ziman, J.1
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