Reconsidering judicial preferences

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 16, Issue , 2013, Pages 11-31

  Epstein, Lee ^a   Knight, Jack ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Ideology; Judging; Judicial behavior; Leisure; Motives; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877910053     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-214229     Document Type: Review

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