Deference lotteries

Texas Law Review

Volumn 91, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 1349-1396

  Mathews, Jud ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84877966142     PISSN: 00404411     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (275)

1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
3. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
4. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference is due when it is "apparent" that "Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, " but declining to set out conclusive criteria for establishing the requisite congressional intent).
5. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 809-22 (2010) (detailing inconsistencies in the application of Chevron).
6. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1458-64 (2005) (describing inconsistencies in when appeals courts apply different deference doctrines).
7. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
8. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1727, 1740 (2010).
9. See Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 767, 770-71 (2008) (observing that "there remains much confusion and conflation in the circuits over how to apply the Chevron doctrine").
10. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 215-16 (2006) (characterizing Mead as "close to disastrous on institutional grounds" owing to the "cognitive and institutional load that the increasing complexity of Mead's legal regime imposes on lower courts, litigants, and other actors").
11. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 205 (arguing that "the Court's reliance on congressional intent should give way to a frankly policy-laden assessment of the appropriate allocation of power in the administrative state" and "that the underlying policy evaluation of the Court misidentifies the criteria that should govern this allocation by focusing on the presence of formal procedures and generality").
12. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 809-22 (2010) (detailing inconsistencies in the application of Chevron).
13. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 549 (2009) (contending that Chevron "asks courts to determine whether Congress has delegated to administrative agencies the authority to resolve questions about the meaning of statutes that those agencies implement, but... does not give courts the tools for providing a proper answer").
14. William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 719, 719 (2002) (describing the Court's current approach to the review of administrative agencies' informal statutory interpretations as "a cumbersome, unworkable regime under which courts must draw increasingly fine distinctions using impossibly vague standards").
15. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
16. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 549 (2009) (contending that Chevron "asks courts to determine whether Congress has delegated to administrative agencies the authority to resolve questions about the meaning of statutes that those agencies implement, but... does not give courts the tools for providing a proper answer").
17. William S. Jordan, III, United States v. Mead: Complicating the Delegation Dance, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 11425, 11425 (2001) (opining that Mead obscured Chevron's "treasured clarity").
18. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807, 809 (2002) (arguing that both the majority and the dissent in Mead were mistaken).
19. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347, 347 (2003) (arguing that the flaws and incoherencies in the case law applying Mead "are traceable to the flaws, fallacies, and confusions of the Mead decision itself").
20. Foundational works on the effects of uncertain legal standards include Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279 (1986).
21. Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 541 (1994).
22. Notable recent works include Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 2011, at 133.
23. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]n an era when federal statutory law administered by federal agencies is pervasive, and when the ambiguities (intended or unintended) that those statutes contain are innumerable, totality-of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation. ").
24. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]n an era when federal statutory law administered by federal agencies is pervasive, and when the ambiguities (intended or unintended) that those statutes contain are innumerable, totality-of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation. ").
25. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1994, at 185, 203 (referring not to the deference lottery, but to the unpredictability generally engendered by aggressive judicial review of agency rulemakings).
26. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1994, at 185, 203 (referring not to the deference lottery, but to the unpredictability generally engendered by aggressive judicial review of agency rulemakings).
27. These are situations where, after Mead, Chevron applies presumptively but not definitively. As a shorthand, I sometimes refer to "agency statutory interpretations" to mean statutory interpretations rendered in these formats. The Article focuses on this subset of agency statutory interpretations because the most important agency decisions are likely to be taken pursuant to one of these procedures, as opposed to less formal forms of agency action.
28. This somewhat technical usage is uncommon, though not unknown, in legal scholarship. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 105 (2006).
29. See Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory 501 (2004) ("We refer to a probability distribution over outcomes as a lottery over outcomes. ").
30. Nolan McCarty & Adam Meirowitz, Political Game Theory: An Introduction 27-33 (2007).
31. For the actual odds from a popular multistate lottery, see Powerball-Prizes and Odds, Powerball, http://www.powerball.com/powerball/pb_prizes.asp.
32. H.R. Rep. No. 110-835, at 5 (2008).
33. The term for a lottery with outcomes that are themselves lotteries is "compound lottery. " Christian Gollier, The Economics of Risk and Time 4 (2001).
34. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
35. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
36. For the classic introduction to Principal-Agent theory, as relevant to the public law context, see Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 739, 756-58 (1984).
37. For the classic introduction to Principal-Agent theory, as relevant to the public law context, see Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 739, 756-58 (1984).
38. Foundational works on the effects of uncertain legal standards include Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279 (1986).
39. See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 Geo. L.J. 901, 903 (2011) (reiterating this distinction).
40. Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1017, 1026-31 (2009) (building on this dichotomy). This distinction is not always drawn in the law and economics scholarship, however, and for simplicity of exposition and consistency with ordinary usage, this Article sometimes refers to the "uncertainty" in deference doctrine even though its analysis supposes that the frequencies of different outcomes are knowable.
41. Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 541 (1994).
42. Foundational works on the effects of uncertain legal standards include Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279 (1986).
43. On the development of these standards, see Marcia M. McMurray, Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 605, 606-18, 623-28 (1987).
44. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 461-67 (1993) (clarifying the various standards applied by courts to corporate decisions and elaborating a framework for understanding the methodology by which judges apply these standards). Thanks to Larry Ribstein for this point.
45. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 461-67 (1993) (clarifying the various standards applied by courts to corporate decisions and elaborating a framework for understanding the methodology by which judges apply these standards). Thanks to Larry Ribstein for this point.
46. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 461-67 (1993) (clarifying the various standards applied by courts to corporate decisions and elaborating a framework for understanding the methodology by which judges apply these standards). Thanks to Larry Ribstein for this point.
47. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399 (2007) (recounting the development of deference in administrative law since the New Deal).
48. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
49. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399 (2007) (recounting the development of deference in administrative law since the New Deal).
50. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399 (2007) (recounting the development of deference in administrative law since the New Deal).
51. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
52. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
53. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
54. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
55. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
56. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
57. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
58. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131.
59. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399 (2007) (recounting the development of deference in administrative law since the New Deal).
60. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399 (2007) (recounting the development of deference in administrative law since the New Deal).
61. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399 (2007) (recounting the development of deference in administrative law since the New Deal).
62. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
63. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
64. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
65. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
66. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
67. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
68. See Reginald Parker, Administrative Interpretations, 5 Miami L.Q. 533, 538 (1951) (describing Skidmore as "the golden middle" between approaches that abdicate courts' authority to review or usurp agencies' authority to interpret.).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Skidmore deference is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation. ").
70. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1937, 1945 (2006) (noting the "open-ended and malleable" nature of the Skidmore standard).
71. For examples of the Court's less-structured post-Skidmore, pre-Chevron deference cases, see Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978).
72. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
73. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 470, 470 (1950).
74. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
75. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
76. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
77. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
78. For his part, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, regarded the opinion as merely a restatement of existing law. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in Administrative Law Stories 399, 420 & n.76 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
79. For his part, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, regarded the opinion as merely a restatement of existing law. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in Administrative Law Stories 399, 420 & n.76 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
80. For his part, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, regarded the opinion as merely a restatement of existing law. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in Administrative Law Stories 399, 420 & n.76 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
81. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).
83. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
84. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
85. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
86. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
87. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
88. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
89. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
90. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
91. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-38.
92. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-38.
93. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-38.
94. This somewhat technical usage is uncommon, though not unknown, in legal scholarship. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 105 (2006).
95. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 480 (2002).
96. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
97. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
98. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
99. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
100. As of April 2, 2013.
101. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).
102. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).
103. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
104. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
105. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
106. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
107. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
108. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1095 (1987) (demonstrating the infrequency with which the Supreme Court reviews lower court decisions and observing the freedom this gives to lower courts to alter existing law).
109. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
110. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
111. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
112. As Eskridge and Baer point out, their dataset is not a "sample" at all, but rather the complete universe of agency interpretation cases during the time period they study. But to the extent their study provides a guide to the Court's conduct going forward, it is a time-specific sample; one would think that patterns identified here would apply also to the years since 2006.
113. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
114. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
115. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
116. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
117. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
118. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
119. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
120. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
121. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
122. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
123. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
124. The agency's chances of winning before the Court are lower when Skidmore is applied than when Chevron is applied. Of formal adjudications and notice-and-comment rulemakings in the Supreme Court, agencies won 78% of those to which Chevron was applied, as opposed to 67% of those to which Chevron was not applied.
125. For instance, the IRS receives Chevron for only 33% of its interpretations, while for the Department of Health and Human Services, the figure is 74%. These agency-based discrepancies are due in some part to subject-specific lines of doctrine that in some cases seem to be eroding. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 706-07 (2011) (dropping the tax-specific National Muffler standard in favor of Chevron analysis for Treasury regulations).
126. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
127. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
128. The data do suggest, in addition, that the rate at which Chevron is applied varies somewhat by agency, and also by whether the agencies are acting pursuant to an express delegation of legislative power, which is substantially correlated with the former. These are thus examples of variables that seem to vary systematically with the incidence of Chevron review, but they are not factors that agencies are in a position to control.
129. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
130. Conservative interpretations survive review 69.4% of the time, and liberal interpretations, 68.12% of the time.
131. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
132. Specifically, a Pearson chi-squared test yields a value of 5.1654, with an associated probability of 0.023: in other words, if continuous and noncontinuous interpretations were in fact treated the same way, we would expect to see a difference this large emerge by chance only 2.3% of the time.
133. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)
134. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)
135. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810-12 (2009) (explaining that an agency's change in position does not trigger a heightened standard of review and does not require justifications for the new policy that is any "more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the first instance").
136. For instance, in the past few years, the Supreme Court has ruled that Chevron governs Treasury regulations interpreting the tax code (Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
137. See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1156, 1173 (2005) (explaining that under path dependence theory, "initial cases of first impression allow great judicial freedom").
138. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
139. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
140. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
141. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
142. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
143. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
144. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
145. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 549 (2009) (contending that Chevron "asks courts to determine whether Congress has delegated to administrative agencies the authority to resolve questions about the meaning of statutes that those agencies implement, but... does not give courts the tools for providing a proper answer").
146. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
147. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
148. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
149. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
150. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
151. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
152. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
153. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
154. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
155. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
156. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
157. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 737-39 (2002) (arguing for an interpretation that emphasizes the importance of expertise).
158. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 737-39 (2002) (arguing for an interpretation that emphasizes the importance of expertise).
159. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
160. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
161. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
162. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
163. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
164. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
165. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
166. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
167. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
168. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
169. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
170. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
171. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
172. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
173. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
174. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
175. "Emergence" refers to the development of complex systems through the aggregation of simple individual behaviors. See generally Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software (2001) (chronicling various systems displaying emergent features).
176. "Emergence" refers to the development of complex systems through the aggregation of simple individual behaviors. See generally Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software (2001) (chronicling various systems displaying emergent features).
177. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
178. The calculations of the probabilities shown in the graph are on file with the author and available upon request.
179. For a more detailed, formal treatment of judicial bargaining on three-judge courts, see Jud Mathews, Opinion Competition and Judge Replacement on Collegial Courts (Ill. Program in Law, Behavior, & Soc. Sci., Paper No. LBSS12-19, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868619.
180. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).
181. For the classic statement of the "attitudinal" model of judicial decision making, see Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited 86-97 (2002).
182. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 421, 425-27 (2007) (discussing how dissents and the threat of dissents can act as a constraint on majority rulings that stray too far from established doctrine).
183. The essence of PPT is to "treat[] policymaking as a game of strategy and focus[] on the choices that rational actors make in pursuit of their goals. " David S. Law, Introduction: Positive Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 1 (2006).
184. McNollGast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1651 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
185. McNollGast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1651 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
186. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 27-28 (1999)
187. see also Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions, in The Politics of Delegation 1, 3-9 (Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2003) (laying out the elements of PA theory).
188. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 27-28 (1999)
189. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 674, 678 (1980).
190. On the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, see Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of Professional and Supervisory Status-Fertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle?, in Labor Law Stories 353, 363-64 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005).
191. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 Duke L.J. 2013, 2034-35 (2009).
192. For a detailed account of changes in direction at two agencies over the course of three presidential administrations, see Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies 3-8 (2d ed. 1996).
193. See Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965) (explaining the need for restrictions on agencies).
194. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 27-28 (1999)
195. Charles R. Shipan, The Legislative Design of Judicial Review: A Formal Analysis, 12 J. Theoretical Pol. 269, 269 (2000).
196. Of course, a key point of this Article is that all else is not equal: if agencies anticipate more aggressive judicial review, they will adapt their interpretive practices strategically. But the net effect will still be a rise in reversal rates.
197. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 87-100 (1990) (describing in detail the costs, in terms of wasted agency resources and reduced auto safety, of judicial invalidations of vehicle safety standards).
198. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
199. See generally Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821 (2003) (analyzing the effects of White House review of agency rules).
200. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54 Econometrica 923, 923 (1986) (identifying and explaining the common agency problem).
201. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54 Econometrica 923, 923 (1986) (identifying and explaining the common agency problem).
202. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
203. See generally Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821 (2003) (analyzing the effects of White House review of agency rules).
204. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2246 (2001) (discussing the emergent role of presidential administrative control).
205. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 32-39 (2009).
206. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 32-39 (2009).
207. Nolan McCarty & Adam Meirowitz, Political Game Theory: An Introduction 27-33 (2007).
208. For a thorough discussion of subjective expected utility theory and the assumptions that underlie it, see generally Paul Anand, Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk (1993).
209. In the language of subjective utility theory, the agency's preferences are single-peaked (i.e., the ideal point is the unique maximizer for the agency) and symmetric (i.e., deviations the same distance from the ideal point to either side of it have the same value to the agency).
210. Nolan McCarty & Adam Meirowitz, Political Game Theory: An Introduction 27-33 (2007).
211. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1994, at 185, 203 (referring not to the deference lottery, but to the unpredictability generally engendered by aggressive judicial review of agency rulemakings).
212. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L.J. 38, 59-60 (1975).
213. For an insightful discussion of how administrative law doctrines empower different constituencies within agencies, see Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 1032, 1079-81 (2011).
214. For an insightful discussion of how administrative law doctrines empower different constituencies within agencies, see Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 1032, 1079-81 (2011).
215. Peter H. Schuck, Foundations of Administrative Law 82-129 (2d ed. 2004).
216. See generally Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (1955) (describing how the policies of the Interstate Commerce Commission at that time were dominated by railroad industry interests so that the agency no longer effectively regulated other transportation industries).
217. For a historical perspective, see, for example, Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy 131-35 (2001) (describing how a "mezzo-level" manager within the Post Office Department was integral in getting a hesitant Congress to enact permanent authority for Rural Free Delivery).
218. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White House Administration, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2395, 2406 (2011) (illustrating Executive control over scientific information with reference to the Bush-era NASA policy of requiring all scientists' press appearances to be first cleared with the agency's public affairs office).
219. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 27-28 (1999)
220. Yehonatan Givati raises an intriguing possibility not explored here: that an agency might be able to choose an interpretation palatable enough to the interested parties to avoid a court challenge, and thereby short-circuit judicial review. Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative Agencies, 12 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 95, 96 (2010). While this might be possible in some instances, it would probably be rare, at least with respect to important policy issues, that an agency interpretation would satisfy all potential challengers. Indeed, previous work has found that 85% of the EPA's nonroutine rules, along with every new health standard issued by OSHA has been challenged in court. Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy 246 (2d ed. 1999). However, the frequency of rulemaking challenges likely varies by subject matter.
221. See Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1717, 1717 (2012) (concluding that the EPA's air toxic emissions rules are only rarely challenged in court).
222. a(∅) = 0.
223. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).
224. see also Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 31 (1998) (finding that agencies win 89% of the time when courts reach the "reasonableness" prong of the Chevron test).
225. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
226. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
227. Peter Strauss's characterization of deference doctrine in terms of "Chevron space" and "Skidmore weight" identifies the same salient distinctions between the two regimes as my deference lottery concept. Chevron creates a zone in which agencies have the discretion to set policy themselves, whereas Skidmore instructs courts how much credence to give agency views in their own resolution of statutory questions. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight, " 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1143 (2012).
228. Note that there are many other ways these curves could be drawn; the Article's only assumption is that the function is "increasing in x": in other words, that the probability of surviving Skidmore review goes up as the interpretation nears x = 1 (i.e., grows safer).
229. Peter Strauss's characterization of deference doctrine in terms of "Chevron space" and "Skidmore weight" identifies the same salient distinctions between the two regimes as my deference lottery concept. Chevron creates a zone in which agencies have the discretion to set policy themselves, whereas Skidmore instructs courts how much credence to give agency views in their own resolution of statutory questions. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight, " 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1143 (2012).
230. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
231. The results can hold whether the agency is risk neutral or risk averse, but they are more pronounced if the agency is risk averse.
232. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 27-28 (1999)
233. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 27-28 (1999)
234. Depending on how the agency's utility function and the Skidmore lottery are defined, it is possible that agency may shift its interpretation towards its ideal point gradually as Skidmore scrutiny increases, rather than all at once after some "tipping point" of Skidmore scrutiny has been reached.
235. The agency's expected benefit from choosing Interpretation B is 68.8: 0.6 * 80 + 0.4 * 0.65 * 80. That is the probability of receiving Chevron review (0.6) times the benefit to the agency from Interpretation B (80), plus the probability of receiving Skidmore review (0.4) times the probability of surviving that review (0.65) times the benefit to the agency from Interpretation B (80). This compares favorably to the expected benefit from Interpretation A (68) and Interpretation C (58.8).
236. Interpretation A yields an expected benefit of 66. This exceeds the expected benefit from Interpretation B (57.6) or Interpretation C (52.8).
237. We would expect courts to reverse agencies 34% of the time: Skidmore will be applied 40% of the time, and the agency will lose 85% of those cases.
238. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
239. This may be the case if the bump upwards in probability of surviving review is greater the closer the agency's interpretation is to the most plausibly faithful interpretation. This kind of manipulation to the Skidmore lottery weakens the "stick" (the penalty for opportunistic behavior) but strengthens the "carrot" (the reward for compliant behavior).
240. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
241. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
242. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
243. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481-85 (2001) (rejecting agency interpretation at Chevron Step Two).
244. see also Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 31 (1998) (finding that agencies win 89% of the time when courts reach the "reasonableness" prong of the Chevron test).
245. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
246. Judges and justices differ in their willingness to grant or refuse deference at Chevron Step One. Justice Scalia, for instance, is less inclined to find ambiguity than most of his colleagues. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the regulation's interpretation runs afoul of the "unmistakably clear" statute).
247. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
248. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486 (reversing in part after rejecting the agency's interpretation).
249. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486 (reversing in part after rejecting the agency's interpretation).
250. Another solution that would be effective in principle but difficult to implement in practice-and would also raise troubling questions from a transparency in governance perspective-is to create an "acoustic separation" between how courts review agencies and how agencies think courts review agencies. In other words, if the deference regime were in fact quite deferential, but agencies anticipated fairly stringent judicial review, the regime could generate the benefits of agency compliance without the costs of high levels of reversals. Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 625, 630 (1984) (defining "acoustic separation" as an imaginary situation in which only officials know the rules for making decisions and only the public knows the conduct rules).
251. Another solution that would be effective in principle but difficult to implement in practice-and would also raise troubling questions from a transparency in governance perspective-is to create an "acoustic separation" between how courts review agencies and how agencies think courts review agencies. In other words, if the deference regime were in fact quite deferential, but agencies anticipated fairly stringent judicial review, the regime could generate the benefits of agency compliance without the costs of high levels of reversals. Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 625, 630 (1984) (defining "acoustic separation" as an imaginary situation in which only officials know the rules for making decisions and only the public knows the conduct rules).
252. Another solution that would be effective in principle but difficult to implement in practice-and would also raise troubling questions from a transparency in governance perspective-is to create an "acoustic separation" between how courts review agencies and how agencies think courts review agencies. In other words, if the deference regime were in fact quite deferential, but agencies anticipated fairly stringent judicial review, the regime could generate the benefits of agency compliance without the costs of high levels of reversals. Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 625, 630 (1984) (defining "acoustic separation" as an imaginary situation in which only officials know the rules for making decisions and only the public knows the conduct rules).
253. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
254. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
255. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Rulemaking, 1988 Duke L.J. 300, 300-01 (remarking that "policymaking through agency rulemaking has declined significantly at some agencies during the past decade, " in large part because of "the approach taken by appellate courts when they review agency rules").
256. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1994, at 185, 203 (referring not to the deference lottery, but to the unpredictability generally engendered by aggressive judicial review of agency rulemakings).
257. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1410-26 (1992) (describing how agencies hold additional hearings, convene panels of outside experts, and undertake studies to anticipate judicial challenges to rulemakings).
258. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1994, at 185, 203 (referring not to the deference lottery, but to the unpredictability generally engendered by aggressive judicial review of agency rulemakings).
259. This somewhat technical usage is uncommon, though not unknown, in legal scholarship. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 105 (2006).
260. see also Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 57, 63-90 (providing an extensive overview of the EPA's internal decision-making process, including the role of agency lawyers)
261. see also Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 57, 63-90 (providing an extensive overview of the EPA's internal decision-making process, including the role of agency lawyers)
262. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).
263. On argumentation frameworks in law, see generally Alec Stone Sweet, Path Dependence, Precedent, and Judicial Power, in On Law, Politics, & Judicialization 112 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002).
264. Giovanni Sartor, A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation, 7 Ratio Juris 177 (1994).
265. Giovanni Sartor, A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation, 7 Ratio Juris 177 (1994).
266. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
267. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 737-39 (2002) (arguing for an interpretation that emphasizes the importance of expertise).
268. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
269. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
270. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to, the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
271. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
272. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
273. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
274. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
275. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).