-
1
-
-
0000547079
-
Legal Principles and the Limits of Law
-
841-842, ("Since the law should strive to balance certainty and reliability against flexibility, it is, on the whole, wise legal policy to use rules as much as possible for regulating human behavior as they are more certain than principles and lend themselves more easily to uniform and predictable application.")
-
See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841-42 (1972) ("Since the law should strive to balance certainty and reliability against flexibility, it is, on the whole, wise legal policy to use rules as much as possible for regulating human behavior as they are more certain than principles and lend themselves more easily to uniform and predictable application.").
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(1972)
Yale L. J.
, vol.81
, pp. 823
-
-
Raz, J.1
-
2
-
-
0000525496
-
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards
-
298-299, (analyzing two undesirable social effects that stem from uncertain regulation: (1) over-deterrence and (2) inefficient risk-taking)
-
see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 298-99 (1986) (analyzing two undesirable social effects that stem from uncertain regulation: (1) over-deterrence and (2) inefficient risk-taking).
-
(1986)
J. L. Econ. & Org.
, vol.2
, pp. 279
-
-
Craswell, R.1
Calfee, J.E.2
-
3
-
-
79958168033
-
Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness
-
104-06, (arguing against the use of broad standards in tax law because of the harm of uncertainty)
-
Kenneth W. Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 101, 104-06 (1999) (arguing against the use of broad standards in tax law because of the harm of uncertainty).
-
(1999)
Ohio N. U. L. Rev.
, vol.25
, pp. 101
-
-
Gideon, K.W.1
-
4
-
-
84888998229
-
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules
-
1178-83, (arguing that courts should decide cases in such a way that provides guidance to lower courts, future legislators, and citizens)
-
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-83 (1989) (arguing that courts should decide cases in such a way that provides guidance to lower courts, future legislators, and citizens).
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(1989)
U. Chi. L. Rev.
, vol.56
, pp. 1175
-
-
Scalia, A.1
-
5
-
-
33846647656
-
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards
-
62-64
-
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV 22, 62-64 (1992).
-
(1992)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.106
, pp. 22
-
-
Sullivan, K.M.1
-
6
-
-
71849112032
-
Problems with Rules
-
957, (describing the conventional view that clarity of rules is a target of law)
-
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1995) (describing the conventional view that clarity of rules is a target of law).
-
(1995)
Cal. L. Rev.
, vol.83
, pp. 953
-
-
Sunstein, C.R.1
-
7
-
-
78049312275
-
Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication
-
For a review of some of the main drawbacks of uncertainty in antitrust law, 99
-
For a review of some of the main drawbacks of uncertainty in antitrust law, see Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 99 (2007).
-
(2007)
Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
, vol.64
, pp. 49
-
-
Crane, D.A.1
-
8
-
-
21144468370
-
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis
-
562-63 (observing that while rules are less costly than standards to interpret and apply, they are more costly to create)
-
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562-63 (1992) (observing that while rules are less costly than standards to interpret and apply, they are more costly to create).
-
(1992)
Duke L.J.
, vol.42
, pp. 557
-
-
Kaplow, L.1
-
9
-
-
79958092828
-
-
Note
-
In the context of contract law, similar claims regarding the cost of contractual vagueness have been put forth.
-
-
-
-
10
-
-
18944385479
-
The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation
-
1587-1588
-
See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1587-88 (2005).
-
(2005)
Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.83
, pp. 1581
-
-
Posner, R.A.1
-
11
-
-
32544460867
-
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design
-
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006).
-
(2006)
Yale L. J.
, vol.115
, pp. 814
-
-
Scott, R.E.1
Triantis, G.G.2
-
12
-
-
33749641668
-
On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts
-
Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006).
-
(2006)
J. L. Econ. & Org
, vol.22
, pp. 289
-
-
Shavell, S.1
-
13
-
-
52249113135
-
Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification
-
503-504, (arguing that ambiguity signals an unwillingness to sue)
-
But see Albert Choi & GeorgeTriantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503-04 (2008) (arguing that ambiguity signals an unwillingness to sue).
-
(2008)
J. Legal Stud.
, vol.37
, pp. 503
-
-
Choi, A.1
Triantis, G.2
-
14
-
-
26844578044
-
Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime
-
Contrary to the conventional view, support for uncertainty was developed recently by, 277
-
Contrary to the conventional view, support for uncertainty was developed recently by Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276, 277 (1999).
-
(1999)
Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
, vol.1
, pp. 276
-
-
Harel, A.1
Segal, U.2
-
15
-
-
0345131390
-
Ten Truths About Tax Shelters
-
In the context of tax law
-
In the context of tax law, see generally David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215 (2002).
-
(2002)
Tax L. Rev.
, vol.55
, pp. 215
-
-
Weisbach, D.A.1
-
16
-
-
70449941024
-
Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain
-
Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241 (2007).
-
(2007)
Va. Tax Rev.
, vol.27
, pp. 241
-
-
Logue, K.D.1
-
17
-
-
79958128292
-
-
Note
-
According to those views, in the context of tax law, uncertainty may enhance the deterrence effect of regulation due to risk aversion. This article, however, highlights the opposing side, arguing that uncertainty decreases legal influence on behavior in a way that strengthens "authentic behaviors."
-
-
-
-
18
-
-
0000787258
-
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
-
207-209, (discussing the use of law to deter crime)
-
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207-09 (1968) (discussing the use of law to deter crime).
-
(1968)
J. Pol. Econ.
, vol.76
, pp. 169
-
-
Becker, G.S.1
-
19
-
-
79958168977
-
-
Note
-
At least in the context of criminal law, ambiguity may lead to invalidation of the law. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.").
-
-
-
-
20
-
-
34547574288
-
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law
-
630-631
-
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630-31 (1984).
-
(1984)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.97
, pp. 625
-
-
Dan-Cohen, M.1
-
21
-
-
79958173928
-
-
Note
-
We focus here on explaining the difference between our first type and Dan-Cohen's argument; our second and third types are too different to enable a meaningful comparison.
-
-
-
-
22
-
-
79958162842
-
-
Note
-
These two concepts are the most heavily studied in the JDM literature.
-
-
-
-
23
-
-
4243329450
-
Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference
-
For an example that attempts to study the relationship between these two concepts in the decision-making process
-
For an example that attempts to study the relationship between these two concepts in the decision-making process, see generally Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference, 92 PSYCHOL. REV. 433 (1985).
-
(1985)
Psychol. Rev.
, vol.92
, pp. 433
-
-
Einhorn, H.J.1
Hogarth, R.M.2
-
24
-
-
0001778197
-
The Politics of Recognition
-
For a discussion of the complex concept of "authenticity,", (Amy Gutman ed.)
-
For a discussion of the complex concept of "authenticity," see generally Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy Gutman ed., 1994).
-
(1994)
Multiculturalism
, pp. 25
-
-
Taylor, C.1
-
26
-
-
79958137653
-
Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships
-
1591-92 (emphasizing the law's ability to shape social institutions, such as cohabitation)
-
See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1591-92 (2009) (emphasizing the law's ability to shape social institutions, such as cohabitation).
-
(2009)
Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
, vol.66
, pp. 1565
-
-
Lifshitz, S.1
-
27
-
-
0348199090
-
On the Expressive Function of Law
-
2022-2024
-
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022-24 (1996).
-
(1996)
U. Pa. L. Rev.
, vol.144
, pp. 2021
-
-
Sunstein, C.R.1
-
28
-
-
0025596897
-
Is Women's Labor a Commodity?
-
For a discussion of the concept of commodification, 81-83
-
For a discussion of the concept of commodification, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 81-83 (1990).
-
(1990)
Phil. & Pub. Aff.
, vol.19
, pp. 71
-
-
Anderson, E.S.1
-
29
-
-
84936628259
-
Market-Inalienability
-
1930-1933
-
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1930-33 (1987).
-
(1987)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.100
, pp. 1849
-
-
Radin, M.J.1
-
30
-
-
79958099464
-
-
Note
-
For an account of the psychological process of crowding-out motivation, see infra note 20 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
79958114864
-
From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law
-
1251 (discussing the decreased willingness of judges and legislatures to adhere to harsh principles in order to promote desirable behavior and deter undesirable behavior)
-
See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1979-1980) (discussing the decreased willingness of judges and legislatures to adhere to harsh principles in order to promote desirable behavior and deter undesirable behavior).
-
(1979)
Iowa L. Rev.
, vol.65
, pp. 1249
-
-
Atiyah, P.S.1
-
32
-
-
79951931375
-
Bankruptcy or Bailouts?
-
485-486, (addressing the role of moral hazards in bankruptcy law)
-
See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 485-86 (addressing the role of moral hazards in bankruptcy law).
-
J. Corp. L.
, vol.35
, pp. 469
-
-
Ayotte, K.1
Skeel Jr., D.A.2
-
33
-
-
79958101593
-
-
Note
-
In Part V, which focuses on legal implications, we shall return to these examples with greater focus on the legal design. We will also demonstrate a second scenario in family law with regard to the distinction between the economic relationship between married partners and that of cohabitants. Ex ante, the distinction between marriage and cohabitation commitments is justified because it provides a "screening mechanism" for spouses to express their different preferences. According to this view, the distinction between marriage and cohabitation does not reflect the superiority of marriage, but rather the advantage of diversity of spousal institutions. Ex post, however, cohabitation law should impose on cohabitants the responsive components of marriage law that aims to prevent exploitation and protect weaker parties in the relationship. Masking the ex post responsive effect of the law may help to preserve the ex ante effect of the screening mechanism.
-
-
-
-
34
-
-
79958115379
-
-
Note
-
See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (choosing to retain a bright-line rule instead of a case-by-case approach, thereby avoiding uncertainty and excessive litigation).
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
0345131390
-
Ten Truths About Tax Shelters
-
224 (Anytime anyone alters his behavior because of taxes we have the same problem-the changed behavior imposed cost on others that the person does not take into account)
-
See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 224 (2002) ("Anytime anyone alters his behavior because of taxes we have the same problem-the changed behavior imposed cost on others that the person does not take into account.").
-
(2002)
Tax L. Rev.
, vol.55
, pp. 215
-
-
Weisbach, D.A.1
-
36
-
-
79958113948
-
Defense of Tax Shelters
-
800-01 (responding to Weisbach's arguments)
-
But see Leo Katz, In Defense of Tax Shelters, 26 VA. TAX REV. 799, 800-01 (2007) (responding to Weisbach's arguments).
-
(2007)
Va. Tax Rev.
, vol.26
, pp. 799
-
-
Katz, L.1
-
37
-
-
0036264511
-
Psychological Foundations of Incentives
-
713-19, (discussing the psychological process of crowding-out and its relevance to economics)
-
See Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 687, 713-19 (2002) (discussing the psychological process of crowding-out and its relevance to economics).
-
(2002)
Eur. Econ. Rev.
, vol.46
, pp. 687
-
-
Fehr, E.1
Falk, A.2
-
38
-
-
0037435018
-
Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism
-
140 (presenting research that "suggests that economic incentives cause mainly negative effects on altruistic cooperation if they come in the form of sanctions and if they are associated with greedy or selfish intentions")
-
Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 140 (2003) (presenting research that "suggests that economic incentives cause mainly negative effects on altruistic cooperation if they come in the form of sanctions and if they are associated with greedy or selfish intentions").
-
(2003)
Nature
, vol.422
, pp. 137
-
-
Fehr, E.1
Rockenbach, B.2
-
39
-
-
0003949907
-
-
(Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 34) (presenting research indicating that incentive contracts undermine voluntary cooperation to such a degree that these contracts are less efficient than fixed-price contracts)
-
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? 1 (Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 34, 2002) (presenting research indicating that incentive contracts undermine voluntary cooperation to such a degree that these contracts are less efficient than fixed-price contracts).
-
(2002)
Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?
, pp. 1
-
-
Fehr, E.1
Gachter, S.2
-
40
-
-
0004093307
-
-
(Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds.) (arguing that payments to blood donors could diminish the quality and quantity of donations)
-
RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 314 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997) (arguing that payments to blood donors could diminish the quality and quantity of donations).
-
(1997)
The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy
, pp. 314
-
-
Titmuss, R.M.1
-
41
-
-
0033220501
-
A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation
-
Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 658-59 (1999).
-
(1999)
Psychol. Bull.
, vol.125
, pp. 658-659
-
-
Deci, E.L.1
Koestner, R.2
Ryan, R.M.3
-
42
-
-
62149123924
-
-
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 07-9)
-
Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially 17 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 07-9, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1010620.
-
(2007)
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
, pp. 17
-
-
Ariely, D.1
Bracha, A.2
Meier, S.3
-
43
-
-
0002195393
-
A Fine Is a Price
-
13-14, (presenting research indicating that small penalties for undesirable behavior may increase the incidence of such behavior)
-
See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-14 (2000) (presenting research indicating that small penalties for undesirable behavior may increase the incidence of such behavior).
-
(2000)
J. Legal Stud.
, vol.29
, pp. 1
-
-
Gneezy, U.1
Rustichini, A.2
-
44
-
-
79958138185
-
Itemizing Personhood
-
131-133, (demonstrating how in the tax law context, one can take the commodification literature into account without going all the way to full delegalization of non-market relationships)
-
see also Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 131-33 (2009) (demonstrating how in the tax law context, one can take the commodification literature into account without going all the way to full delegalization of non-market relationships).
-
(2009)
Va. Tax Rev.
, vol.29
, pp. 93
-
-
Dagan, T.1
-
45
-
-
0000125532
-
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk
-
See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
-
(1979)
Econometrica
, vol.47
, pp. 263
-
-
Kahneman, D.1
Tversky, A.2
-
46
-
-
84988112522
-
Ambiguity and Rationality
-
152 (discussing the definition of ambiguity)
-
See Deborah Frisch & Jonathan Baron, Ambiguity and Rationality, 1 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 149, 152 (1988) (discussing the definition of ambiguity).
-
(1988)
J. Behav. Decision Making
, vol.1
, pp. 149
-
-
Frisch, D.1
Baron, J.2
-
47
-
-
0009883679
-
On the Robustness and Possible Accounts of Ambiguity Aversion
-
169-171, (recognizing the phenomenon of ambiguity avoidance and discussing possible explanations)
-
Gideon Keren & Léonie E.M. Gerritsen, On the Robustness and Possible Accounts of Ambiguity Aversion, 103 ACTA PSYCHOL. 149, 169-71 (1999) (recognizing the phenomenon of ambiguity avoidance and discussing possible explanations).
-
(1999)
Acta Psychol
, vol.103
, pp. 149
-
-
Keren, G.1
Gerritsen, L.E.M.2
-
48
-
-
84965432094
-
The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under Uncertainty
-
306
-
Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under Uncertainty, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 305, 306 (1992).
-
(1992)
Psychol. Sci.
, vol.3
, pp. 305
-
-
Tversky, A.1
Shafir, E.2
-
49
-
-
79958120753
-
-
Note
-
It should be admitted that the disjunction effect may be limited to ambiguity with regard to a specific event, which is narrower than the broader claim we wish to develop in our project.
-
-
-
-
50
-
-
0347532747
-
The Discounting of Ambiguous Information in Economic Decision Making
-
350-351
-
See Eric Van Dijk & Marcel Zeelenberg, The Discounting of Ambiguous Information in Economic Decision Making, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 341, 350-51 (2003).
-
(2003)
J. Behav. Decision Making
, vol.16
, pp. 341
-
-
Van Dijk, E.1
Zeelenberg, M.2
-
51
-
-
33845355121
-
The Uncertainty Effect: When a Risky Prospect Is Valued Less Than Its Worst Possible Outcome
-
1284
-
Uri Gneezy et al., The Uncertainty Effect: When a Risky Prospect Is Valued Less Than Its Worst Possible Outcome, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1283, 1284 (2006).
-
(2006)
Q. J. Econ.
, vol.121
, pp. 1283
-
-
Gneezy, U.1
-
52
-
-
84857046974
-
The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment
-
486 (suggesting that perceived severity has significant deterrent effect at relatively high levels of perceived certainty)
-
See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment, 59 SOC. FORCES 471, 486 (1980-1981) (suggesting that perceived severity has significant deterrent effect at relatively high levels of perceived certainty).
-
(1980)
Soc. Forces
, vol.59
, pp. 471
-
-
Grasmick, H.G.1
Bryjak, G.J.2
-
53
-
-
1642368397
-
The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach
-
486-487
-
Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 486-87 (2004).
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(2004)
Iowa L. Rev.
, vol.89
, pp. 443
-
-
Baker, T.1
Harel, A.2
Kugler, T.3
-
54
-
-
0242534404
-
Death, Taxes and Cognition
-
578-93. (discussing people's behavior with regard to estate-tax planning)
-
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 578-93 (2003) (discussing people's behavior with regard to estate-tax planning).
-
(2003)
N.C. L. Rev.
, vol.81
, pp. 567
-
-
Fennell, L.A.1
-
55
-
-
10044258933
-
Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing
-
248-250
-
See Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REV. 231, 248-50 (2004).
-
(2004)
Ala. L. Rev.
, vol.55
, pp. 231
-
-
Aviram, A.1
Tor, A.2
-
56
-
-
32144460379
-
Ambiguity and Income Taxation
-
640-45, (advocating a low or zero tax rate for foreign investments to overcome investors' ambiguity-based preference for domestic funds)
-
Terrance R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 640-45 (2002) (advocating a low or zero tax rate for foreign investments to overcome investors' ambiguity-based preference for domestic funds).
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(2002)
Cardozo L. Rev.
, vol.23
, pp. 617
-
-
Chorvat, T.R.1
-
57
-
-
43349090963
-
Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma
-
98-99
-
Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. ECON. 81, 98-99 (2008).
-
(2008)
Rev. L. & Econ.
, vol.4
, pp. 81
-
-
Feldman, Y.1
Harel, A.2
-
58
-
-
70450055911
-
Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?
-
985
-
Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 985 (2009).
-
(2009)
N. Y. U. L. Rev.
, vol.84
, pp. 980
-
-
Feldman, Y.1
Teichman, D.2
-
59
-
-
79958138708
-
-
Note
-
When referring to legal benefits, we include also saving future legal costs.
-
-
-
-
60
-
-
79958098912
-
-
Note
-
We recognize that using low probabilities limits the ability of our findings to generalize in terms of other situations with higher probabilities.
-
-
-
-
61
-
-
79958102659
-
-
Note
-
In addition, we have also measured an elaborate demographic profile to account for risk preferences. This last factor was used as the control in all of the presented analyses.
-
-
-
-
62
-
-
79958153040
-
-
Note
-
We rely on the concept of intention developed by Icek Ajzen.
-
-
-
-
63
-
-
44949274046
-
The Theory of Planned Behavior
-
181 ("Intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior.")
-
See Icek Ajzen, The Theory of Planned Behavior, 50 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 179, 181 (1991) ("Intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior.").
-
(1991)
Org. Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes
, vol.50
-
-
Ajzen, I.1
-
64
-
-
79958158951
-
-
Note
-
ANOVA, a univariate analysis of variance, aims to identify the sources of variance among participants. In contrast to MANOVA, ANOVA involves only one dependent variable.
-
-
-
-
65
-
-
79958083020
-
-
Note
-
MANCOVA and ANCOVA are similar procedures to MANOVA and ANOVA, respectively. The major difference is that MANCOVA and ANCOVA control for the influence of a supplementary independent variable (a covariate) such as demographics and attitudes toward risk.
-
-
-
-
66
-
-
79958157343
-
-
Note
-
While the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that the legal instrument subgroups did not differ significantly on the risk-attitudes measure, the measure, which was expected to be associated with the outcome factors, was included as a covariate in the analyses to be reported. A similar pattern of results emerged without covariating for the risk attitudes and, therefore, the possible effect of the measure as a competing explanation for the participants' outcomes was substantially reduced. Covariating for the three background variables revealed similar patterns of results unless reported otherwise.
-
-
-
-
67
-
-
79958100022
-
-
Note
-
2=.05.
-
-
-
-
68
-
-
79958100520
-
-
Note
-
2=.08.
-
-
-
-
69
-
-
79958145909
-
-
Note
-
This hypothesis is based on the Bonferroni post-hoc test, which helps to address the problem of multiple comparisons.
-
-
-
-
70
-
-
0034575819
-
Feeling "Holier Than Thou": Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?
-
For a discussion of the sources of the "self-other gap", 861-62, (discussing why people tend to hold more charitable views of themselves than of others)
-
For a discussion of the sources of the "self-other gap," see Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling "Holier Than Thou": Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 861, 861-62 (2000) (discussing why people tend to hold more charitable views of themselves than of others).
-
(2000)
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol.
, vol.79
, pp. 861
-
-
Epley, N.1
Dunning, D.2
-
71
-
-
78649340892
-
The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality
-
For a discussion of the gap in the legal context, 1153-54, (examining the effect of various regulatory mechanisms on social enforcement patterns)
-
For a discussion of the gap in the legal context, see Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1153-54 (2010) (examining the effect of various regulatory mechanisms on social enforcement patterns).
-
(2010)
Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.88
, pp. 1151
-
-
Feldman, Y.1
Lobel, O.2
-
72
-
-
79958147056
-
-
Note
-
Participants were divided into three subgroups according to the thirty-third and sixty-sixth percentiles of the measure of the perception of the arrangement from the employee's perspective. Two items were used to build this factor: q 4 (whether the chosen arrangement is profitable for the employee) and q 8 (whether the chosen arrangement is fair for the employee).
-
-
-
-
73
-
-
79958148106
-
-
Note
-
These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.
-
-
-
-
74
-
-
79958103755
-
-
Note
-
2=.02.
-
-
-
-
75
-
-
79958108512
-
-
Note
-
2=.02.
-
-
-
-
76
-
-
79958168976
-
-
Note
-
Participants were divided into three subgroups according to the thirty-third and sixty-sixth percentiles of the measure of the perceived reduction in the employee's wage.
-
-
-
-
77
-
-
79958156810
-
-
Note
-
These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.
-
-
-
-
78
-
-
79958176138
-
-
Note
-
2=.03.
-
-
-
-
79
-
-
79958082482
-
-
Note
-
Note that with regard to the second interaction, certainty could not have had an effect when neither type of law differed significantly from the control group for the moderate- to high-level intensity of preferences.
-
-
-
-
80
-
-
79958145268
-
-
Note
-
Three subgroups were compared: High External Reward under Uncertainty, High External Reward-Probabilistic Reasoning, and External Reward with Certain Probability.
-
-
-
-
81
-
-
79958157342
-
-
Note
-
2=.03.
-
-
-
-
82
-
-
79958164530
-
-
Note
-
2=.06; Expected Preference: M=72.62, SD=22.68; Observed Preference: M=46.96, SD=31.14.
-
-
-
-
83
-
-
79958154157
-
-
Note
-
2=.09.
-
-
-
-
84
-
-
79958108999
-
-
Note
-
2=.16.
-
-
-
-
85
-
-
79958105383
-
-
Note
-
This second type of uncertain benefit was slightly stronger than the first type, but still no significant effect was present.
-
-
-
-
86
-
-
79958106788
-
Mediation of a Bankruptcy Case
-
60 [M]ediation gives the parties the control of determining the outcome of the dispute and avoids the uncertainty inherent in all litigation
-
See, e.g., Michael S. Wilk & Rik H. Zafar, Mediation of a Bankruptcy Case, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 60 (2003) ("[M]ediation gives the parties the control of determining the outcome of the dispute and avoids the uncertainty inherent in all litigation.").
-
(2003)
Am. Bankr. Inst. J.
, vol.22
, pp. 12
-
-
Wilk, M.S.1
Zafar, R.H.2
-
87
-
-
32544460867
-
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design
-
In the context of contract law, (discussing the trade-offs between precise terms, which are more costly to negotiate, and vague terms, which may lead to inefficient litigation), 836-37
-
In the context of contract law, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 836-37 (2006) (discussing the trade-offs between precise terms, which are more costly to negotiate, and vague terms, which may lead to inefficient litigation).
-
(2006)
Yale L. J.
, vol.115
, pp. 814
-
-
Scott, R.E.1
Triantis, G.G.2
-
88
-
-
77951961183
-
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts
-
218, (arguing that parties strengthen their relationships by jointly accepting vulnerability "to costly and uncertain enforcement" through ambiguous contract terms)
-
See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 218 (2009) (arguing that parties strengthen their relationships by jointly accepting vulnerability "to costly and uncertain enforcement" through ambiguous contract terms).
-
(2009)
Del. J. Corp. L.
, vol.34
, pp. 191
-
-
Hill, C.A.1
-
89
-
-
79956121151
-
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change
-
95. contrasting the characteristics of and strategies used by "repeat players" and "one-shotters"
-
See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974-1975) (contrasting the characteristics of and strategies used by "repeat players" and "one-shotters").
-
(1974)
L. & Soc'y Rev.
, vol.9
, pp. 97-104
-
-
Galanter, M.1
-
90
-
-
0000438048
-
The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . .
-
William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC'Y REV. 631, 636-37 (1980-1981).
-
(1980)
L. & Soc'y Rev.
, vol.15
, pp. 636-637
-
-
Felstiner, W.L.F.1
-
91
-
-
79958122608
-
-
Note
-
There is an additional concern that should be taken into account regarding the influence of cognitive biases like the disjunction effect on decision-making in large organizations.
-
-
-
-
92
-
-
0000094797
-
Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law
-
1568 (demonstrating that where the law is uncertain, large organizations tend to create structural and cultural environments that discourage employees from exercising their rights)
-
See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1568 (1992) (demonstrating that where the law is uncertain, large organizations tend to create structural and cultural environments that discourage employees from exercising their rights).
-
(1992)
Am. J. Soc.
, vol.97
, pp. 1531
-
-
Edelman, L.B.1
-
93
-
-
79958130166
-
-
Note
-
For more details, see infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the certainty in cohabitation law).
-
-
-
-
95
-
-
79958177023
-
-
Note
-
Of course there could be relevant non-economic considerations. The rule of law is often considered a virtue of a legal system irrespective of its economic ramifications.
-
-
-
-
96
-
-
44849100091
-
Marriage and the Elephant: the Liberal Democratic State's Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between Adults
-
26 (claiming that until recently, the legitimacy of the state's involvement in and support for marriage went largely undisputed)
-
Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: the Liberal Democratic State's Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 26 (2007) (claiming that until recently, the legitimacy of the state's involvement in and support for marriage went largely undisputed).
-
(2007)
Harv. J. L. & Gender
, vol.30
, pp. 25
-
-
Eichner, M.1
-
97
-
-
0039886264
-
What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples
-
For a survey of the many tangible legal benefits of marriage
-
For a survey of the many tangible legal benefits of marriage, see generally David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996)
-
(1996)
Mich. L. Rev.
, vol.95
, pp. 447
-
-
Chambers, D.L.1
-
98
-
-
79958123648
-
Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective
-
Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 291 (2001).
-
(2001)
Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L.
, vol.9
, pp. 291
-
-
Wald, M.S.1
-
99
-
-
79958155194
-
Spousal Rights and Spousal Duties: The Liberal Case for Privileging Marriage
-
(Scott FitzGibbon et al. eds) (surveying the public arguments in favor of marriage)
-
See Shahar Lifshitz, Spousal Rights and Spousal Duties: The Liberal Case for Privileging Marriage, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 165, 165-69 (Scott FitzGibbon et al. eds., 2010) (surveying the public arguments in favor of marriage).
-
(2010)
The Jurisprudence Of Marriage And Other Intimate Relationships
, vol.165
, pp. 165-169
-
-
Lifshitz, S.1
-
101
-
-
10344265990
-
A Good Man Is Hard To Find: Marriage as an Institution
-
27-28
-
Russell D. Murphy, Jr., A Good Man Is Hard To Find: Marriage as an Institution, 47 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 27, 27-28 (2002).
-
(2002)
J. Econ. Behav. & Org.
, vol.47
, pp. 27
-
-
Murphy Jr., R.D.1
-
103
-
-
0346479802
-
Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage
-
1908-1910
-
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1908-10 (2000).
-
(2000)
Va. L. Rev.
, vol.86
, pp. 1901
-
-
Scott, E.S.1
-
104
-
-
0040371514
-
The Channeling Function in Family Law
-
For a similar argument, 495
-
For a similar argument, see Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 500-01 (1992).
-
(1992)
Hofstra L. Rev.
, vol.20
, pp. 500-501
-
-
Schneider, C.E.1
-
106
-
-
0007256844
-
Parental Cohabitation and Children's Economic Well-Being
-
1009 (finding that children in cohabitating households have an economic advantage over children in single-parent households but are at an economic disadvantage compared to children in married households)
-
See Wendy D. Manning & Daniel T. Lichter, Parental Cohabitation and Children's Economic Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 998, 1009 (1996) (finding that children in cohabitating households have an economic advantage over children in single-parent households but are at an economic disadvantage compared to children in married households).
-
(1996)
J. Marriage & Fam.
, vol.58
, pp. 998
-
-
Manning, W.D.1
Lichter, D.T.2
-
107
-
-
84926282046
-
Is He Married? Marriage as Information
-
For an economic analysis of the moderating aspects of marriage and the social benefit thereof, 259, (noting that marriage is a signal of desirable qualities, such as stability)
-
For an economic analysis of the moderating aspects of marriage and the social benefit thereof, see William Bishop, Is He Married? Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 259 (1984) (noting that marriage is a signal of desirable qualities, such as stability).
-
(1984)
U. Toronto L.J.
, vol.34
, pp. 245
-
-
Bishop, W.1
-
108
-
-
0043045482
-
Family as a Rational Classification
-
33, 42-43 (noting that members of traditional families generally regulate their behavior to uphold the household's reputation; noting that domestic partnership can be feigned for temporary social benefits and does not implicate the same level of mutual responsibility)
-
David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 15, 33, 42-43 (1996) (noting that members of traditional families generally regulate their behavior to uphold the household's reputation; noting that domestic partnership can be feigned for temporary social benefits and does not implicate the same level of mutual responsibility).
-
(1996)
Wash. U. L. Q.
, vol.74
, pp. 15
-
-
Haddock, D.D.1
Polsby, D.D.2
-
109
-
-
79958132335
-
-
Note
-
See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (protecting housing rights of cohabitants).
-
-
-
-
110
-
-
33745384428
-
Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain
-
1935, Baird and Bernstein have argued that uncertainty in the evaluation of the reorganized corporation is part of the reason for the lack of coherency in absolute-priority criteria
-
Baird and Bernstein have argued that uncertainty in the evaluation of the reorganized corporation is part of the reason for the lack of coherency in absolute-priority criteria. See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1935 (2006).
-
(2006)
Yale L.J.
, vol.115
, pp. 1930
-
-
Baird, D.G.1
Bernstein, D.S.2
-
111
-
-
0346158837
-
On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard
-
For a critical review and analytical discussion
-
For a critical review and analytical discussion, see generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
-
(1996)
Tex. L. Rev
, vol.75
, pp. 237
-
-
Baker, T.1
-
112
-
-
79958136607
-
-
Note
-
The relationship between bankruptcy laws and morally hazardous behavior is relatively straightforward and has been widely recognized in the literature.
-
-
-
-
113
-
-
79958166373
-
Bankruptcy Laws: Basic Economic Principles
-
(Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Ashoka Mody eds) (discussing lending behaviors without due diligence)
-
See, e.g., Joseph E. Stigliz, Bankruptcy Laws: Basic Economic Principles, in RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS (Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Ashoka Mody eds., 2001) (discussing lending behaviors without due diligence).
-
(2001)
Resolution Of Financial Distress
-
-
Stigliz, J.E.1
-
114
-
-
79958116438
-
-
Note
-
We are aware of the cost of legal ambiguity in this context. For example, ambiguity may cause debtors to wait too long before asking for legal relief. The challenge of bankruptcy lawmakers, therefore, is to find the equilibrium between morally hazardous risks and over-deterrence. A possible option is to continue with the general broad standards ex ante but to add to the existing ambiguous system a semi-individualized pre-ruling mechanism ex post that provides executives who run into financial distress the ability to estimate the legal result of bankruptcy versus alternative debt arrangements.
-
-
-
-
115
-
-
24044506048
-
Who Is a Worker?
-
For a comparative discussion of many of the tests used by the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom
-
For a comparative discussion of many of the tests used by the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, see generally Guy Davidov, Who Is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57 (2005).
-
(2005)
Indus. L. J.
, vol.34
, pp. 57
-
-
Davidov, G.1
-
116
-
-
67349187650
-
Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment
-
417-420
-
Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV 351, 417-20 (2002).
-
(2002)
B. C. L. Rev.
, vol.43
, pp. 351
-
-
Befort, S.F.1
-
117
-
-
33646581069
-
Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work
-
162-163
-
See Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. LAB. L. 153, 162-63 (2003).
-
(2003)
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L.
, vol.24
, pp. 153
-
-
Befort, S.F.1
-
118
-
-
79958089677
-
Temporary Employment Business in Germany
-
For a discussion of this issue in Germany, 8
-
For a discussion of this issue in Germany, see Anke Freckmann, Temporary Employment Business in Germany, 15 INT'L CO. & COM. L. REV. 7, 8 (2004). Similar laws can be seen in France and Belgium that have strict ex ante limitations both on the length of time and on the reasons that justify using contractors. Furthermore, in these countries, there is an equal-pay requirement for contractors.
-
(2004)
Int'l Co. & Com. L. Rev.
, vol.15
, pp. 7
-
-
Freckmann, A.1
-
120
-
-
79958109515
-
Labour Law and the Division of Power Between the Federal Level, the Communities and the Regions in Belgium
-
Othmar Vanachter & Martin Vranken eds
-
Othmar Vanachter, Labour Law and the Division of Power Between the Federal Level, the Communities and the Regions in Belgium, in FEDERALISM AND LABOUR AW 21 (Othmar Vanachter & Martin Vranken eds., 2004).
-
(2004)
Federalism and Labour Law
, pp. 21
-
-
Vanachter, O.1
-
121
-
-
79958180358
-
-
Note
-
Indeed, very recently, the National Labor Court in Israel allowed a company to fire a temporary worker after nine months even though there was no other reason behind the layoff.
-
-
-
-
122
-
-
79958093630
-
-
Note
-
See File No. 759-39-10 National Labor Court, Zohar Golan v. O.R.S (Dec. 9, 2010), Padaor (by subscription) (Isr.).
-
-
-
-
123
-
-
0347080020
-
The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law
-
594
-
See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 94 (2001).
-
(2001)
Ucla L. Rev.
, vol.48
, pp. 519
-
-
Stone, K.V.W.1
-
124
-
-
68949167349
-
Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach
-
697
-
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 699 (2009).
-
(2009)
U. Ill. L. Rev.
, vol.2009
, pp. 699
-
-
McCormack, S.W.1
-
125
-
-
77951924974
-
Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance
-
237-40, (describing the types of challenges Commissioners may bring under the economic-substance doctrine)
-
See Davis P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 237-40 (1999) (describing the types of challenges Commissioners may bring under the economic-substance doctrine).
-
(1999)
Tax Law
, vol.52
, pp. 235
-
-
Hariton, D.P.1
-
126
-
-
79958139717
-
-
Note
-
ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998).
-
-
-
-
127
-
-
79958153039
-
-
Note
-
For the purpose of this article, it is unnecessary to figure out the exact relationships between these two inquiries.
-
-
-
-
128
-
-
79958096749
-
-
Note
-
See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (2006).
-
-
-
-
129
-
-
79958165754
-
-
Note
-
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (2006).
-
-
-
-
130
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79958087563
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(Bar Ilan Univ. Pub. Law, Working Paper), (justifying the common practice in the United States of listing prices excluding sales tax rather than listing prices with sales tax included, as such a practice prevents the distorting effect of tax on behavior)
-
See, e.g., Jacob Nussim, Taxes, Prices, and Consumer Protection 3 (Bar Ilan Univ. Pub. Law, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397643 (justifying the common practice in the United States of listing prices excluding sales tax rather than listing prices with sales tax included, as such a practice prevents the distorting effect of tax on behavior).
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(2009)
Taxes, Prices, and Consumer Protection
, pp. 3
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Nussim, J.1
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131
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84928449611
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Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives
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975-976, (arguing that some tax incentives may be more efficient policy tools than direct-expenditure programs)
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See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (1986) (arguing that some tax incentives may be more efficient policy tools than direct-expenditure programs).
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(1986)
Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.64
, pp. 973
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-
Zelinsky, E.A.1
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132
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21344450801
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Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement
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2330-2334, (concluding that the analogy of surrogacy to baby-selling only strengthens the conclusion that surrogacy transactions should be legal)
-
See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2330-34 (1995) (concluding that the analogy of surrogacy to baby-selling "only strengthens the conclusion that surrogacy transactions should be legal").
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(1995)
Va. L. Rev.
, vol.81
, pp. 2305
-
-
Epstein, R.A.1
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133
-
-
84890651737
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The Economics of the Baby Shortage
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324, (advocating a market in babies)
-
Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978) (advocating a market in babies).
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(1978)
J. Legal Stud
, vol.7
, pp. 323
-
-
Landes, E.M.1
Posner, R.A.2
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134
-
-
70350264854
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Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M
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See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007).
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(2007)
Harv. J. L. & Gender
, vol.30
, pp. 67
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Sanger, C.1
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135
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0024276659
-
-
Note
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See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (holding that a full surrogacy agreement is unenforceable).
-
-
-
-
136
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77952002561
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Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification
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117-120, (Summer)
-
Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 117-20 (Summer 2009).
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(2009)
Law & Contemp. Probs.
, vol.72
, pp. 109
-
-
Scott, E.S.1
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137
-
-
79958113947
-
-
Note
-
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1989) (prohibiting surrogacy contracts), invalidated by Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
-
-
-
-
138
-
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79958084233
-
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Note
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IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 2010) (prohibiting enforcement of most surrogacy agreements).
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-
-
-
139
-
-
79958106300
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Note
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LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void).
-
-
-
-
140
-
-
79958139716
-
-
Note
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MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.855-59 (West 2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void and imposing criminal penalties on parties to such contracts).
-
-
-
-
141
-
-
79958153595
-
-
Note
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NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void).
-
-
-
-
142
-
-
79958163465
-
-
Note
-
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (enforcing a gestationalsurrogacy agreement against the gestational-surrogate mother). Yet it is important to note that, unlike the Baby M case that addresses full surrogacy, most of the modern cases have addressed gestational surrogacy.
-
-
-
-
143
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-
79958171229
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The Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making Markets
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For criticism on the distinction between gestational- and traditional-surrogacy contracts in the existing law, see generally
-
For criticism on the distinction between gestational- and traditional-surrogacy contracts in the existing law, see generally Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885 (2009).
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(2009)
Cardozo L. Rev.
, vol.30
, pp. 1885
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Ben-Asher, N.1
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144
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77951983967
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Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the Alleged Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts
-
For a survey on the existing laws in various countries, see Summer
-
For a survey on the existing laws in various countries, see Hugh V. McLachlan & J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the Alleged Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 92-96 (Summer 2009).
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(2009)
Law & Contemp. Probs.
, vol.72
, pp. 92-96
-
-
McLachlan, H.V.1
Kim Swales, J.2
-
145
-
-
28444474071
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What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification
-
Cf. 58-59, (proposing an antiessentialist theory of commodification of parental roles that accounts for multiple meanings)
-
Cf. Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2003) (proposing an "antiessentialist" theory of commodification of parental roles that accounts for "multiple meanings").
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(2003)
N.C. L. Rev.
, vol.82
, pp. 1
-
-
Ertman, M.M.1
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146
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79958111678
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Note
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Apparently, the function of completing the accurate reimbursement fees could have been fulfilled by the courts. Nonetheless, we believe that administrative agencies have greater expertise and are less likely than courts to antagonize the parties by creating unnecessary rivalry between them.
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